archive: A retreat it is
A retreat it is
Inder Malhotra
The Observer
July 14, 1999
Title: A retreat it is
Author: Inder Malhotra
Publication: The Observer
Date: July 14, 1999
On Sunday afternoon, when the Chief Election Commissioner announced
the precise timetable of the elections, it was clear enough that the
end of the Kargil war was nigh. Only a few hours later the whole
thing was official. The Indian Army and Air Force, which have fought
so valiantly and had already succeeded in evicting the Pakistani
soldiers and their mercenary jehadist adjunct from Batalik and Kargil,
could see the invaders turning tail and returning to the Pakistani
side of the Line of Control (LoC). More significant and eloquent was
the press briefing in Islamabad of the Pakistani foreign minister,
Sartaj Aziz, who formally announced the withdrawal of the Pakistani
forces though he never used the W-word. He used instead the charming
euphemism 'de-escalation' and 'disengagement'.
However, Aziz would not have been himself had he contended himself
with fudging the Pakistani withdrawal and maintaining the absurd and
demonstrably false claim that the marauders returning from Kargil are
'freedom fighters' and that the Pakistani army has never been involved
in the defeated and discredited misadventure.
The pertinent point in this 'context is that Nawaz Sharif's decision,
in the face of sharp and widespread opposition and criticism within
his country and even within the ruling establishment, to cut his
losses, eat the tumble pie and withdraw from the strategic peaks in
the Kargil region, is the outcome of an agreement between Pakistan and
the United States, not between India and Pakistan.
Sharif had his compulsions to make the desperate dash to Washington.
But after he had signed a joint statement with the US President, he
had no option but to abide by the document.
For, Clinton's prestige was at stake. He was not going to bomb
Pakistan a la Yugoslavia if Sharif had reneged on his word. But there
was no way Bill was going to allow Nawaz to destroy the US President's
credibility as the globe's supercop.
Since then, America's anxiety to both prevent a nuclear-armed Pakistan
from behaving irresponsibly and save a nearly bankrupt Pakistan from
total collapse has increased considerably. This is so because of
fresh facts that have come to light about Islamabad's potential for
nuclear proliferation.
The detention of the North Korean ship carrying missile spare parts
and components to Pakistan - presumably in return for transfer of
nuclear technology rather than cash - and the visit to top secret
Pakistani nuclear installations by Saudi Arabia's powerful defence
minister speak for them-selves.
What accentuates American concern over the 'Saudi connections' with
the Pakistani nuclear programme (despite the close and historic ties
between Washington and Riyadh) is that the Americans have failed to
secure any 'plausible explanation' from either Pakistan or Saudi
Arabia.
At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that Prince Sultan bin Abdul
Aziz, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the US, has personally gone out his
way to help Sharif extricate himself from the Pakistani folly in
Kargil. The prince, whose influence in inter-national affairs must
never be underestimated, lent the Pakistani Prime Minister his
personal aircraft and accompanied him to London and Riyadh.
Viewed against the backdrop of these complex dialectics, it is
reasonable to assume that the process of the Pakistani withdrawals
will be completed. Whether this happens within a week, as New Delhi
expects, or in two weeks, as Aziz had indicated, remains to be seen.
What is reasonably certain is that the process will be accompanied by
wild Pakistani rhetoric, strenuously claiming victory, and even some
tantrums. But that would make no difference to reality.
The wide world knows what had happened. People in Pakistan know it
too. The widely circulated article of Ayas Amir in Dawn superbly
arguing that the Clinton-Sharif statement 'nails Pakistan's
humiliation to the past', is firmly representative of the informed
Pakistani thinking.
>From the past and the present, attention must now turn to the future.
Where are we likely to go from here? Purely from the point of view of
India-Pakistan relations in the post-Kargil period, two things are
crystal clear.
First, although Pakistan has made a great song and dance about the
resumption of the Lahore process to solve all issues, including
Kashmir, and Clinton's commitment to take a 'personal interest' in
accelerating this process, both Islamabad and Washington know that the
Lahore process cannot be resumed until after the Lok Sabha elections
in this country.
Moreover, any Pakistani illusion that the Indo-Pakistan dialogue,
started after October, would revive the atmosphere prevailing at the
time of the bus ride to Lahore would be quickly shown to be a
delusion.
Secondly, and here again we are faced with a dialectical situation,
there is need for the dialogue to be resumed as early as possible.
Having ourselves welcomed, at times excessively, the 'international
community's condemnation of the Pakistani violation of the LoC', we
will have to be mindful of the same community's insistence on
'substantive and speedy' discussions on the wider Kashmir issue. The
challenge to Indian diplomacy will be to see to it that Clinton's
personal interest does not turn into intervention or meddling, and
that this interest is used to our advantage. This is going to be
extremely tough.
However, before the next round of Indo-Pakistan dialogue can take
place, the Kargil episode might have had a powerful impact on the
internal politics of both Pakistan and India.
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