Author: Editorial
Publication: The Washington Post
Date: May 15, 2002
Last January Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf delivered a highly promoted television address in which
he promised to lead his divided and impoverished country in an entirely
new direction. His aim, he said, was to create a modern, prosperous and
democratic "Islamic welfare state"; to do that, he would purge the country
of the Islamic extremism that had infected its politics, its schools and
its armed forces. Terrorism, Mr. Musharraf declared, would no longer be
tolerated, and militant groups that had waged war against India and its
rule of Muslim Kashmir would no longer be supported. In the days after
the speech, as police rounded up some 2,000 militants from five newly banned
organizations, it seemed that Mr. Musharraf might really be determined
to transform his country, defuse a mounting confrontation with India and
turn a short-term alliance with the United States in Afghanistan into a
long-term partnership.
Four months later, that hopeful
prospect has largely dissipated. Most of the militants Mr. Musharraf had
arrested are back on the streets, and there has been a string of sensational
terrorist attacks against Westerners in Pakistani cities. Extremist religious
schools are still operating. Guerrillas are once again infiltrating from
Pakistan into Kashmir, prompting renewed talk of war between two nuclear-armed
states that between them have 1 million troops deployed along their border.
Mr. Musharraf may even be scaling back his cooperation with the U.S. military;
according to a report in The Post by Thomas E. Ricks and Kamran Khan, Pakistan
has refused to launch operations against concentrations of al Qaeda and
Taliban fighters who have taken refuge in its western provinces.
Rather than pursue the courageous
agenda he outlined, Mr. Musharraf has recently devoted himself to a counterproductive
effort to consolidate power at the expense of Pakistani democracy. Last
month he staged a one-sided referendum to extend his term as president
for five years, an initiative that served to weaken rather than confirm
his political authority. Now he is talking about imposing a military-dominated
national security council to oversee future civilian governments. Pakistan's
normally fractious political parties, media and civil society have united
in opposition to these measures, virtually ensuring that Mr. Musharraf
will be locked in a power struggle for the foreseeable future, not with
Muslim extremists but with the very Pakistanis who most support a secular
and democratic society.
Perhaps Mr. Musharraf believes he
must strengthen his position before carrying out the promised reforms;
more likely he finds it easier to take on journalists, civilian politicians
and India than the Muslim extremists or those in his own military who insist
on promoting an insurgency in Kashmir. In any case, his present course
risks not only the ruin of his promise of reform but even greater disasters,
including the resurgence of al Qaeda inside Pakistan, or war with India.
The Bush administration embraced Mr. Musharraf last year after he pledged
his support for the military campaign in Afghanistan; it showered him with
economic aid and overlooked his bogus referendum. But it cannot continue
to cling to him if he is to lead his regime over a cliff. Once again, as
it did after Sept. 11, the administration must present the Pakistani president
with a stark choice: Either he must act decisively against the extremists
of al Qaeda and Kashmir, and implement the domestic reforms he promised,
or lose the support of the United States.
