Author: Ijaz Hussain
Publication: Dawn, Karachi
Date: February 25, 2001
FOLLOWING the imposition of the
second instalment of sanctions against the Taliban government for their
refusal to extradite Osama bin Laden and to close the alleged terrorist
training camps in Afghanistan, there were widespread demonstrations by
the religio-political parties in Pakistan, a steep rise in the prices of
daily necessities in impoverished Afghanistan and a large exodus of refugees
towards Pakistan.
These developments are indeed a
cause for great concern for countries of the region and beyond for the
potential that they hold for posing a threat to the regional and international
peace and stability. The present discussion proposes to take up the following
questions: Are the sanctions likely to impact upon the rulers and spare
the people of Afghanistan as claimed by the sponsors of the relevant UN
Security Council resolutions? In what manner are these sanctions likely
to affect Pakistan? And finally, how to get out of the present standoff
between Afghanistan and the US on the Osama issue?
Taking up the issue of the possible
consequences of the sanctions on Afghanistan, it is claimed by the sponsors
of the latest resolution, as they did at the time of the adoption of the
previous resolution in October 1999, that these sanctions are Taliban-specific
and are not directed against the Afghan people. In other words, they contend
that these are "smart sanctions" meant to change the behaviour of the rulers,
and the common people of Afghanistan are not likely to be affected by them.
This is patently false, because
the sponsors know that they will succeed in achieving their objective only
when they hurt the common people. All objective observers of the Afghan
scene, including the UN secretary-general, the welfare agencies operating
in Afghanistan and the UN mediator Frances Vandrell recognize that the
sanctions would hit hard the ordinary Afghans.
The report prepared by the Office
of the UN Coordinator for Afghanistan on the impact of sanctions imposed
in 1999 entitled "Vulnerability and Humanitarian Implications of the UNSC
Sanctions on Afghanistan" can be quite helpful in assessing the possible
consequences of the present sanctions. Though the report is highly biased
(it could not have been otherwise because a subsidiary organ of the UN
could not have made a finding against the parent body) as it rejects any
negative fallout of the sanctions. Yet it cannot help conceding that "a
significant impact of sanctions is the extent to which they have aggravated
ordinary Afghans' sense of being isolated and victimized.
From interviews, it was clear that
there is a widespread perception that the UN has set out to harm rather
than help Afghans.... Most people take it as self-evident that sanctions
have disrupted trade, pushed up prices and caused suffering." Since perception
is a reality, the combined effect of the two sanctions is likely to be
disastrous for the Afghan people. Already reports coming out of Afghanistan
suggest a sharp decline in the value of Afghan currency so much so that
the Pakistani rupee has reportedly replaced Afghani as the legal tender.
Similarly, prices of commodities
of daily use are sky-rocketing. As to the effect on the Taliban regime,
it is likely to be minimal as acknowledged by the UN Coordinator's report
for the reason that "the weakness of civil society, the lack of freedom
of expression and minimal respect for political rights mean that there
is no channel whereby popular dissatisfaction over sanctions could be directed
into pressure on the regime to change its politics." This reluctant admission
by the Coordinator exposes the claim by the sponsors of the resolutions
that the sanctions are likely to hurt the Taliban regime and not the ordinary
Afghans.
As to the consequences for Pakistan,
they could be equally devastating. Already about 1,50,000 refugees have
entered Pakistan, despite the fact that the latter has closed its border
for the new refugees. A large number of displaced Afghans are anxiously
waiting to swarm into this country any time, which is likely to put tremendous
pressure on Pakistan's economy and security. Perhaps this is meant to put
pressure on Pakistan to change its policies towards the Taliban.
The role of some welfare agencies
working for Afghanistan becomes equally suspect when they criticize the
latter which is not a party to the refugee Convention for closing its border
and practically do not utter a word against other neighbours of Afghanistan
some of whom have refused to let these refugees in despite being parties
to the said Convention. In addition to the enormous refugee burden, which
is likely to increase tremendously in the months and years to come, the
role of the Pakistani Taliban is a cause for concern as they with their
specific agenda, could pose a serious threat to the country's civil society.
