Title: Abundant caution,
but not abundant enough
Author:
Publication: The Indian
Express
Date: January 16 &
17, 2000
Quattrocchi was the representative
of Snamprogetti in India. He had no locus standi here in the deal. Snamprogetti
was not a party to this deal. Its corporate status is much larger than
Bofors. Quattrocchi was independent of Snamprogetti in whatever he did
with respect to Bofors. He was a very close friend of Rajiv Gandhi. They
knew each other's families. Their children were also friends. Before their
wedding, I think Sonia's parents stayed in Quattrocchi's house...
Neither did Rajiv Gandhi
ever instruct me nor did I ever instruct Defence Secretary (S.K. Bhatnagar)
to rate Bofors as number one or number two, or choose Bofors at all...
As far as I was concerned, it made no difference to me... because I was
determined that we should buy the cheaper of the two. At the airport, before
my departure for Bhutan, the Defence Secretary had informed me that Bofors
was ready to offer 10 guns free and therefore, their quoted price was cheaper
than that of Sofma.
The Defence Secretary
also told me in clear terms that the French were not coming down any further...
He gave me a definite impression that Bofors was the cheapest and therefore
I approved of going ahead...
As a matter of abundant
caution, which apparently was not abundant enough, I had also instructed
him much earlier to inform the Swedish that they would have to certify
that no payment could be made to any agent... Martin Ardbo, President of
Bofors, had confirmed through a letter to the Secretary, PMO, that they
did not have any representative or agent especially employed in India for
this purpose.
In this context, I would
like to make it very clear that the decision conveyed by the PM to me and
that conveyed by me to the Defence Secretary was that there should not
be any middlemen. I wonder how the Defence Secretary had restricted the
scope of `middlemen' to Indian agents. The term `Indian agents' which is
reflected in the correspondence is definitely not my creation and appears
to be that of the Defence Secretary. At that time, I did not appreciate
the complication of using the word `Indian' in this context.
I take responsibility
for the word `Indian agent' in the letter of Bofors. It was for me to see
this and get this word deleted. However, I did not take cognizance of the
element of mischief in this word. Now, I feel cheated that instead of putting
the precise term of `middlemen', the word used was only `Indian agents'.
Now I realise the fundamental blunder... The Defence Secretary did not
have the final word. Whosoever was knowingly using this word is liable
as it is virtually condoning a criminal act. At that point of time, I was
not aware that I was being taken for a ride.
However, I would like
to make it clear that Bofors have violated the contract even if they had
mentioned the word `Indian agents' in their reply to us, (saying) that
they did not have any Indian agents. They have paid Win Chadda, an Indian,
as your records and documents now show. Therefore, this amounts to violating
the contract with India, and Bofors is liable.
The contract was then
concluded with AB Bofors and I was of the view that it was successful because
the closing price at which it was concluded was Rs 300 crore less than
the starting offer.
The Defence Secretary
has quoted me on March 22, 1986, that I had given my blessings to the Bofors
contract. He misquoted me in the sense that... I did not give `blessings',
I gave instructions.
I remember that on April
16 (1987) I was called to 7, Race Course Road and informed by the PM that
Swedish Radio had made a broadcast indicating that kickbacks had been paid
to senior public functionaries in relation to the Bofors contract. I must
confess that I was absolutely amazed... The PM indicated that the MoD should
prepare itself to deal with all queries related to this allegation, including
queries arising in Parliament.
Some days later a Cabinet
meeting was held at 7, Race Course Road and I was asked to attend. The
Cabinet was informed that I would brief the meeting. P. Shiv Shankar, Law
Minister, who was sitting beside me, informed me that K.C. Pant had been
appointed Defence Minister and on his arrival from North Korea, he would
be sworn in.
Between that date and
June 1987, various meetings were held in the MoD, PMO and 7, Race Course
Road connected with this subject. I was not present in all the meetings,
but I did attend one or two with the PM. In my last meeting with the PM
on June 4, I had informed him that it was my intention to make every effort
possible to obtain the names of the recipients, if any, from AB Bofors.
To the best of my recollection, he neither approved nor disapproved this
course of action. I then instructed the Defence Secretary to take three
specific steps: First, to contact Bofors at once and inform them that we
wish to know the names of all the recipients. Second, to obtain legal advice
from senior law officer (Attorney General) in relation to the cancellation
of the contract. Third, to contact the Army Chief and get his comments
on the security implications with respect to the cancellation of the contract.
He informed me that he
would be using two officers of the Ministry, N.N. Vohra, the then Additional
Secretary, and Shri Banerjee JS(O) for this task.On July 3, 1987 the Defence
Secretary informed me that he would like to have a meeting wherein N.N.
