Author: Inder Malhotra
Publication: Afternoon Despatch
& Courier
Date: February 27, 2001
After several positive statements
and promising indications about its determination to maintain the upswing
in Indo-US relations, the month-old Bush administration has made its first
false move. It is as hurtful as it is unnecessary. Its baneful consequences,
to be discussed in detail presently, are already becoming obvious. The
incipient mischief needs to be nipped in the bud in the best interests
of both sides.
First, the facts. Tarapur is this
country's first nuclear power station that was built nearly 35 years ago
by the United States that had also guaranteed the supply of its fuel, enriched
uranium, throughout the plant's life. From the very start, Tarapur has
been under safeguards agreed to by India and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and accepted by the US.
Fuel duel
In spite of this, in the late 70s,
after this country first nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974 and the subsequent
election of President Jimmy Carter, the US reneged on its commitment to
supply the fuel required to run Tarapur. After prolonged and painful negotiations,
it was agreed that France would supply enriched uranium on exactly the
terms and conditions on which America was doing earlier.
This could continue only upto 1992.
In that year, France, which had refused to sign the NPT ultimately, decided
to adhere to it. (So did China that, too, had stayed out of the NPT when
it came into force in 1970). Consequently, India decided to import the
nuclear fuel from China, under continuing IAEA safeguards, and Beijing
readily agreed to sell it.
Russia came into the picture in
October last when the Russian president, Mr. Vladimir Putin, on a visit
to Delhi, agreed to fuel Tarapur, in addition to concluding some other
nuclear agreements with this country.
Against this backdrop, America's
demand on Russia not to supply India fuel for Tarapur, voiced in a public
statement by the spokesman of the state department is curious, to say the
least. The stated American pretext is that India has not accepted full-scope
safeguards, as against safeguards in relation to specific foreign-aided
nuclear facilities. But then this was precisely the position when the US
applauded the agreement with France and raised no objection to the subsequent
agreement between India and China.
Another American reason to demand
cessation of fuel supplies is that "India has a nuclear weapons programme."
In heaven's name, this country tested half a dozen nuclear weapons in May
1998 and declared itself a nuclear weapon power then. Russia, a signatory
to the NPT and a member of the London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG)
knew this when it agreed not only to sell enriched uranium to this country
but also to do a lot more.
For instance, Moscow is building
at Koodankulam in south India a nuclear power station with two reactors
of 1000 MW each. Moscow will provide the fuel for both on terms similar
to those applicable to Tarapur. France, which is also keen on cooperation
with India in nuclear power industry, is carefully watching the goings-on,
and herein might lie a clue to America's quixotic move. The US laws prevent
export to nuclear equipment and material to countries that do not accept
full-scope safeguards. The US nuclear industry therefore is worried about
the lucrative India market for nuclear power stations being captured by
others. Another, wider objective vis-a-vis Russia also seems to be at work.
Angered by Moscow's strong opposition to America' National Missile Defence
(NMD) programme, Washington does want to pressurise Russia in whatever
way it can. As for India, American purpose appears to be to serve notice
that nuclear nonproliferation remains an issue despite the Bush administration's
own rejection of the CTBT. Furthermore, if the Koodankulam project could
be wrecked, American companies might be in a strong position to sell conventional
power stations to this country to meet its acute shortage of electricity.
In 1993, the US had succeeded in
arm-twisting Russia into amending its deal with India for the supply of
cryogenic engines for the geo-stationary satellite-launching vehicles (GSLVs).
But what has been the result? India has developed its GSLV largely on its
own, and it will be operational next year - only a few years behind the
original schedule. If the fuel supply for Tarapur is interrupted, this
country can use the indigenously developed Mox fuel or continue to rely
on China.
The key question is whether Russia
will again succumb to American pressure. Moscow does need trade with and
technology from America. But unlike Mr. Boris Yeltsin and Mr. Kozyrev,
who ran Russian policy in the mid-90's, President Putin and his colleagues
are Russian nationalists determined to uphold their country's interest.
Russia also has the option of moving closer to China and jointly resisting
American attempts to lay down the law for the rest of the world.
Whatever the course of future developments,
the dangers inherent in Washington's ill-considered and ill-timed statement
on Tarapur have already become manifest. In both this country and the US
there are people mired in the old mind-set. Those in this country have
started shouting that the "honeymoon" between the most powerful and most
populous democracies "is over". Those subscribing to this view have strong
objection also to an earlier statement by the American defence secretary,
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld. While berating Russia for being a "missile proliferation,
he had lumped India along with Iran and Libya, earlier described by the
US as "rogue states" as recipients. He had made things worse by saying
that all this "threatened" other people including the "US, Western Europe
and countries in West Asia". To add insult to injury, Mr. Rumsfeld had
remained totally silent on China's supplies of missiles and missile technologies
to Pakistan.
Even so, officials in the South
Block had tried to make light of the US defence secretary's tactless remarks
as no more than an aberration. After the demand on Russia to terminate
the Tarapur arrangement such indulgence is not possible. The trouble, however,
is that over-reaction could be equally harmful.
It is in India's best interest to
have the kind of qualitative change in its relations in the United States
that has been in the offing for some time. Differences over the nuclear
issue will not disappear. But to allow them to become an obstacle to better
and cooperative relations with the United States would be an unwise policy.
The best things India can do is to make known its point of view to the
Bush administration in no uncertain terms. Beyond that it should be left
to Russia to resist and reject the untenable American dictate. Interaction
with France on the nuclear issue should all so be intensified.
US diplomacy
On the other hand, those who go
on crowing about a "paradigm change" in America's attitude towards this
country must learn to recognise that even when the relationship with the
US becomes intimate, problems with Washington will persist. This is case
with countries like China and Japan which, for different reasons, find
a higher place in the American scheme of things than does India. The overbearing
US also miffs its European allies from time to time. For instance, except
for Britain, which joined the aggressive action, other European countries
have distanced themselves from the US bombing of Iraq. China and Russia
have condemned it. Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee has deplored it in moderate
tones and rightly asked for the lifting of sanctions on Iraq.
In dealing with the US, this country
will have to be steadfast, of course, in defence of its vital interests
on which there can be no compromise. But it must also learn to be skillful
and where necessary flexible. America knows that this country's minimum
and credible nuclear deterrent will not disappear. If we play our card
well, America will come to terms with this reality, as Russia has done,
and France is likely to do.
