Title: What, Not Who,
of Kargil
Author: Jyotirmaya Sharma
Publication: The Times
of India
Date: January 8, 2000
After the Kargil crisis
the government set up a committee on July 29, 1999 to go into the causes
that led to yet another war with Pakistan. The committee comprising of
Mr B G Vergese, Lt-Gen (retd.) K K Hazari and Mr. Satish Chandra has now
submitted its report to the government and has done so in record time.
Mr K Subrahmanyam, chairman of the committee, spoke to Jyotirmaya Sharma
about what went into the making of the Kargil Review Committee report.
Q. Now that the Kargil
Review Committee has submitted its report to the Prime Minister, what are
your main conclusions?
A. Till the report is
released by the government, I am not in a position to disclose the contents.
But I shall be happy to talk about the drawing up of the report.
Q. What can you say about
the report? There was criticism that the Kargil Review Committee was not
constituted under the Commission of Enquiries Act and therefore it did
not have powers to summon witnesses. It was also said that it did not have
access to classified documents.
A. I am happy to report
that the committee had no difficulty in meeting people it wanted to have
interaction with - government servants and people outside the government.
The committee met the former president Venkataraman, the present prime
minister, former prime ministers V P Singh, Narasimha Rao, and I K Gujral,
the present home, external affairs and defence ministers. Also, the cabinet
secretary, national security adviser, foreign secretary, home secretary,
defence secretary, chiefs of staff, chiefs of external and internal intelligence,
the governor and the chief minister, chief secretary and home secretary
of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, DG, BSF, Northern and Southern army
commanders, 15 & 16th Corps commanders, divisional commanders, brigade
commanders, down to battalion commanders who fought the war. In all, the
committee met 92 persons. I cannot think of anyone whom we should have
met who declined to meet us. There were only three exceptions. Mr Chandrasekhar
felt he had nothing to contribute, Mr Deve Gowda could not spare the time.
Mr R K Mishra of the Observer publications felt he could not meet the committee
because of the present situation in Pakistan.
As regards documentation,
the cabinet secretary had instructed all departments to allow full access
to the committee of all information of the highest possible classification.
The committee obtained and perused over 9,000 documents including all classifications
of top secret. In a sense, the experience of the Kargil Review Committee
was unprecedented in this country's history.
Q. Were the people you
interacted with forthcoming?
A. Absolutely. In fact,
all our questions were frankly and candidly answered. We have compiled
two volumes of record of discussions. When they are released, you will
find the committee has carried out security deletions of the information
given by those who interacted with the committee since some of the information
given to us was too sensitive to be shared with the public. The record
of these discussions will speak for itself.
Q. There was criticism
that both you and Mr Verghese were members of the National Security Advisory
Board and therefore there was a conflict of interest in your being members
of the committee.
A. This criticism arose
out of a mistaken impression about the National Security Advisory Board.
The Board is an advisory body and the members have no other responsibility
except what was given to them in their advisory capacity. Obey were given
two tasks - to formulate a nuclear doctrine and to prepare a Strategic
Defence Review. They were not involved with the country's current security
policy or security management and they were not provided any information
on a day-to-day basis about policy and management. Therefore, there was
no conflict of interest. Unfortunately, there is a lot of misinformation
and disinformation in this country. Someone wrote about a National Security
Commission wasting its time on nuclear doctrine instead of preparing the
country against hijacking. Everyone who cares to know should be aware that
the 27 members of the National Security Advisory Board are in different
jobs and vocations outside the government. They are performing a public
service by sparing their time and do not owe any obligation to the government.
Q. Could you describe
the working of the committee?
A. The committee was
constituted for three months. It asked for an extension of six weeks since
it could not interact with some of the key actors within this period because
of the elections and the subsequent exercise in government formation. It
finished its work within that period. Perhaps this will be one of the committees
to have produced a report in the shortest period of time. The report runs
into over 2,200 pages. We held 200 meetings, met over 350 people, including
92 persons with whom we had recorded discussions. The report runs into
17 volumes including the main report, the executive summary, annexures
and appendices, which run into 14 volumes.
Q. How do you account
for the committee's ability to carry out its task without being empowered
under the Commission of Enquiry Act?
A. The Committee approached
its task in a spirit of openness and transparency. A judicial commission
would have resorted to an inquisitorial procedure. A judge would have needed
a lot of background and knowledge. Many witnesses appearing before such
a commission would have been unduly defensive. In our case, we were reviewing
the events and developments to establish the factual position that led
to the Kargil crisis. Therefore, everyone who interacted with the committee
was also interested in finding out what went wrong. We believe we have
been able to establish what went wrong. We did not undertake the exercise
to find out who went wrong. That would have been a different kind of exercise.
Had one started by going into the question of who went wrong rather than
what went wrong, it would have been a witch-hunt. We believe we have attempted
to establish what went wrong. Because of that approach, we were able to
obtain co-operation from everybody we interacted with.
Q. Is the enquiry focussed
specifically on Kargil or is its scope broader?
A. We were mandated
to review all events leading up to Kargil. Therefore, we have gone into
all developments since the Shimla Pact which established the present line
of control. We have taken into account nuclear developments and the proxy
war, and that takes us back into the 80s. We have, however, focused more
on the events of the last three years.
Q. Do you think this
report will be published by the government?
A. I cannot speak for
the government. However the indications are positive. If the government
was not thinking of publishing the report, there was no need for the prime
minister to receive the report in public before TV cameras. Having put
its credibility at stake, it is in the government's interest to publish
it and share with the country the knowledge of what went wrong and how
these defects are to be remedied.