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What, Not Who, of Kargil

What, Not Who, of Kargil

Jyotirmaya Sharma
The Times of India
January 8, 2000
Title: What, Not Who, of Kargil
Author: Jyotirmaya Sharma
Publication: The Times of India
Date: January 8, 2000

After the Kargil crisis the government set up a committee on July 29, 1999 to go into the causes that led to yet another war with Pakistan. The committee comprising of Mr B G Vergese, Lt-Gen (retd.) K K Hazari and Mr. Satish Chandra has now submitted its report to the government and has done so in record time. Mr K Subrahmanyam, chairman of the committee, spoke to Jyotirmaya Sharma about what went into the making of the Kargil Review Committee report.

Q. Now that the Kargil Review Committee has submitted its report to the Prime Minister, what are your main conclusions?
A. Till the report is released by the government, I am not in a position to disclose the contents. But I shall be happy to talk about the drawing up of the report.

Q. What can you say about the report? There was criticism that the Kargil Review Committee was not constituted under the Commission of Enquiries Act and therefore it did not have powers to summon witnesses. It was also said that it did not have access to classified documents.
A. I am happy to report that the committee had no difficulty in meeting people it wanted to have interaction with - government servants and people outside the government. The committee met the former president Venkataraman, the present prime minister, former prime ministers V P Singh, Narasimha Rao, and I K Gujral, the present home, external affairs and defence ministers. Also, the cabinet secretary, national security adviser, foreign secretary, home secretary, defence secretary, chiefs of staff, chiefs of external and internal intelligence, the governor and the chief minister, chief secretary and home secretary of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, DG, BSF, Northern and Southern army commanders, 15 & 16th Corps commanders, divisional commanders, brigade commanders, down to battalion commanders who fought the war. In all, the committee met 92 persons. I cannot think of anyone whom we should have met who declined to meet us. There were only three exceptions. Mr Chandrasekhar felt he had nothing to contribute, Mr Deve Gowda could not spare the time. Mr R K Mishra of the Observer publications felt he could not meet the committee because of the present situation in Pakistan.

As regards documentation, the cabinet secretary had instructed all departments to allow full access to the committee of all information of the highest possible classification. The committee obtained and perused over 9,000 documents including all classifications of top secret. In a sense, the experience of the Kargil Review Committee was unprecedented in this country's history.

Q. Were the people you interacted with forthcoming?
A. Absolutely. In fact, all our questions were frankly and candidly answered. We have compiled two volumes of record of discussions. When they are released, you will find the committee has carried out security deletions of the information given by those who interacted with the committee since some of the information given to us was too sensitive to be shared with the public. The record of these discussions will speak for itself.

Q. There was criticism that both you and Mr Verghese were members of the National Security Advisory Board and therefore there was a conflict of interest in your being members of the committee.
A. This criticism arose out of a mistaken impression about the National Security Advisory Board. The Board is an advisory body and the members have no other responsibility except what was given to them in their advisory capacity. Obey were given two tasks - to formulate a nuclear doctrine and to prepare a Strategic Defence Review. They were not involved with the country's current security policy or security management and they were not provided any information on a day-to-day basis about policy and management. Therefore, there was no conflict of interest. Unfortunately, there is a lot of misinformation and disinformation in this country. Someone wrote about a National Security Commission wasting its time on nuclear doctrine instead of preparing the country against hijacking. Everyone who cares to know should be aware that the 27 members of the National Security Advisory Board are in different jobs and vocations outside the government. They are performing a public service by sparing their time and do not owe any obligation to the government.

Q. Could you describe the working of the committee?
A. The committee was constituted for three months. It asked for an extension of six weeks since it could not interact with some of the key actors within this period because of the elections and the subsequent exercise in government formation. It finished its work within that period. Perhaps this will be one of the committees to have produced a report in the shortest period of time. The report runs into over 2,200 pages. We held 200 meetings, met over 350 people, including 92 persons with whom we had recorded discussions. The report runs into 17 volumes including the main report, the executive summary, annexures and appendices, which run into 14 volumes.

Q. How do you account for the committee's ability to carry out its task without being empowered under the Commission of Enquiry Act?
A. The Committee approached its task in a spirit of openness and transparency. A judicial commission would have resorted to an inquisitorial procedure. A judge would have needed a lot of background and knowledge. Many witnesses appearing before such a commission would have been unduly defensive. In our case, we were reviewing the events and developments to establish the factual position that led to the Kargil crisis. Therefore, everyone who interacted with the committee was also interested in finding out what went wrong. We believe we have been able to establish what went wrong. We did not undertake the exercise to find out who went wrong. That would have been a different kind of exercise. Had one started by going into the question of who went wrong rather than what went wrong, it would have been a witch-hunt. We believe we have attempted to establish what went wrong. Because of that approach, we were able to obtain co-operation from everybody we interacted with.

Q. Is the enquiry focussed specifically on Kargil or is its scope broader?
A. We were mandated to review all events leading up to Kargil. Therefore, we have gone into all developments since the Shimla Pact which established the present line of control. We have taken into account nuclear developments and the proxy war, and that takes us back into the 80s. We have, however, focused more on the events of the last three years.

Q. Do you think this report will be published by the government?
A. I cannot speak for the government. However the indications are positive. If the government was not thinking of publishing the report, there was no need for the prime minister to receive the report in public before TV cameras. Having put its credibility at stake, it is in the government's interest to publish it and share with the country the knowledge of what went wrong and how these defects are to be remedied.
 



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