Author: Abhijit Bhattacharyya
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: January 17, 2002
Introduction: If India is fighting
an anti-terror was, Pakistan is waging a pro-terror
Assuming that an India-Pakistan
military confrontation owing to Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism
is round the corner, it is time to make assessment of the combat ground
realities. It is also time to throw light on the escalating violence because
of Pakistan's peculiar brand of Islam based on distortion, fundamentalism,
misrule and terrorism.
It is also time to recall the 6th
century BC Chinese philosopher general Sun Tzu: "War is a matter of vital
importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival
or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied." It is an unprecedented
recognition that armed strife is not a "transitory aberration" but a conscious
act of unforeseen consequences which in turn makes it susceptible to rational
analysis based on cold facts and figures.
Question, therefore, is: What could
be the nature of India's anti-terrorist war against Pakistan on Kashmir?
The answer is: It could be anything about aerial and land warfare but without
any role for the Indian Navy. This is unlike America's anti-terrorist and
anti-Islamic fundamentalist war in Kunduz, Kabul and Kandahar.
Going by cold statistics, India
today (like in the past) is superior to Pakistan both in terms of men and
material. The Indian Army is 1,100,000 strong to Pakistan's 550,000; India's
12 Corps is matched by 9 Pakistani Corps; 34 Indian and 19 Pakistan Divisions;
3 Armoured Corps each for both the adversaries; 3,414 main battle tanks
of India are arraigned against 2,300 Pakistani tanks; 53,000 strong Indian
Navy versus 25,000 Pakistani Navy; 110,000 men and 774 combat aircraft
of the IAF and 45,000 men and 353 aircraft of PAF.
The problem, however, starts beyond
the number of men and material. The crux of the matter lies in the complicated
interaction between geography and history; religion and fanaticism; polity
and culture of neighbours separated at birth owing to congenital enmity
supplemented by unbridled ambition and adventurism of Pakistani leaders.
Let us see the deployment of the
Pakistani Corps formations, which normally consist of at least two divisions
(each division consists of 16,000 to 18,000 soldiers). In Pakistan's Punjab,
there are X Corps in Rawalpindi (3 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armoured Brigade
and 2 Infantry Brigades); I Corps in Mangla (with 1 Infantry, 1 Mechanised
and 1 Armoured Division and 1 Armoured Brigade); XXX Corps in Gujranwalla
(with 2 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured and 1 Mechanised Brigade) and
IV Corps at Sialkot (with 2 Infantry and 1 Armoured Division and 2 Infantry
Brigades).
In Sind too, there are stationed
II Corps at Multan (with 1 Infantry and 1 Armoured Division); XXXI Corps
at Pano Aqil (with 2 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured and 1 Mechanised
Brigade) and V Corps at Karachi (with 2 Infantry Divisions, 2 Armoured
and 1 Infantry Brigade). In the North West Frontier is deployed 2 Infantry
Divisions with the XI Corps Headquarters at Peshawar and in Baluchistan's
Quetta is stationed XII Corps (with 2 Infantry Divisions).
Compared to Pakistani Army's Corps
Headquarters position, the Indian Command Headquarters, according to the
Military Balance 2001-2002 (of International Institute for Strategic Studies),
have the following composition: "Northern Command's 3 Corps with 8 Infantry
and 2 Mountain Divisions; Western Command's 3 Corps with 1 Armoured, 5
Infantry and 3 RAPID Divisions; Central Command's 1 Corps with 1 Armoured,
1 Infantry and 1 RAPID Division; Eastern Command's 3 Corps with 1 Infantry
and 7 Mountain Divisions and Southern Command's 2 Corps with 1 Armoured
and 3 Infantry Divisions."
A remarkable characteristic of the
Pakistani army deployment is that none of its Corps Headquarters is located
in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK). India, however, owing to Pakistani
attack in October 1947 and its three subsequent misadventures of 1965,
1971 and 1999, today has its Northern Command in Udhampur along with 3
Corps Headquarters stationed in Kashmir. It is interesting to see this
divergence in deployment tactics. Why doesn't Pakistan station at least
one of its corps in POK? To this writer, it appears to be a two-fold Pakistani
policy of direct diplomacy and indirect destruction.
Directly, Pakistan wants to show
to the diplomats that its army does not have any sizeable presence in the
"disputed" Kashmir unlike India; and indirectly Pakistan resorts to destruction
of all types from this area through training camps for Islamic terrorists
assembled from all over - Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, South
East Asia, Chechnya, Bosnia, etc.; all in the name of Islam and under the
guidance of Islamic Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. This has resulted
in the loss of trained soldiers for Indian Army and paramilitary forces.
For Pakistan, however, it is a loss of Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists
of all variety, who are a mixture of Pakistani and foreigners.
Thus, war or no war, the diabolical
variety of Pakistani Islam fights its jihad against the kafir army of Hindu
India through criminals, crooks, even mentally unbalanced and AIDS patients,
whose death in suicide missions fetches money for their family from ISI
and martyrdom in the eyes of their ilk. In fact, the unethical methods
of Pakistan have resulted in considerable losses to both non-fanatical
Indian soldiers and the Islam-indoctrinated Pakistani soldiers, whose generals
still believe that one Pakistani soldier is equivalent to five Indian soldiers,
notwithstanding the fact that Pakistani defeat in all the wars and the
humiliating surrender of its entire army in Dacca on December 16, 1971,
to the Indian Army.
Whether it is war or peace in Kashmir,
Pakistan wants to raise the pitch and rate of Indian casualty to an unacceptable
level with a minimum loss to its own army. In other words, the Pakistan-sponsored
crossborder terrorism resorted to by Muslims of all variety form a cheaper
forward defence for Pakistan. This defends Islam and Pakistan. It also
ensures Pakistan to become a sanctuary for the radical Islamists (including
the just defeated Taliban) and a base for the Muslim guerrilla fighters
as well as the suicide squads.
What should be the Indian posture?
Should the LoC be crossed? Although the Government of India reserves its
sovereign right to do what it wishes to in matters pertaining to war, perhaps
it would not be incorrect to remember that unlike Pakistan, India faces
threats from more than one front. India can ill afford to create a military
vacuum in North, East and the North-East.
Although India's problems are genuine,
no Western country would ever encourage or support India's crossing the
LoC. That would upset the West's economic, geopolitical and strategic designs.
The West, though it doesn't confess it, is fighting Islamic terrorists.
India too is fighting it. Possibly, peace in Kabul would imply increased
violence in Kashmir. But India can afford to play and pay with the lives
of its "surplus" manpower. But how can the West fight a body-contact war
with a force of "deficit" manpower and newly recruited female soldiers?
Any war on terrorism by India, therefore, has to be within the LoC. The
West will never allow it to do otherwise. The West wants liberalisation
for Indian markets. But it cannot be liberal with India fighting terrorism.
The Indians too partly deserve to be held responsible for the sorry state
of affairs. For too long they have pampered Western interests and given
an impression of being weak, soft and corrupt. How can India change overnight
to be strong, hard and honest? Pakistan for the West is a geographer's
delight and historian's counterbalance against a rising India. "Cross border
terrorism serves India right," lip service of the West notwithstanding.
(The author is an alumnus of the
National Defence College of India and the views are his personal).
