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archive: Victory in reverse: the great climbdown

Victory in reverse: the great climbdown

Ayaz Amir
Dawn, Karachi
July 9, 1999


    Title: Victory in reverse: the great climbdown 
    Author: Ayaz Amir 
    Publication: Dawn, Karachi
    Date: July 9, 1999 
    
    THAT the Kargil adventure was ill-conceived, if not downright foolish,
    was becoming clear, albeit slowly, even to the congenitally blind and
    benighted. 
    
    That consequently Pakistan, swallowing its pride and not a few of its
    brave and gallant words, would sooner or later have to mount a retreat
    was also becoming clear, especially after Niaz Naik's secret visit to
    New Delhi which was a desperate bid to get India to agree to some kind
    of a deal which would provide a face-saving way out for us. 
    
    But that the climbdown when it came would be so headlong and
    ill-judged, and that in the process it would leave in tatters the last
    shreds of national pride, should take even prophets of doom by
    surprise. A script written by a college of cynics could not have
    equalled, let alone excelled, the singular performance of the Heavy
    Mandate in Washington. 
    
    It is not a question of interpreting the hidden meaning of the
    Washington statement. This statement is a model of clarity which nails
    Pakistan's humiliation to the mast and leaves nothing to the
    imagination. If it is still being proclaimed as a great step forward
    to resolve the Kashmir dispute, it only confirms the view that in
    Pakistan brazenness is always the last resource of a floundering
    government. 
    
    To repeat the first point, at issue is not Pakistan's retreat. Given
    the nature of the Kargil adventure, the fact that in planning it the
    army high command substituted fantasy for a sense of reality, Pakistan
    had no option but to effect a roll-back eventually, whatever armchair
    Rommels might say to the contrary. As a feint aimed at embarrassing
    the Indian army, the Kargil operation could have made some sense. As
    an attempt at permanently occupying the Kargil heights it was madness
    if only because no country, whether India or Pakistan, would tolerate
    such a naked trespass into territory under its control. At issue is
    the manner of our retreat as agreed to by our great helmsman. 
    
    Even when it finally dawned upon Pakistan's Bismarcks and Napoleons
    that the Kargil intrusion was a blunder, there was no reason to panic.
    Pakistan still had options before it which, if sensibly exercised,
    could have brought about a withdrawal with a minimum loss of national
    dignity. We could have settled matters with India and told it that a
    mistake had been made which we were willing to undo provided (1) there
    was a scaling down of hostilities along the Line of Control and (2)
    that India did not make it a point to crow about our discomfiture.
    This would have been far preferable to the course actually adopted. 
    
    But this would have required a measure of statesmanship, a quality of
    which there has been not the slightest evidence in Islamabad since
    this crisis erupted. So Pakistan's war leadership did what flowed
    naturally from its basic instincts: go cap-in-hand to Washington and
    agree to an extraordinary statement which commits us to undo our
    Kargil folly. 
    
    A pathetic sop sweetens this mini-Munich: a pledge from the American
    president that once concrete steps have been taken to restore the Line
    of Control - that is, once we have undone our folly - he will take "a
    personal interest" in encouraging India and Pakistan to resume
    bilateral discussions. Only a leadership with no idea of national
    pride and dignity can suppose that an empty pledge such as this is
    sufficient recompense for the blood of our martyrs. 
    
    A more complete negation of Pakistan's stand, and a more complete
    vindication of India's position, is hard to envisage. Yet official
    drum-beaters and Pakistan Television, that weary performer forced to
    dance to every government's tune, are trying to sell the agreement
    sealed at Blair House, Washington, as the greatest diplomatic triumph
    since the Congress of Vienna. 
    
    The people of Pakistan are not surprised. They are stunned because
    this is not what they had been led to expect. The two surprised
    parties must be Clinton and Vajpayee. When Nawaz Sharif telephoned
    Clinton and requested an urgent meeting, the American president, who
    is no one's fool, must have realized in a flash that it was all up for
    the Pakistanis. But is it far-fetched to suppose that even he must
    have been taken aback by the eager enthusiasm of the Pakistani
    leadership to cave in and put its signature to a one-sided document. 
    
    By the same token, Vajpayee too must have been taken by surprise. The
    Indian army, despite the successes it has scored, was not having an
    easy time of it in Kargil and Drass. Dangerous terrain, an elusive
    enemy and heavy casualties are not things an army likes. Imagine then
    the sense of relief in New Delhi when Clinton called to say that the
    Pakistani leadership was about to execute a volte face and all it
    demanded in return was that he (Clinton) should give this turnaround
    his blessing. A bang turning to a whimper: to this time-worn phrase a
    fresh meaning has been given. 
    
    The Tashkent and Simla accords look like victory parchments by
    comparison. Ayub Khan did not suffer humiliation at Tashkent. Even if
    the Tashkent agreement went down badly in Pakistan because official
    propaganda, always a curse in this country, had raised popular
    expectations to fever pitch, it was a fair agreement between two
    countries which had fought each other to a standstill. At Simla on the
    other hand, Pakistan was at a grave disadvantage because it had
    suffered a humiliating defeat at India's hands. Yet even in the shadow
    of that disaster Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to his enduring credit, managed
    to preserve what remained of Pakistan's honour. The Washington
    statement defies understanding. For such submission wherein lay the
    compelling necessity? 
    
    Why has this happened? The answer is simple. Pakistan has suffered a
    failure of leadership, a failure of vision and, most important of all,
    a failure of nerve. When the crunch came the politico-military
    leadership could not take the heat. 
    
    Will explanations be demanded for this shambles? It is safe to say no
    because post-mortems of this kind are not in the Pakistani tradition.
    The government's spin machine will go into over-drive, as it has
    already, in a bid to paint the Washington capitulation as a Roman
    triumph. The Bismarcks will cover for the Napoleons and the Napoleons
    for the Bismarcks. 
    
    To be sure, Pakistan's fighting men will feel betrayed. The Kashmir
    cause itself has received a mortal blow. But then who cares. Greater
    disasters in our history have gone unsung. The humiliation of Kargil
    too (or is it the humiliation of Washington?) will soon be forgotten. 
    
    Even so, is there nothing to be done? To begin with, all the models of
    the Shaheen and Ghauri missiles, and all the replicas of the Chaghi
    hills, which adorn our various cities, should be put on board the best
    of our naval cruisers and, in a solemn midnight ceremony, dumped far
    out into the waters of the Arabian Sea. If this crisis has proved
    anything, it is that the possession of nuclear weapons does not confer
    immunity from the taking of stupid decisions. 
    
    Furthermore, the prime minister and the army chief, if they can help
    themselves, should not say anything for a while: no explanations, no
    brave statements. The people of Pakistan can do without salt being
    poured over their wounds.
    



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