Vohra would brief me on what had been happening. By that time the Attorney
General, K. Parasaran, had opined that the contract could be cancelled
with no serious adverse financial implications. N.N. Vohra had met the
Vice President of AB Bofors in Delhi, who informed him that given the seriousness
with which the GOI viewed the matter, the President of Bofors was prepared
to come to India to continue discussions with the MoD and give the names
of the recipients.
At that point of time,
the PM was away on tour to Moscow. I instructed the Defence Secretary to
contact the then Cabinet Secretary, B.G. Deshmukh, and request a meeting
of the Cabinet Committee of Political Affairs (CCPA) to discuss this issue
when the PM arrived.
In the meantime, the
Defence Secretary had also informed me that General Sundarji had furnished
his opinion... that there was no serious implication to the country in
cancelling the contract, as informed by Sundarji.
I was informed that the
CCPA's meeting had been fixed for July 4, 1987, and that I should be present
along with the Defence Secretary and any other official, if required. I
instructed the Defence Secretary to ensure that Vohra was present at the
meeting.
The CCPA meeting was
held on July 4 at 7, Race Course Road. I requested the PM's approval for
N.N. Vohra to brief the CCPA. Vohra did brief the CCPA and distributed
copies of Parasaran's comments. The meetings were attended by Buta Singh,
N.D. Tiwari, P. Shiv Shankar and probably P.V. Narasimha Rao.
Some of the members present,
like Buta Singh, were very vocal and questioned the propriety of taking
a decision to summon the Bofors chief. It is possible they were acting
in such a fashion based on the mood of the PM. Immediately, the PM also
expressed his anger and displeasure at Vohra and demanded to know on what
basis and whose authority he had initiated this discussion with AB Bofors.
To the best of my recollection, I told the PM that Vohra was acting under
my instructions.
Some of the members of
CCPA present felt that this action was unwarranted because a JPC had already
been decided upon. However, I had a strong view and continue to have the
same view that in matters like this, the Executive should get the information
and then submit it to the Parliamentary Committee. Apparently, there was
a difference of view between me and these members of the CCPA. The PM apparently
agreed with his fellow members of the CCPA. The meeting concluded with
the instructions that a future investigation in this matter would be under
the JPC and the MoD should co-operate fully with it. Instructions were
issued to inform the President of Bofors not to come until summoned by
the JPC and the MoD was not to act on the recommendation of Parasaran.
Vohra was asked to ensure that the Bofors team, which was to start on July
4, should be stopped forthwith from coming to India...
Eight to ten days after
this meeting the Defence Secretary informed that he had received a long
and detailed communication from the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister,
Serla Grewal, asking why the MoD had not complied with the PM's earlier
directions to furnish its views in relation to the implications for security
and financial matters in the event of the cancellation of the contract.
I was outraged at this note from the PPS to the PM because to the best
of my knowledge I had complied with this instruction. I do not know- whether
the PPS did not know or whether she was misinformed. In such circumstances,
she should have got in touch with the Defence Secretary and enquired first
before sending the note. Therefore, I submitted my resignation.
I did not discuss my
intention to resign with anyone. I think it is a non-negotiable thing.
On two to three occasions between July 20, 1987 and June 1988, I had the
chance to speak in Parliament on Bofors. I remember saying that there is
no such thing as `Winding Up Charges' in contract law and that I had recommended
that the contract may be cancelled if Bofors did not disclose the names
of the recipients of bribes. The Congress was very offended when I said
in my last speech in the House that the JPC was a joke because I was present
when the deal with Bofors was concluded, and yet I was never called before
it.
I remember having had
two meetings in 1986-87. One was with Johan Adberg who represented the
Swedish Government. He had come here for some foreign trade (issue). There
is a record of his presence in the MEA. Generally, I never met any representative
of companies, but I did meet this gentleman, as he was representing his
government. I told him that there must be no middlemen in this contract
and thatthe cheapest gun would be preferred.
Subsequently, in January
1986, I met a man called Bianco, who was the Secretary of State to French
President Mitterand, who had come to India and called on me in relation
to the deal. I told him what I had told Adberg.The Army had carried out
detailed tests and evaluation and come up with the choice of two guns,
of which the government had to decide on one. I was of the view, and continue
to be of the view even now, that both guns are equally good. Any controversy
related to the quality of the gun is based on subjective choice.
The LOI was issued with
my permission. I have seen the note of A.V. Singh JS(O) forwarded by the
Defence Secretary. I have also approved the same on March 13, 1986. On
being asked about the haste with which the LOI had been signed by so many
functionaries, prima facie, I would say it is a `High Speed Decision' which
is very, very unusual. I am unable to comment on the rationale for such
high speed. It is abnormal.
Did Rajiv Gandhi meet
theSwedish PM and give a commitment that we would buy the Bofors gun? I
was not informed about this meeting, nor do I know about any such decision.
