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archive: America At Full Tilt

America At Full Tilt

Pramit Pal ChaudhurI
The Telegraph
July 8, 1999


    Title: America At Full Tilt
    Author: Pramit Pal ChaudhurI
    Publication: The Telegraph
    Date: July 8, 1999
    
    Anyone surprised by Washington's decision to tilt sharply against
    Pakistan during the Kargil crisis needs to wake up and smell the
    post-Cold War coffee. United States anger with Pakistan proceeds
    logically from its assessment of how best the globe should be managed.
    Looking beyond Kargil, however, one can see embedded in this worldview
    the potential for stronger and deeper Indo-US ties.
    
    It helps to understand what the US, as the sole superpower, wants in
    the world these days. It wants what historically any country or group
    of countries desires when it finds itself numero uno in the world:
    stability. This was true of the United Kingdom and the Concert of
    Europe in the last century. It is true of the US after the Soviet
    Union's demise. When the status quo puts you on top, you do want no
    disturbances.
    
    Bill Clinton's administration has not defied history. His first term
    national security advisor, Anthony Lake, outlined a three part
    doctrine on keeping the world steady: promote democracies, promote
    free trade, stop weapons of mass destruction. Studies showed that
    democracies did not fight each other and that a ticking global economy
    ensured prosperity. Security could be guaranteed by the US military so
    long as too many countries did not develop nuclear, bacteriological
    and chemical arsenals. The US's first priority, Lake said, "is to
    strengthen the core community of market democracies.''
    
    The doctrine has been retouched over the years. The democracy bit was
    finetuned to include opposition to ethnic nationalism a la Slobodan
    Milosevic. The US also built an uneasy working relationship with
    undemocratic China. The odd financial meltdown among the emerging
    markets tempered free market advocacy. However, Lake's troika remains
    largely in place.
    
    To the White House, India - democratic and opening its economy - was
    cut from just the cloth the new world order needed. In 1997, Clinton
    ordered the state department to explore means to expand Indo-US ties.
    New Delhi had other concerns and blew a nuclear hole in these plans.
    Pokhran II clearly ran counter to Lake's third pillar. In Washington's
    eyes, India went from possible hero to possible zero.
    
    The accomplishment of the interminable Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott
    talks was India persuading the US that the tests did not constitute a
    threat to the post-Cold War order. India was not a rogue, it was not
    out to rock the boat, it just wanted to be counted among the big boys.
    The US was further reassured when India outlined a restrained nuclear
    deterrent policy. Atal Behari Vajpayee also inched towards the
    comprehensive test ban treaty and took a bus to Lahore.
    
    The US was generally reassured by India's actions. It was assumed
    Pakistan would follow suit. Instead, Islamabad ignored the nuclear
    tests and stuck to its tradition of pulling risky rabbits from its
    beret. Kargil was the upshot.
    
    However, Pakistan's aggression was so blatant, its strategy so
    foolhardy in a nuclear environment and its incursion so pointless once
    Indian forces had secured the Srinagar-Leh highway, that the world
    community was unanimously disapproving. Though the nonaligned
    countries remained quiet, the West wagged its fingers. The US was
    irate. Pakistan was more than rocking the boat, it was threatening to
    breach the hull with a nuclear explosion.
    
    As the hills came alive with the sound of gunfire, the US position
    against Pakistan hardened. Pakistan claimed India had dropped bombs
    across the line of control. The US said it lied. Pakistan claimed the
    line of control was not demarcated. The US said rubbish. Pakistan
    claimed it had nothing to do with the intruders. The US said nonsense.
    Pakistan tortured Indian soldiers. The US asked for the post mortem.
    Pakistan tried to get support for a ceasefire. The US blocked such
    moves, even consulting China. Finally, the US placed a knife on
    Pakistan's International Monetary Fund jugular.
    
    Washington's reaction was not a matter of whimsy. The writing was on
    the doctrine.
    
    The endgame has begun in Kargil. The issue is where will India and the
    US go from here. There are signs the US may try to pick up the threads
    it had begun weaving before the Pokhran tests. Clinton is ready.
    Talbott said the US president saw "India and the United States -
    fellow democracies with highly developed entrepreneurial economies -
    as natural partners.''
    
    This spring, a state department analyst spoke to two senior Indian
    journalists in Washington. The official said the US no longer sought
    "symmetry'' in its relations with India and Pakistan. Pakistan would
    focus on its internal problems. India, however, would play an
    increasingly important global and regional role. The US would not
    block its international aspirations. Washington wanted its strategic
    dialogue - Talbott said with a "with a capital S and a capital D'' -
    to continue even after the Pokhran detritus was cleared.
    
    Strategic dialogues and partnerships are hallmarks of the new world
    order. Treaty alliances are dead. Such dialogues stress soft issues
    like values, institutions, trade, people to people stuff and frank
    discussions to ensure differences are not allowed to fester because of
    misunderstanding.
    
    Will this worldview in which India fits so neatly survive Clinton's
    departure? Probably yes. The US began tilting against Pakistan when
    George Bush was in power. He imposed Larry Pressler's famous
    amendment. Clinton painted on a canvas first sketched by Bush. The
    continuity is still there: the two main contenders for the US
    presidency both share Clinton's liberal internationalism.
    
    The rival foreign policy school in Washington, the realists, believe
    military power and alliances are the stuff of international relations.
    Democracy and trade are side issues, atom bombs and geopolitics are
    the final arbiters. The realists' attitude towards India ranges from
    neutral to positive. None see India as a threat. Some even see it as a
    counter to China or a regional power the US could ally with.
    
    Most Indians will be suspicious. Cold War memories still linger. It
    helps to recognize that the 1971 tilt against India also derived from
    the then logic of US foreign policy. It was not about personalities
    but interests. It is because the present US tilt against Pakistan is
    derived from a similar, hardnosed calculus that it has the potential
    to serve as the basis for a longterm relationship. Vajpayee had
    declared in New York City last year that India and the US were
    "natural allies.'' Kargil's greatest accomplishment may be its
    clearing the air between the world's oldest and largest democracies.
    



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