Here one need not forget that they,
in tandem with other well-armed fundamentalist forces in the country such
as Al-Akhwan and other Jihadi outfits, are already waiting in the wings
to take advantage of any deterioration in the law and order situation to
strike against the state and seize power. Hence the threat to the existence
of a moderate and modern Muslim state of Pakistan from those who adhere
to an obscurantist Taliban ideology is clearly there. In fact, this threat
is far greater for us than for the US because the existence of the Taliban
government in Afghanistan is an invitation for the Pakistani Taliban to
repeat the Afghan example.
It goes without saying that as long
as the Taliban remain in power in Afghanistan they would be a source of
inspiration for the extremist forces in Pakistan to emulate their example
by means legal or otherwise. It is in our interest to snap the umbilical
chord which exists between the extremists of the two countries. This is
a very sensitive and difficult task and needs to be handled with lot of
care and wisdom. That perhaps explains why the government had to back down
in the recent past on the issue of a contemplated procedural change in
the blasphemy law or talked the Al-Akhwan out of the idea of marching on
Islamabad instead of dealing with it with a firm hand or showed softness
on the violation of the ban on the display of weapons by JUI outfits. With
the passage of time as the sanctions start to bite more and more, Pakistan
is likely to come under a siege-like situation with all the risks that
go with it. Any rash action on the part of the government could prove costly.
Pakistan also needs to rethink its
Afghan policy. One may argue that any radical change in Pakistan's Afghan
policy would amount to throwing away the gains of the Afghan jihad which
is to have a friendly government in Kabul, thus freeing the policy makers
from the predicament of a two-front security situation. In the first place,
this assessment is erroneous because Afghans are first and foremost nationalists
and anything else afterwards. If occasion arises they may not hesitate
to cause trouble for Pakistan without being dissuaded by the consideration
of the religious bond. Besides, there is no need to abandon them.
In fact, the gains that the Taliban
have made, particularly in terms of the maintenance of law and order and
the disarming of different Afghan factions need to be preserved. What is
required is a sincere effort towards the establishment of a genuine broad-based
government in Kabul. Perhaps under the sanctions regime what was not possible
previously may become possible.
Lastly, the question arises as to
what should be done to resolve the stand-off between the Taliban and the
US on the question of Osama bin Laden. The latter wants Osama to be handed
over to it or to a third country for purposes of trial. Afghanistan rejects
this and instead proposes three options in the matter, namely, the latter's
trial by an Afghan shariat court or by a court composed of ulema from Afghanistan,
Saudi Arabia and another Islamic country or entrusting an OIC watch-dog
committee to monitor his activities while he remains in Afghanistan.
It is obvious that any proposal,
in order to be acceptable to the parties, would have to be based on give-and-take.
The deadlock between the Taliban and the US on the question of Osama's
trial is understandable because whereas the former does not trust a secular
court, the latter is not prepared to accept a religious tribunal. However,
international law seems to be on the Taliban's side in the matter because
of the absence of an extradition treaty between the parties, non-recognition
of the Taliban government by the US and Osama not being an "extraditable
person".
Besides, given the sense of self-respect
of the Afghans and certain values they hold sacred, they are not likely
to surrender Osama to the US. Indeed, the matter has become more of an
ego problem than anything else between a superpower and a defiant and proud
people. It would therefore be preferable to abandon the idea of a court
trial and instead work on the basis of the opening provided by the Taliban
in terms of a fourth option. According to reports attributed to the Taliban
from time to tie, Osama has offered to leave Afghanistan on several occasions.
Why not make this offer the basis of a settlement of this seemingly intractable
issue?
Taking advantage of this offer,
one would suggest that Osama and his family be allowed to proceed to a
country of his choosing other than Afghanistan for which they would enjoy
safe conduct. Once there, they would be granted political asylum and would
be free from prosecution for all previous acts of omission and commission
and in return their activities would be closely monitored. As to the last
aspect, the government of the country granting sanctuary would stand surety
for the good conduct of Osama and his family.
