archive: What is the political leadership up to?
What is the political leadership up to?
Ayaz Amir
Dawn
Title: What is the political leadership up to?
Author: Ayaz Amir
Publication: Dawn
Date:
OF the situation arising from the flare-up in northern Kashmir nothing
is more dismaying, nay mind-boggling, than the smug attitude of the
political leadership. While the army is in a state of near-war, for
the political leadership it is business as usual: cricket on Saturday
afternoons, politicking in Sindh, the unveiling of more gimmicks, like
the housing scheme, on the home front.
India has conducted itself far better in this emergency. Government,
opposition and the armed forces are one about removing the 'intrusion'
in the Kargil sector. There has been criticism over the intelligence
failure in detecting the freedom fighters; there are no differences
over the objective of flushing them out from their positions. Indian
diplomacy has been more effective and quicker off the mark. Indian
television does not insult the intelligence of its viewers the way PTV
does.
As for public opinion, it is aflame in India and all for teaching
Pakistan a lesson. In Pakistan by contrast there is apathy at the
popular level simply because the government, apart from the tripe on
PTV, has not taken the trouble to mobilize the people. Every Indian
politician worth his or her salt has visited Kashmir and gone near the
Line of Control. It took Nawaz Sharif over a month to make a similar
visit to forward locations on our side of the border. Farooq Leghari,
to his credit, has also been there. But which other politician of
note?
It might have been thought that for an elected leader, heavy mandate
and all, this was the one supreme occasion to speak to the people, if
only to take them into confidence. What have we seen instead? Ghaus
Ali Shah is to be the saviour of Sindh, the Ehtesab Bureau is to
investigate the affairs of the cricket team (or so at least a bemused
nation has been informed), there is endless propaganda about the
housing revolution which is set to take the country by storm, after
the news headlines on PTV there is the same footage every evening
which, to the strains of an Iqbal song, tells us of the prime
minister's abiding love for the poor. This has been the political
leadership's way of preparing the nation mentally for the emergency it
faces.
To be sure, PTV has been the one great instrument of governmental
direction. But, as always, so shallow and pathetic has been the drivel
from it that even standing its higher bosses against a wall is
inadequate punishment for their appalling ineffectiveness. The ISPR
and its spokesman, it must be conceded, have done a better job of
putting the national viewpoint across but then against collective
disarray and the rooted idiocy of a fossilized propaganda machine,
what can a slim institution do?
How convenient the labels 'freedom fighters' or 'Kashmiri Mujahideen'.
They enable us and the political leadership to believe that Kargil is
a distant affair and that since, in any case, we cannot afford to
proclaim our involvement, it is strategy of the highest order not to
get too emotional about this affair. Nawaz Sharif certainly seems cool
and collected about it. No let-up on the dazzling shots to the
boundary at the Bagh-I-Jinnah. No beads of sweat or marks of tension
on a forehead known to be receptive to the first signs of stress. Is
Kargil indeed on a different planet?
This is not to say there is no enthusiasm at home for the success of
our arms in Kashmir. Threatening India's life-line to Leh, Siachen and
Ladakh has been the dream of Pakistan's fighting commanders. If it has
finally happened there is bound to be excitement and even a heady
feeling induced by the predicament in which the Indian army has been
placed. But tragically for Pakistan this feeling is confined to two
pockets: the rank and file of the army, which think that a major
tactical victory has been won, and the Mujahideen groups which have
been involved in the Kashmir uprising since 1989.
This public aloofness is intriguing. Even during the disaster of 1971,
when retrieving the last shreds of national pride from the maelstrom
of humiliation had become a problem, there was greater popular backing
for the war effort. A disaster there was but the nation as a whole
(minus the people of East Pakistan of course) was in it together. This
time - when through no small expenditure of blood and resources a
limited military advantage of some strategic significance has been
gained - the nation is apathetic or it is keeping its enthusiasm
well-concealed. Our soldiers are on their own.
Who is to blame for this state of affairs? Did the political
leadership not know of the Kargil operation? Did it not give its
approval to it? While it is entirely conceivable, given the Caesars
that we have, that all the implications and ramifications of this
operation may not have fully struck the prime minister (or, for that
matter, the military command which appears to have confused tactics
and grand strategy) whose fault is that? Why should Pakistan's
fighting men have to carry - as much in 1999 as in 1971 and 1965 - the
burden of leadership failure?
Since the policy was jointly approved, what accounts for the confusing
signals that are emanating from Islamabad? While fighting rages in the
north, peace overtures are being made which appear not to take into
account the successes gained on the battlefield. Former foreign
secretary Niaz Naik who went as Nawaz Sharif's emissary to India has
hinted at the possibility of a deal and said senior military officials
may meet soon to prepare a schedule for withdrawing the 'freedom
fighters' from the positions they occupy.
If this is indeed the case, what is Pakistan demanding in return? Will
India forswear bilateralism and agree to discussions on the future of
Kashmir involving the UN? If not, what will Pakistan get for the
valour of its soldiers? If it is seen that it does not get a great
deal, that an agreement for withdrawal is being brokered under
American pressure, how will our soldiers and officers react? Will they
not have reason to feel betrayed by their political and military
leadership?
There is little point in saying at this stage that the Kargil
operation was flawed. That it was ill-conceived, with its political
objectives not clearly thought through, seems to be pretty clear. But
then the responsibility for this rests on the shoulders of the
political and military leadership. In any event, we ventured forth and
along the way precious lives have been lost. These sacrifices should
not be in vain.
It is important therefore for Pakistan to salvage something from the
Kargil situation. A verbal concession on Kashmir if no more, an avowal
by India to discuss the problem more meaningfully than it has hitherto
done, is the minimum that Pakistan should demand of the international
community if the Kargil and Drass peaks have to be evacuated. Or else
a profound sense of disenchantment will take hold in the armed forces.
Not the least of the ironies of the Kargil venture is that going ahead
with it is as full of hazard as winding it down abruptly. If the first
course can invite a wider conflict, a sudden withdrawal will
demoralize the army, set back the Kashmiri freedom struggle by many
years and raise the sanctity of the Line of Control which is anathema
for Pakistan because it makes nonsense of its stand on the Kashmir
dispute. And there will be no repeating the Kargil venture because the
Indian army henceforth will be on its guard. In other words, this will
have been a glorious feat of arms with nothing to show for the valour
of our soldiers.
So Pakistan needs to keep its nerve if it is not to be panicked into a
bad agreement. This requires forceful and steady leadership. Herein
lies the rub for if we have not seen much of leadership during the
last two months, by what magic wand will we suddenly get it at this
juncture?
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