Author:
Publication: Rediff on Net
Date: August 29, 2001
Many people saw the Agra Summit
as a great triumph both domestically and internationally for General Pervez
Musharraf. After Prime Minister Vajpayee invited him to visit India and
even strangely congratulated him while he was in the process of getting
rid of the democratically elected president of Pakistan, Rafiq Tarar, the
United States government did him the honour of referring to him as 'President'
Musharraf for the first time, when he arrived at Agra.
Musharraf chose to behave in Delhi
and Agra somewhat like a Mughal conqueror rather than an honoured guest.
He brushed aside the wishes of his hosts and welcomed the leaders of the
separatist Hurriyat Conference at his high commissioner's residence in
Tilak Marg, even as he kept two former prime ministers of India waiting
before he said hello to them. Former prime ministers may be routinely exiled
or hanged by military dictators in Pakistan. They are held in respect in
India.
While in Agra, Musharraf chose to
address his own people live on television during the course of what was
purported to be a background briefing of leading luminaries of our redoubtable
fourth estate. What people in India and Pakistan got to see was some of
the icons of India's media engaged in a display of servility that would
have warmed the hearts of those who adore the likes of Emperor Aurangzeb.
This was where things began to go wrong for Musharraf.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee is known to
be man of great forbearance, patience and understanding. He was even prepared
to pander to some of Musharraf's prejudices against agreements with India
signed by democratically elected leaders of Pakistan like Bhutto and Nawaz
Sharif. But even he could not ignore Musharraf's brazen justification of
his intrusion in Kargil as a Pakistani response to the liberation of Bangladesh
and his characterisation of his jehad in Jammu and Kashmir as an 'indigenous
freedom struggle.' Musharraf's commando instincts became evident in New
Delhi and Agra. But like his misadventure in Kargil, his commando instincts
compelled him to aim to capture one range of hills too many.
While Musharraf was basking in the
glory of his media coverage in Agra some days ago, things have now become
somewhat more complex for him both domestically and internationally. Eminent
jurists in Pakistan like former chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah have started
raising pointed questions about the constitutional validity of Musharraf
continuing as president, or materially altering the constitution now that
the time is approaching for him to hand over power to democratically elected
leaders.
It is known that Musharraf intends
to drastically alter the constitution, so that effective power lies not
with the democratically elected prime minister and parliament, but in a
military-dominated national security council that he proposes to head.
Commonwealth Secretary General Don Mckinnon was recently in Islamabad to
assess the prospects for return to democratic rule in Pakistan. While New
Delhi may have its own compulsions to deal with the Musharraf dispensation,
it should not hesitate to bring Musharraf's plans to amend the constitution
and curtail the powers of democratic institutions and democratically elected
rulers to the notice of the leaders of Commonwealth countries and indeed
to the notice of the international community as a whole.
While Musharraf has succeeded in
splitting the Muslim League, his protégés have not done too
well in the recently held 'non-party' elections to local councils. It is
well known that Musharraf's corps commanders (also known in Pakistan as
'crore commanders') spared no effort to compel legislators to elect only
those considered 'suitable' to hold important offices wielding government
patronage. But, despite the best of the efforts of the 'khakis' as the
army officers are known in Pakistan, candidates supporting Benazir Bhutto's
Pakistan People's Party fared remarkably well in the election.
It is clear that an increasing number
of people in Pakistan now feel there has been no change for the better
that the Musharraf dispensation has been able to bring to their lives.
More importantly, the military in Pakistan has not been able to do anything
meaningful in dealing with sectarian killings and violence in the country.
Sectarian organizations like the Sipah-e-Sahiba not only routinely kill
Shias, but also have links with the Taleban and with those involved in
jehadi activities in J&K, Central Asia, Chechnya and elsewhere. Thus,
while Musharraf can try to placate world opinion by acting against relatively
minor sectarian organizations like the Sunni Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the
Shia Sipah-e-Mohammad, he has neither the will nor the ability to act against
strong sectarian outfits especially in Punjab.
It would be a serious mistake to
read recent moves by Musharraf to act against some jehadi organisations
in the Sind province alone for collecting funds as any manifestation of
the cooling of his ardour for supporting his favourite jehadis in Jammu
and Kashmir. It is significant no action has been taken against jehadi
outfits in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province, from where the
bulk of the ISI-supported jehadis are drawn for action in J&K. Under
severe pressure from the Indian security forces the jehadis are now hitting
soft targets. The recent massacres of Hindus and particularly of shepherds
are part of a concerted policy to follow up on the earlier targeting of
Kashmiri Pundits.
The aim of Musharraf's jehadis is
to ethnically cleanse the Kashmir Valley and force the exodus off the entire
Hindu population to the Jammu and Kathua districts. This is not a development
that New Delhi can be sanguine about. If such killings and actions like
those being undertaken by the Lashkar-e-Tayiba across India continue, it
may be necessary to consider striking across the Line of Control and even
the international border in a swift, proportionate, measured and internationally
justifiable manner. No one should be allowed to presume that our patience
and forbearance is unlimited.
Musharraf's woes and dilemmas are
not confined to his domestic constituency only. Pakistan now finds itself
internationally isolated because of its material and military support to
the Taleban in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Following
unimpeachable evidence gathered by a UN team of experts about Pakistan's
continuing support for the Taleban, the UN Security Council has now demanded
the posting of international monitors in Pakistan to keep a watch on developments
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The screws are tightening around
the necks of those engaged in promoting jehad worldwide. But, in an ultimate
analysis, we in India should realise that while the international community
may at best pay lip service to cross border terrorism directed against
us, it is for us to set our house in order in J&K and deal firmly with
those across the border who believe we can be forced out of J&K by
'bleeding' us.
Many of our bleeding heart liberals
have for a long time felt it is politically incorrect to describe the Hurriyat's
role in accurate and precise terms. The Hurriyat is nothing but an organisation
that incites and supports violence, gets funds from abroad and nauseatingly
and persistently echoes the ISI line.
It is heartening that the young
Minister of State for External Affairs, Omar Abdullah, has referred to
the Hurriyat in precisely these terms. There are now clear indications
that the Hurriyat leadership's ardour to kowtow before the visiting Musharraf
at his high commissioner's residence has disgusted a wide cross-section
of public opinion in the Kashmir Valley.
It remains to be seen how long this
motley crowd largely made up of political non-entities or people scared
of the guns of foreign terrorists holds together coherently. Musharraf
may, in an ultimate analysis, have done us many a favour by his actions
and words in New Delhi and Agra. But, at the same time New Delhi must ensure
it does not say or do anything that is construed as a manifestation of
weakness, or lack of resolve by the generals in Rawalpindi.
