Title: Upgrading India
Author: Amos Perlmutter
Publication: The Washington
Times
Date: March 28, 2000.
The Clinton administration
has finally publicly recognized a process that has been going on for some
time in South Asia: a revolutionary change in the balance of power
-the emergence of India as a nuclear power and the strategic decline of
Pakistan. The president's trip was historic in the sense that it
recognized the end of the Cold War in South Asia and with it the end of
the special U.S.-Pakistani relationship that was directly connected to
the Cold War.
India, the largest multi-ethnic,
multination, multi-religious democracy has now emerged from its old anti-Americanism.
India is a nuclear power and should be recognized, without lectures by
the U.S. president, as a member of the Nuclear Club along with the
United States. India has demonstrated stability and international
responsibility. It is a true democracy, a non-expansionist state.
The contrast with Pakistan is remarkable - a military autocracy dominated
by radical Islamicists in the military and dedicated to upsetting the status
quo in Kashmir.
The reasons for India's
success in becoming a nuclear power stem from its dangerous neighborhood.
To the north is its chief rival, China, an aggressive, expansionist, authoritarian
nuclear state whose political system is still in flux. The aspirations
of the present Chinese leadership behoove the Indians to rely on an existential
security system lest the Chinese once again, as they did in 1962, challenge
India's sovereignty. India's perennial foe, Pakistan, also a nuclear
state, is interventionist in its orientations. I find it extremely
curious that before the trip, President Clinton described the Indian Subcontinent
as, "the most dangerous place in the world today." President Kircheril
Raman Narayanan of India rebuked President Clinton during the ceremony
celebrating "new beginnings between India and the U.S." by blunt,
straightforward talk, characterizing Mr. Clinton's description is
"alarmist."
The Clinton administration
continues to subordinate a realistic policy with India to its obsessive
neo-Wilsonian idealism when it comes to its dogmatic policy of non-proliferation.
Why spend such precious political capital achieved in the president's recent
trip by continuously nagging the Indians on the issue of non-proliferation
and its nuclear weapons. Why not invite India to become a member
of the Nuclear Club instead. The Indian experience with the British
Raj, and now the United States, makes them very sensitive to any paternalistic
lecturing on the part of the great powers. India is striving to become
a major power in international politics, especially in Asia. It is
apprehensive of Chinese verbal threats toward Taiwan and Chinese meddling
in Tibetan politics.
The president's trip,
which was also a personal pilgrimage to India, was a stunning success.
He received tumultuous ovations from the Indian people and their parliament.
Before leaving India, after accumulating so much public and private acclaim,
why not top it off with a declaration establishing a strategic alliance
between India and the United States and a formal recognition of India as
a nuclear power. Unfortunately, the administration stopped short
of such a declaration. If the reason is that the United States wants
to balance its relationship equally between India and Pakistan, it is a
terrible error. If the reason has to do with the dogma of non-proliferation,
it is a serious political mistake. Such a declaration would include
a statement concerning America's recognition of India's nuclear power and
an Indian acceptance of the responsibility that comes with such power.
President Clinton should have paid attention to Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee when he said, according to the March 22 New York Times, "We have
the means and the will to eliminate this [Kashmir] menace." The combined
"Vision Statement," signed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee,
summarized the differences between the United States and India. "The
United States believes India should forgo nuclear weapons. India
believes that it needs to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent
in keeping with its own assessment of its security needs."
Unfortunately, the issue
of India's nuclear power has created tensions. Who is the United States
to tell the Indians to sign the CTBT when the U.S. Congress rejected it?
Why should India sign a non-proliferation treaty if it is not a member
of the Nuclear Club? This most important issue was not resolved as
it should have been during President Clinton's otherwise successful visit
to India.
Two statements
by Mr. Clinton received extremely different responses from the Indian
Parliament. According to the March 23 New York Times, when the president
said, "We learned that deterrence alone cannot be relied on to prevent
accidents of miscalculation . . . and in a nuclear standoff,
there is nothing more dangerous than believing there is no danger," the
response was total silence. But when he said, "Only India can determine
its own interests. Only India can know if it truly is safer today then
before the tests. I do not presume to speak for you or tell you what
to decide," there was tumultuous applause. President Clinton's trip
has elevated the importance of the U.S.-India relationship in the eyes
of the leaders and the people of both countries. The president's
success in India, despite his lecturing the Indians on nuclear power, should
be followed by this and the next president with a clear strategic policy
toward India and South Asia. The foundation for an American-Indian
strategic dialogue has been established in this historic trip. The next
step is to formulate and implement a policy that addresses America's interest
in Asia and elevates India to the level of Japan as a major strategic ally
in the forthcoming political and diplomatic confrontations with China.
(Amos Perlmutter is a
professor of political science and sociology at American University and
editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies.)