In hindsight, considering that the LOI was issued immediately thereafter,
I can visualise two possibilities. One, I was appointed in the MoD in 1985
with the instructions that I should organise that Bofors should get the
contract. Second, that I was not at all in the picture and any manoeuvering
in relation to Bofors was done without my knowledge. I was never told by
Rajiv to opt for any gun and I did not give any instruction to Sundarji
or the Defence Secretary to opt for any gun.
I am shown my note dated
June 10, 1986 to the PM which I typed myself on my small typewriter. Since
I did not get a reply from him, I thought that his silence was approval
for me to go ahead with the work I was doing to get information out of
Bofors. I did not receive any written instructions from him.
I never saw the PM's
note (Knee-jerk reactions and stomach cramps will not serve anypurpose...)
to me because it was received in the MoD after my resignation. His note
is very harsh. He has stated that I ad put my prestige above the nation.
It is very sad to see such a comment because it is an utter falsehood.
Though I sent my note
to him on June 10, 1987, till my resignation, that is until around July
20, 1987, I never got any reply. I am surprised to see such a note now
in the file because Rajiv Gandhi's note is dated June 15, 1987. I used
to meet him almost every day after June 10, 1987 till the period of my
resignation and the PM never showed his anger. It was only at the July
4 CCPA meeting that I came to know his view on the issue. Till then, I
was of the opinion that we both shared the same view.
I do not remember whether
I saw Gen Sundarji's note on security implications. I think I had a telephonic
conversation with him in which he mentioned that he was sending a note,
but he had told me verbally that there was no serious security implication
in case we cancelled thecontract.
Gen Sundarji told me
that he had sent the note to the Defence Secretary and he had returned
it to him. I told him that I had not given any such instruction. I called
the Defence Secretary and he told me that it was the RM, Mr K.C. Pant's
instruction to return the note. As Defence Secretary, it was his responsibility
to tell the RM what was right and what was wrong. If the RM or the Defence
Secretary do not agree with the views of the COAS, they should write a
letter to him. Asking him to take back his note is not the done thing.
Later, on July 15, 1987,
in response to a letter from Serla Grewal, Gen Sundarji reissued the same
letter following a meeting in my office. In the last meeting with the PM,
I had mentioned that such instructions were passed from the MoD to the
COAS. The PM told me that he had not given any such instruction.
Gen Sundarji came to
me after I submitted my resignation and before I left office and told me
that since I was aware of the procedure and all the evaluations whenthe
contract was concluded, it was my responsibility to defend the reputation
of the Indian Army. I told him that though I had resigned from the MoD,
I was still a Member of Parliament and in any debate that occurred in the
Rajya Sabha, I would say everything that was known to me.
Gen Sundarji had quoted
me as saying that if I opened my mouth, the government would fall in one
day. What I meant was that the atmosphere was so surcharged that any kind
of rumour was being believed, and that because I had resigned, anything
that I said would have carried credibility and therefore, if I had opened
my mouth, the government would have fallen. Gen Sundarji had quoted this
out of context.
If I knew Quattrocchi
was involved, I would have stopped him. I do not think he could have wielded
influence in the matter without the involvement of somebody in government.
Since the information of Quattrocchi's involvement has come to light, it
sets me thinking as to who could be the link. I do not think Bhatnagar,
by himself,could do this. I do not know the links of Gopi Arora with Quattrocchi.
There can be two possibilities. Quattrocchi must have capitalised on his
closeness to Rajiv Gandhi and applied pressure to expedite the decision.
The second possibility is that Quattrocchi would have told the firms that
he is close to the PM and that he would get the deal through and would
have demanded payment once it was through.
It is not likely that
any influence could swing the contract in favour of Bofors in the MoD without
the influence of at least the Defence Secretary or the utter negligence
of the MoD. The Defence Secretary was not known to be a negligent man.
From the day I joined
the MoD, Arun Nehru had no role. He was MOS (Power). He got Internal Security
and I got Defence. I have seen the reports in the press about Ardbo's diary
etc. Arun Nehru was dropped from the Ministry around August/September 1986.
He had a difference of opinion with Gandhi, his friend and relative. I
cannot say whether they fell apart because ofBofors.
It is not correct to
say tht I was scared to speak out because of the threat of security to
my children. Irrespective of some differences between me and Rajiv Gandhi,
we were very good friends. My children were as safe with him as they were
with me. Once S.S. Gill, former I&B Secretary, who was writing a book,
called me and asked me to confirm the statement of Gen Sundarji that the
lives of my children were in danger. I told him to write in his book that
this was not correct.
Was there a quid pro
quo between Bofors representatives and politicians and officials connected
with the deal? I don't know. To my knowledge, there was none. I am not
aware of any party thrown by Bofors. At least, I have never been invited,
nor did I ever attend.
