Author: Sudha Ramachandran
Publication: Asia Times
Date: May 15, 2002
A longtime supporter of Myanmar's
pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, India has welcomed her release from
detention as a concrete step by the Myanmar government toward achieving
lasting peace and tranquility in the country. India has consistently advocated
reconciliation and moves toward restoration of democracy, a spokesperson
from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said last week.
Indeed, India has extended moral
support and more to the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. Especially in
the 1988-92 period, New Delhi was vocal in its backing of Suu Kyi, calling
on the junta to recognize the people's unambiguous mandate in the 1990
election in favor of her National League for Democracy (NLD). Signaling
its support for Suu Kyi, the Indian government even awarded her the prestigious
Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International U! nderstanding in 1995.
Several pro-democracy Myanmar activists
have taken refuge in India and the exiles are known to be in close touch
with its defense minister, George Fernandes. For several years, the government-controlled
All India Radio's Myanmar service relayed pro-democracy propaganda.
India has traditionally supported
pro-democracy movements in its neighborhood - its backing of the Nepalese
Congress in its struggle against the monarchy is an example. Besides, the
close relationship between the leaders of the two newly independent countries
- India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Myanmar's independence
hero Aung San (father of Suu Kyi) and Suu Kyi's ties with India (she received
her university education in New Delhi) - are still recalled here with fondness.
However, India, which has supported
Suu Kyi largely on a matter of principle and for sentimental reasons, has
found that the policy is not pragmatic and did not serve India's secu!
rity interests. Around 1992-93, New Delhi realized that its policy of backing
Suu Kyi against the generals was proving counter-productive as it had left
the door open for the blossoming of ties between Myanmar's junta and the
Chinese government.
Incidentally, relations between
Myanmar and China had been steadily improving from the late 1970s. Bilateral
visits at the highest level, China's distancing itself from the Burmese
Communist Party and Yangon's (then Rangoon) endorsement of China's policy
toward Kampuchea (support to the Khmer Rouge), among other things, brought
the two countries closer.
China's ties were on a firm footing
by the mid-1980s. When the rest of the world ostracized the junta for the
brutal crackdown in 1988, Beijing extended a supportive hand to the generals.
When the rest of the world criticized the generals for human-rights violations
and were reluctant to trade with Myanmar, China was ready to engage in
diverse forms of cooperation, inc! luding sale and supply of military equipment,
trade in consumer goods, building Myanmar's infrastructure and so on.
This prompted India to re-evaluate
its strategy of vocal and open support for the pro-democracy movement in
Myanmar. Several factors have contributed to a change in strategy from
one of criticizing the generals for their refusal to heed the democratic
mandate to that of doing business with them.
The most important has been the
significant and growing military cooperation between Myanmar and China,
with grave implications for India's security. The most worrying for India
has been growing Chinese naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. According
to Indian intelligence reports, the Chinese-built radar facility on Myanmar's
Coco Islands (near India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands) provides Beijing
with input on India's missile-testing facilities in its east-coast state
of Orissa.
Then, several insurgent groups active
in India's strife-torn northe! astern states operate from sanctuaries in
Myanmar. India has realized it needs Myanmar's cooperation to crack down
on the insurgents and break their supply lines. There is also the booming
drug trade that India cannot tackle without support from Myanmar's military.
India is also keen to reap the considerable
potential that exists in cooperation in the economic and energy fields.
Besides, Myanmar is India's stepping stone to Southeast Asia. India's "Look
East" policy "could not have acquired momentum if we continued to ignore
the junta in Myanmar", a Ministry of External Affairs official pointed
out to Asia Times Online. India's heart might beat for the pro-democracy
movement, but its head has directed it to improve ties with the generals.
In the guise of non-interference
in the internal affairs of Myanmar, India changed tack in the early 1990s.
Vocal support for the democratic aspirations of the people of Myanmar was
toned down.
Strategic calculations! prompted
India to initiate a policy of "strategic Engagement" with the generals
in 1991. At the Jakarta summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1992,
India did not block Myanmar's re-admission into the grouping. High-level
visits between diplomats of the two countries followed.
In 1994, a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) was signed to increase cooperation between the civilian border authorities
of the two countries to prevent "illegal and insurgent activities". Another
bilateral agreement was signed to regularize and promote border trade.
It was only post-1998 that India's
ties with the generals received a significant boost. India under a government
that was pursuing a "muscular foreign policy" aimed at beefing up its defense
and security interests went all out to woo Yangon.
In November 2000, the vice chairman
of Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council, General Maung
Aye, visited India. Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has vis! ited
Yangon twice since then. India now supplies military equipment to Myanmar
and is said to have leased helicopters to its army.
However, it is a road project that
is the most visible and positive evidence of India-Myanmar cooperation.
The road linking Moreh in India's northeastern state of Manipur with Kalewa
on the Chindwin River in Myanmar is expected to transform trade between
the two countries radically. Last month, India, Myanmar and Thailand reached
agreement on a road connecting the three countries. The stepping-stone
provided by improving ties with Myanmar is helping India reach out to Southeast
Asia.
How successful has India been in
deepening engagement with Myanmar? In the early 1990s, India's castigation
of the generals did adversely affect relations. Today, however, while New
Delhi has not completely succeeded in wiping out the perception that it
empathizes with Suu Kyi's struggle, it avoids commenting on the situation
in Myanmar beyond mouthin! g such terms as reconciliation and peace. That
is something the generals are willing to live with. Doing business with
each other is in the mutual interest of India and the generals. Their interaction
might not be close but it is correct. "Unlike the general to our west [President
General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan], the generals to our east [the junta
in Myanmar] do not undermine our security interests and are willing to
cooperate on an array of issues," says the External Affairs Ministry official.
The time-tested ties that the junta
has with China stand in the way of India's closer cooperation with Myanmar.
But there are issues with regard to China that trouble Yangon - the growing
influx of Chinese into Myanmar that has in the past triggered violent clashes
between the immigrants and locals, is one - and should these differences
deepen, New Delhi can expect an improved relationship with Myanmar.
The junta is said to be uncomfortable
with its overwhelming! dependence on China and there is a possibility that
India could gain should it decide to reduce that reliance.
Last week's statement on Suu Kyi's
release is yet another example of India's tightrope walk in Myanmar. It
made clear its position of support to restoration of democracy in Myanmar
- a tilt in favor of Suu Kyi. It corrected that tilt by giving the generals
a pat on the back for their "concrete steps" toward lasting peace.
