Author: Ashok Parthasarathi
Publication: The Times of India
Date: January 21, 2002
Introduction: Crouching Dragon,
Hidden Tiger
A while ago, several national dailies
carried reports about the government having "discovered" that the Bangalore-based
Chinese company Huawei Technologies may have helped Pakistan and the Taliban
upgrade their telecom network with both hardware and software during 2000
and 2001. The reports go on to state that, according to intelligence sources,
all the company's 300 software professionals are Chinese and that the chief
executive of the company was formerly an officer of the People's Liberation
Army of China. There are conflicting reports as to whether the cabinet
committee on security discussed this matter on the basis of a report from
the Intelligence Bureau.
The spokesman of the company has
confirmed that the firm had indeed supplied communication equipment to
Pakistan but "was never involved with the Pakistan armed forces". While
he also ruled out diversion of this equipment to the Taliban early this
year, Taliban media reported that it had an agreement with the same Chinese
company for the supply and installation of 12,000 digital telephone lines
in Kabul. This directly contradicts the assertion of the company's spokesman.
It may also not be widely known that the entire telecom system of Afghanistan
under the Taliban was merely an extension of the Pakistani telecom system.
The whole issue tragically reflects
the naivety of a country which aspires to be a major power in South Asia
and which has made a pitch to be a permanent member of a restructured Security
Council. Should the "automatic foreign investment approval policy and procedure"
through the RBI even for 100 per cent foreign equity companies not have
had built into it a proviso that such "automaticity" would not apply to
proposals from our neighbours, including China, and in industry sectors
sensitive from a security point of view, such as IT and telecom and several
dual use technology-based products.
The case of China is particularly
important because of the track record of its 20-year, across-the-board,
broad and deep scientific, technological and industrial assistance to the
nuclear weapon missile and military programmes of Pakistan. What is more,
one presumes that the government is aware that China signed an MoU with
the Taliban itself for "economic and technological cooperation" of all
days on September 11, 2001.
The Chinese stance on all such assistance
has the distinctive feature of the Chinese government blandly and often
vehemently denying any role by China in such activities. In this case also,
the Chinese company has denied that it was developing and supplying telecom
and telecom surveillance equipment to the Taliban via Pakistan. This is
despite the company having admitted that it markets all its IT and telecom
products to world markets from an office in Pakistan.
And it is not as if the government
does not perceive China as a threat or is not taking measures to face this.
To take but one example, recently there was a high visibility press release
by the Indian Air Force along with photographs showing our frontline air
superiority aircraft, the MiG-29, at Leh, the highest airbase in the world.
The press release stated that the capacity of the MiG-29s to operate from
Leh had now been built up to deal with "western and northern threats".
Another indicator is the development and recent operational deployment
by ISRO of a "technology evaluation satellite" which is really a military
reconnaissance satellite, that gives us excellent coverage not only of
Pakistan but also of China with a one-metre resolution.
Another remarkable aspect of the
case of Huawei Technologies is how our embassy in Beijing issued tourist
visas to 180 Chinese software professionals without first ascertaining
where they were going to in this country and for what purpose or activity.
If our embassy had issued such visas
after prior consultation with the ministry of external affairs in New Delhi,
the lapse would be even more serious as no clearance from the Intelligence
Bureau seems to have been taken at that stage. The reported desire now
of the MEA to at least hereafter have all potential FDI investment applications
from China and Sri Lanka subjected to clearance by the IB, prior to issue
or otherwise of approvals, is a tragically belated measure.
Do the proponents of 'push all foreign
investment applications through fast' in the government know that even
in the US existing laws would require a company like Huawei Technologies
to obtain prior security clearance for establishment of a 100 per cent
Chinese-owned company and prior export clearance of sensitive software
and hardware before shipment to Pakistan, let alone the Taliban.
The other trend is to not say anything
which will annoy the Chinese. Successive governments since 1988 have adopted
this policy and conveyed this in Parliament and to the media. That despite
such conditioning, the Huawei Technologies case has received so much press
coverage, is reassuring.
Finally, this case reflects a serious
lack of sensitivity to threats to national security as opposed to threats
to national defence of the kind indicated above and even more to security
threats which relates to, or derive from high-tech and hi-science products,
technologies and services particularly so-called dual use versions. What
is more, even where such sensitivity or awareness exists at the political,
administrative, military or intelligence levels, they are largely confined
to explicitly military science and technology.
That there are serious potential
security threats in many "civilian" sectors of industry, transport, communications,
energy and public health of which there was awareness in the 70s and even
in the 80s, is not recognised today. If that were not so, the Huawei Technologies
case or the dredging of Mumbai harbour by a Chinese firm or supply of X-ray
baggage inspection machines by other Chinese companies to Leh, Kargil and
Jorhat just would not have arisen at all, to then be rejected by the Navy
and the IB.
Let us hope the government will
not just plug this particular hole but undertake a comprehensive review
of its policies relating to the often subtle and indirect security threats
that emanate from technological and scientific activities, both governmental
and commercial. The government must then undertake the much-needed tightening
of policies and procedures and then put in place regulatory monitoring
and reporting and quick response action mechanisms which are relevant to
such threats which will become more and more frequent in the 21st century.
(The author is professor and chairperson,
Centre for Studies in Science Policy, JNU, New Delhi)
