Author: Anil Narendra
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: December 14, 2000
Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee's announcement of unilateral ceasefire has not silenced the guns
in Jammu & Kashmir as it was hoped. The reasons are obvious.
Against whom was the
ceasefire? Local Kashmiris, Kashmiri militants, foreign militants, our
jawans or the Pakistani army? If the ceasefire was for our security forces,
then we can say that we have succeeded to some extent; to the extent that
the guns of our boys have been silenced, but not completely. From
day one of the ceasefire, they have been under attack from the militants.
They have to take preventive and self-defensive actions.
Some militant outfits
have welcomed the ceasefire, others are still sending out confused signals,
while some have rejected it outright. The foreign militant outfits,
as expected, have not only rejected the Prime Minister's offer but have
since accelerated their attacks. Pakistan has reduced the intensity
of the firing on the LoC. So that is one positive sign. But
that is all that the ceasefire has been able to achieve so far.
Coming to the ground
realities in Jammu & Kashmir, what the Prime Minister s Ramzan ceasefire
has done is that the security forces' role has been transformed from carrying
out counter-insurgency operations to policing. Once again they have
been forced to go into the defensive mode. Last Tuesday, militants
attacked almost all the forces engaged in counter-insurgency in the State.
The ratio of the militants-security
personnel casualty has been reversed after the ceasefire. A police
bulletin on the situation before and after the ceasefire announcement suggested,
that after November 28, more security forces personnel have been killed
than the militants. In another incident, two militants of a Fidayeen
squad managed to engage the CRPF forces camping in a cinema hall in Anantanag
for 22 hours.
CRPF Inspector General
Joshi, says that the Fidayeen attacks cannot be totally prevented as determined
groups of militants on a "suicide mission" could attack any place.
Explaining the spirit of the ceasefire, BSF Inspector General GS Gill said
the forces would retaliate but in a very controlled manner with the minimum
of civilian casualty. He also apprehends that militant attacks would
continue.
Had the searches, cordons
and crackdowns continued as before, the militants could have been detected
at any checking point. Owing to the ceasefire, the movement of explosives
and arms had also become easy for the militants, as there was no checking
of vehicles and hideouts. The forces are now being asked to adopt
"area dominance" to check the activities of the militants who have taken
undue advantage of the ceasefire.
With regards to the political
scene, much now depends on the leaders of the Hurriyat, the outfit in the
Valley which can bring about a qualitative change in the ground situation.
While some leaders of the Hurriyat have welcomed the Prime Minister's offer,
others have reserved their comments. One thing though they all agree
upon is that Pakistan should be made a party to the peace conference.
Pakistan has also signalled its approval for dialogue by authorising the
Hurriyat to negotiate on their behalf for the time being.
The fact of the matter
is that the Hurriyat realises that it is becoming redundant in Kashmir.
Its frequent hartal calls have had no effect on its popularity graph.
With foreign militants escalating attacks, Hurriyat leaders now want to
grab the centrestage. They see the ceasefire as an opportunity to
come back in the limelight. Assuming they shed their cloak and dagger
act, the key question is, Can they now silence the guns? With limited pockets
of influence, and organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al-Badr and Jaish-e-Mohammad
who are beyond their control what can they achieve is another question.
Can the Hurriyat have peace; and, most important, will that peace work?
It cannot escape the Hurriyat leaders that they were the ones who brought
the gun culture in the Valley, in the first place. The question haunting
the Hurriyat leaders is, What will they tell the relatives of the 80,000
people killed in the fight for "azadi" in the last 11 years?
There can be no objection
to a dialogue with the Hurriyat, but it is important that it should position
itself as a voice of the Kashmiri people rather than as a mediator between
India and Pakistan or as Islamabad's proxy. The Hurriyat leadership
will sooner rather than later have to decide whether it wants to play a
proactive role in the peace process by positioning itself as the voice
of the Kashmiri people or whether it is content to be seen as Pakistan's
puppet. However, there is another snag, namely, Pakistan has consistently
remained suspicious of Kashmiri sentiments and would be wary of any dialogue
between the Indian Government and the Kashmiris. Consequently, should
the Hurriyat leaders, or a section of them, enter into talks with India
alone, they would be doing so at considerable risk to themselves.
The Hurriyat could be
looking for some further concessions from New Delhi, to enable the organisation
to prevail upon militant groups to give peace a chance. The Government
of India may or may not accept it, but the key to peace is more in the
hands of Pakistan and their front militant organisations. And they
(Pakistani militants) want "azadi". Is the Government of India willing
to talk about the modalities of the "azadi" of entire Kashmir? Is it willing
to talk to Pakistan across the table? Has the Government obtained the consent
of the people of India to do so? Assuming that General Pervez Musharraf
intervenes, what is the guarantee that all the foreign-based militant organisations
will listen to him? After all they are all running their "shops".
Will they give up just because Gen. Musharraf or Mr Vajpayee wants
them to?
The militants at the
behest of Pakistan and some Western countries are now harping on one main
pre-condition: That Kashmir be declared a disputed territory. If
Mr Vajpayee agrees to this then Pakistan would cease to be an aggressor
in Kashmir, thus equating the aggressor (Pakistan) with the aggressed (India).
This wisdom has been exported to Pakistan by their benefactors in the West,
which has always wanted play the mediator in their so-called disputed territory
of Kashmir, enabling them to favour their one-time stooge ally, Pakistan.
More particularly, this helps in justifying the US's role as global policeman.
It also gives the West the leverage to protect its strategic interests
in this part of the world. Therefore, Indian thinktank should be
cautious of US suggestions on the Kashmir issue.
If Mr Vajpayee hoped
for favourable Muslim response because of the Ramzan ceasefire declaration,
he has dashed the hope with his recent remarks on the Ayodhya issue.
That, incidentally, was also uttered during Ramzan. This may adversely
affect the ceasefire bid in Kashmir. Muslim leaders like Imam Ahmed
Bukhari of Jama Masjid is now asking the Prime Minister to resign for his
remarks on the Ayodhya issue. And the Imam has also proclaimed himself
a mediator between the Prime Minister and the militant outfits in Kashmir.
