Title: Clinton Warning
Puts Pakistan Out in the Cold
Author: Pamela Constable
Washington Post Service
Publication: International
Herald Tribune
Date: March 28, 2000
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -
President Bill Clinton's stern warning to Pakistan during his visit here
has left its military government facing a sober new reality: The Cold War
strategic alliance with the United States is over, and Pakistan must move
to restore democracy and control terrorism in Kashmir or fend for itself
in its mounting confrontation with India.
But the choice facing
Pakistan's leader, General Pervez Musharraf, is one he may not be willing
or able to make, according to analysts here. If he cracks down on insurgent
groups fighting in Indian Kashmir, he risks igniting the wrath of powerful
Islamic forces inside Pakistan, including segments of the army. If he does
not, he risks forfeiting Western economic support and driving his struggling
nation deeper into poverty.
''Pakistan must do some
very hard thinking now. It cannot sustain its policy on Kashmir and build
a viable economy at the same time,'' said Talaat Massood, a former Pakistani
Army chief. ''We cannot afford to be marginalized, but there are those
in Pakistan who want to continue the Cold War for their own interests.
I fear the message from Washington is so harsh that it may strengthen those
forces.''
Before arriving in Pakistan
on Saturday, Mr. Clinton paid a cordial four-day visit to India and called
for a comprehensive economic and strategic relationship with New Delhi.
His trip signaled a clear preference for democratic India over military-ruled
Pakistan as a future U.S. partner in South Asia and marked the end of the
uneasy, arm's-length approach that dominated U.S.-India relations for decades,
largely as a result of India's tilt toward the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.
In addition, comments
by Mr. Clinton and his aides suggested that Washington was moving closer
to accepting India's position on Kashmir, the divided Himalayan border
region that both India and Pakistan claim. Indian security forces, which
control their country's portion of Kashmir, have been under constant attack
by Pakistan-based Islamic insurgents who want to ''liberate'' the predominantly
Muslim population there from rule by India, which is mostly Hindu.
In interviews and speeches
during the week, Mr. Clinton said he believed that ''elements'' of the
Pakistani government were involved with the Kashmiri insurgents, that it
was ''wrong'' to attack across the Line of Control separating Indian and
Pakistani Kashmir, and that it would be very difficult for the two rivals
to resume dialogue as long as violence continues in Kashmir.
Indian officials were
delighted by the shift in U.S. policy, which they saw as a long overdue
acknowledgment of their country's economic ties and political commonality
with the United States. The visit promised to open new doors for U.S.-India
partnerships and technology sharing, even though U.S. sanctions imposed
after India's nuclear tests in 1998 still restrict such transfers.
Even more important,
New Delhi viewed Mr. Clinton's critical comments about Pakistan's role
in Kashmir, along with his repeated assertions that he would not mediate
the dispute, as a vindication of its tough stance on Kashmir and proof
that, at long last, Washington was finally casting off its Cold War blinders
toward Pakistan's pernicious role in the region.
''The whole purpose of
his visit was to tell the Pakistani people that the U.S. supports democracy,''
said K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian defense and national security expert. ''At
the end, the lingering image in people's minds will be one of Mr. Clinton
dancing with village women in India, and slipping into Pakistan with three
decoy planes. Those images will tell the whole world what the nature of
states in South Asia is.''
In stark contrast to
his embrace of India, Mr. Clinton's brief stop in Islamabad was hurried,
somber and marked by unusually heavy security. There were no joint statements
or even photographs of Mr. Clinton with General Musharraf, and the president's
televised speech to the nation made a polite but pointed demand: Pakistan
must change or face total isolation by Washington.
Thus, his stopover here
completed the shift in the American approach toward the region: an end
to the long-standing, Cold War era policy in which military rule in Islamabad
was tolerated because Pakistani collaboration was needed to confront Soviet
military designs on neighboring Afghanistan and bolster America's security
interests in the area.
Although Mr. Clinton's
stop in Pakistan was controversial within his administration, the combined
impact of his visit to both countries left an indelible impression in the
region that Washington has chosen democracy over dictatorship in South
Asia, and that its willingness to bargain on a range of thorny issues,
from trade to nuclear nonproliferation, is no longer hostage to the strategic
calculus of the past.
Rifaat Hussain, chairman
of the department of defense and strategic studies at Quaid-I-Azam University
in Islamabad, said that Mr. Clinton ''almost behaved as if he were in enemy
territory'' in Pakistan and that ''his visit marks the closure of the U.S.-Pakistani
strategic alliance.''
''Pakistan always assumed
it could count on the U.S. to bail it out in a confrontation with India,''
he added. ''Now the message from Washington is clear: If you are aggressive,
we will side with India. If you don't become part of our values, you are
on your own.''
Some military analysts
suggest that Mr. Clinton's rebuff could drive Pakistan to seek closer strategic
relations with three traditional and controversial allies in the region:
China, a nuclear superpower and longtime rival of India; Iran, a revolutionary
Islamic state led by Shiite Muslim clerics, and Afghanistan, an international
pariah headed by a fundamentalist Muslim militia.
No one predicts that
the chill with Washington will prompt the Pakistani military to provoke
a serious confrontation with India, let alone a nuclear war between the
two countries, both of which tested nuclear weapons in 1998. But some analysts
said it could remove any remaining constraints on Islamabad's control over
the insurgents in Kashmir, whose violent attacks have escalated in the
past several months.
''Clinton has chosen
India, and we must take a deep look at the new ground realities. It is
time for Pakistan to readjust its geopolitical priorities and rediscover
its traditional friends in the region,'' said Aslam Mirza Beg, a former
Pakistani Army chief. ''We don't need to enter into an arms race with India,
but we cannot let Kashmir go. Let Kashmir become a bleeding wound for India.
The costs will be heavy on both sides, but heavier for India.''
But U.S. officials, whose
principal concerns in South Asia are to reduce the threat of terrorism
and nuclear war, are betting that a chastised Pakistan will be less likely
than before to initiate any new aggression against India, and hoping that
a triumphant New Delhi may be more willing to reopen negotiations on Kashmir
now that it no longer need fear a U.S. interventionist tilt toward Islamabad.
Some Pakistani analysts
also say they hope General Musharraf - who has said repeatedly he is willing
to resume negotiations with India and wants to gradually restore democratic
rule at home - will swallow his pride and realize that his best hope to
salvage his country of 140 million people from financial ruin and political
isolation lies in rescuing its longtime friendship with Washington.
