Long Haul in Kashmir

Author: Editorial
Publication: The Times of India
Date: August 10, 2000

Those who had expected that the Hizbullah Mujaheedin's ceasefire offer would bring about a quick solution to the Kashmir problem are bound to be disappointed.  Surely, though, that was a rather naive expectation.  The politico-strategic equations in Kashmir are far too complex for peace to arrive so easily in the state.  There has been much speculation -- and some evidence -- that the US has played a `proactive' role in starting the process of negotiations.  Indeed, some had gone so far as to claim that much of the recent drama was precisely that: A drama where the actual dialogue was far less open and far more multi-faceted than the public pronouncements of all parties involved.  Yet, the Hizbul's adamant refusal to extend its ceasefire deadline shows how difficult it is to control the ground situation through backroom manoeuvres -- however well meaning they may be.  It is clear that Syed Salahuddin and General Musharraf have failed to stand up to the more orthodox sections within Pakistan and the Jehadi movement in Kashmir; Salahuddin was called a traitor by leaders of the Jamaat e-Islami.  In any case, to many it is not only a question of political alliances but literally their daily bread: Foreign mercenaries -- and they constitute a significant section of the militant movement -- are in Kashmir to earn money through terrorism and more importantly the narcotics trade.  So, there are many groups who are violently opposed to any peace in Kashmir as for them it would mean both political and financial bankruptcy.  Sensing the complexity of the situation, the US seems to have desisted from pressuring Musharraf into extending the Hizbul's deadline.

Fortunately for us, we have emerged from all this with some honour: We have come across as both more accommodating and committed to a peace settlement.  That is why the Hizbul today is divided on the sagacity of lifting the ceasefire.  There are, in fact, indications that some sections of the Hizbul are keen to continue informal negotiations.  But, the Vajpayee team would be well advised to look beyond a single militant outfit and broadbase the dialogue to include other important players -- the top leadership of the Hurriyat, other valley-based militant groups, political groups from Ladakh and Jammu, citizen's organisations and, indeed, the National Conference.  However, even this might not be enough for a lasting solution: For, the Kashmir problem, to a large extent, is also the `Pakistan' problem.  As long as the Pakistani state continues to be dominated by the army, the orthodoxy and the `feudals' who form its base, Kashmir would always continue to be Pakistan's obsession -- feigned or real.  That is why internal reforms are essential: Pakistan needs a democratic polity, a proper civil society, land reforms and economic development.  This is where the international community -- especially the US -- can play a positive role without being interventionist.  Pakistan could be given effective economic aid -- not for militaristic expansion but for providing jobs, expanding markets and freeing the productive potential of its people from their current state of cryogenic suspension.  And, the US too has something to gain.  Pakistan's emergence as a responsible modern state will help protect it from the two things it fears the most -- terrorism and drugs.  After all, and unfortunately, the subcontinent is the chief `exporter' of these two deadly commodities.
 

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