archive: The Battle of Tololing Ridge
The Battle of Tololing Ridge
General Ashok K Mehta
Rediff on Net
June 25, 1999
Title: The Battle of Tololing Ridge
Author: General Ashok K Mehta
Publication: Rediff on Net
Date: June 25, 1999
The Indian army has seized lodgments on equivalent heights as the
intruders in both Drass and Batalik. But the battle for each post will
be fought separately and resolutely.
The capture of Tololing heights on June 21 culminating in the battle
for Point 5140 is just the beginning of the long haul. Its
capitulation has taken three weeks of gallant fighting and nearly 100
casualties. The elimination of this segment of the intrusion removes
in part, the observed domination and interdiction of the Leh highway.
Tiger Hill, the key to rolling back the most dangerous of the four
pockets of intrusion, is still holding out. It will be the next target
in Drass.
The enemy can still observe some movement on the road from Kaksar and
Tiger Hill which means artillery fire can be brought on the road as
targets are already registered. No direct observation is required for
this. But the Tololing thorn has been taken out for a relatively low
price when compared with similar battles at OP Hill in Rajouri sector
in 1965 or eviction of other intrusions across the LoC. The reason is
now there is no pressure of time on troops. Neither the government nor
the Chief of Army Staff has imposed on field commanders, any time
stipulation for the eviction of intrusions and restoration of the LoC.
The battle of Tololing ridge is a classic re-enactment of first
securing a toe-hold on the ridge before attempting the pinnacle. The
toe-hold becomes a foothold, gets firmed in and creeps towards Point
5140. This initial operation of seizing a lodgment is known as the
firm base for the main assault. This task was achieved by the 13 J&K
Rifles.
The enemy immediately brought down salvo after salvo of mortar and
artillery fire as the Tololing ridge had been registered earlier as a
SOS target. Had the enemy not been forced to withdraw from the ridge
but completely surrounded, the defender would have asked for
Red-over-Red-over-Red fire on its own position. Whether in or out of
the ridge, Tololing had to be plastered. That is one reason why 13 J&K
Rifles suffered heavy casualties taking Tololing.
Point 5140 on the other hand, was captured with relatively few
casualties. It was attacked from three directions: along Tololing
ridge and from the north and west of it along extremely difficult and
precipitous approaches. These attacks were launched by night allowing
maximum time to posture the assault with stealth and cunning. Because
troops were so close to the objective, and it was dark, neither air
strikes nor mortar and artillery fire could be employed. It was a
bayonet assault, from one rock face to another, one ledge to the
other, scampering to the top. When the enemy realised it was being
encircled by two other battalions -- 18 Garhwal Rifles and 1 Naga --
discretion became the better part of valour.
In the rarified atmosphere and minus 10 degree centigrade, wind speeds
of 30 to 40 kms and a wind-chill factor, the Naga-Garhwali and
Kashmiri soldiers would have required the skills of Santosh Yadav and
Tenzing Norgay to rappel to the top. And once on top, to stay there.
When tired and breathless soldiers reach the objective this phase of
battle is the most crucial. Most battles have been lost before they
are won, by the immediate counterattack of the enemy.
Sometimes, the enemy employees a ruse: deliberately vacating the top.
Instead, they form up on the reverse slopes to pounce on the
unsuspecting attacker the moment he reaches the top. The Tololing
battle has shown the experience, wisdom and valour of Indian soldiers.
Once our troops are also on equivalent heights, they have a distinct
advantage. Further, soldiers can be recycled easily with fresh ones,
something the enemy cannot easily do. In Siachen where 15 soldiers are
occupying a post, another 25 are held in reserve below the post. Bana
top, the highest 21,000 feet post in Siachen which India wrested from
Pakistan in 1987, can take a maximum of 9 soldiers. For the last 12
years, Pakistan has launched dozens of assaults but failed to
recapture Bana. The sheer difficulty of scaling the post makes the
attempt a non-starter. The only hope of capturing these posts is if
sentries there are asleep.
No wonder Benazir Bhutto used to first bait General Zia ul Haq and
later Nawaz Sharief for losing Siachen and taunt them with the gift of
burqas.
The Batalik intrusions though contained, are dangerous because these
can turn the southern flank of Siachen through Turtuk. Tiger Hill and
Batalik heights are next to come under the hammer. There is absolutely
no need to press the stopwatch button. After the diplomatic beating of
Pakistan in Cologne, time is on India's side in Kargil.
There is no question of Siachenisation of these intrusions which are
across the LoC. Siachen on the other hand, is a compact defensive
layout but in no man's land. The cost for Pakistan maintaining these
posts in penny pockets between Indian defences in Kargil will be
horrendous if feasible during winter. Once intrusions are vacated
India can close the gaps at a much smaller cost as the army used to in
the past.
It is important the army is not hassled on the issue of when this war
will end or when the LoC will be resolved. It is necessary not to
impose any constraints of time when the soldiers are operating,
especially under conditions of maximum restraint.
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