Author: Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Publication: Outlook
Date: July 23, 2001
General Pervez Musharraf is the
fourth serving army chief to assume power in Pakistan. The October 1999
coup was an institutional response by the army to what the top commanders
viewed as then prime minister Nawaz Sharif's efforts to divide them and
control the army, quite in the same way as he had weakened Parliament and
divided the Supreme Court. Sharif's attempts to remove Musharraf, who was
then on a tour of Sri Lanka, failed because the senior commanders, who
were expecting such a step, responded by capturing power in one brief and
swift operation. By the time Musharraf's aircraft landed in Karachi, the
army was in full control of the situation.
The fourth military takeover in
October 1999, and the ability of the Musharraf government to manage the
country's affairs without encountering any serious challenges, reconfirms
the military's strategic position in Pakistan's political system. It can
be described as the most formidable and autonomous political actor in Pakistan,
capable of influencing the nature and direction of political changes. Its
clout has manifested in the form of direct military rule (October 1958-June
1962, March 1969-December 1971, July 1977-December 1985, and October 1999-)
and influence over key foreign policy and domestic issues when out of power.
Several considerations and interests
shape the military's disposition towards the political process. National
security is its first major interest and it consequently exercises influence
in key foreign policy areas, especially the nuclear policy, relations with
India, including Kashmir, and Afghanistan. The military isn't opposed to
India-Pakistan rapprochement but a civilian government is expected to keep
the military on board in any normalisation process with India. The military,
like most civilian policymakers, will not like to improve relations with
India unless it addresses the Kashmir issue. Overseas arms and equipment
procurement is the second military interest, which too has foreign policy
implications. Its third interest pertains to preserving its autonomy, countering
any civilian interference in its internal organisational and service affairs,
including promotions and transfers. Then there is the issue of expenditure,
opposed as the military is to unilateral cuts in defence expenditure by
civilian leaders. Another consideration relates to improvement of
service conditions and continuation of perks and privileges the military
personnel have acquired during the long years of military rule. It also
wants to protect the industrial and business interests it has developed
through its four welfare foundations. Finally, the military expects the
civilian leaders to maintain some degree of political and economic stability,
a pre-requisite to sustain its professional and corporate interests.
The military's primary consideration
is not direct exercise of power, but protection and advancement of its
interests. If these can be protected, it would prefer to stay on the sidelines.
The commanders are willing to negotiate their interests and accommodate
civilian leaders. What they can't accept is a frontal attack on their institutional
and corporate interests, a deliberate campaign to malign the military or
unilateral decision-making by civilian leaders on matters concerning them.
Top military commanders concede
that governance is not one of their primary tasks and that this right belongs
to civilian leaders. Yet, simultaneously, they firmly believe that they
must play an autonomous role, provide inputs for important political decisions
and that they must mediate when political competition between civilian
groups appears disorderly.This is precisely why governance in Pakistan
is a delicate balancing act between the military chiefs and the elected
civilian leaders. The civilian governments can enjoy greater autonomy and
freedom of action if they establish a relationship of trust and confidence
with the military.
The army chief is a pivot in Pakistan's
power structure. Another institution that has gained importance is the
corps commanders' meeting. Presided over by the army chief, this conference
includes top commanders, principal staff officers at the army headquarters
and other senior officers holding strategic appointments. They discuss
all important issues and develop a consensus on broad policy outlines whose
implementation is left to the discretion of the army chief. He also consults
other service chiefs on important issues. In this way, the military, especially
the army, pursues collective decision-making, of immense importance when
the military directly rules the country. Even now the army chief doesn't
rule on his own-he and senior commanders work together.
Despite repeated assumption of power,
the military continues to maintain a professional, disciplined and cohesive
profile. This increases its clout in a society where political and social
forces are fragmented, often engaged in intense confrontation. Unlike the
Turkish army, Islam is an integral part of the ideology of the Pakistan
military. Most soldiers, both non-commissioned and commissioned officers,
are conscious of Islamic identity-a good number of them are also religiously
conservative. However, the military doesn't encourage any religion-inspired
activity by service personnel that adversely affects professionalism and
service discipline.
The Pakistan military's current
centrality to the political process represents a shift from the disposition
it maintained at the time of withdrawal of British rule in 1947. Though
the military was integral to the British imperial rule in South Asia and
served as its ultimate shield, it functioned within the parameters set
out by the civilian authority and stayed away from active politics. These
traditions were accepted as the cardinal principles of military organisation
in Pakistan.
Subsequently, though, several factors
contributed to the ascendancy of the military. These included strong security
pressures from the early days of independence due to problems with India,
decline of political leadership after the demise of Mohammad Ali Jinnah
in 1948 and Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951, the failure of the Muslim League that
led the independence movement to transform itself into a national party,
the gradual degeneration and fragmentation of the political process, and
the unnecessary delay in establishing the first Constitution, which was
not implemented until March 1956. Other contributing factors were the institutional
imbalance between the strong civil-military bureaucratic and political
institutions, and economic difficulties which caused alienation at the
popular level.
Military rulers have generally tried
to tailor the political system for the post-military withdrawal period.
Ayub Khan 'civilianised' his military rule in June 1962 by giving a new
constitution. Yahya Khan couldn't transform his military rule into civilian
rule as he lost the war to India in East Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq carefully
tailored the post-withdrawal political system to 'civilianise' his military
rule in December 1985. Now Gen Musharraf is expected to civilianise his
rule to ensure continuity of policies and key personnel in the post-withdrawal
period through constitutional changes, cooption of a section of the political
elite and holding of a carefully regulated elections in 2002.Even after
the return of the military to the barracks, it'll continue to wield power
from the sidelines.
(Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a Lahore-based
political and defence analyst. His most recent book is Military, State
and Society in Pakistan, Macmillan Press, London, 2000.)
