Author: Zubeida Mustafa
Publication: The Dawn
Date: May 28, 2002
May 28 is the fourth anniversary
of Pakistan's nuclear tests at Chaghai. On Yom-i-takbir, which the government
celebrated in a big way in 1999, it informed the people through boastful
newspaper ads: "We are the seventh nuclear power of the world".
Today, as war clouds gather on the
horizon, this nuclear status gives us no joy or confidence. Those in power
might reassure us that nuclear weapons will not be used. But who will believe
them? Can states, which possess nuclear arsenals, keep their confrontation
limited to warfare with conventional weapons?
The fact is that the nuclear capability
we created for ourselves four years ago hangs like an albatross tied round
our neck. When Islamabad decided to test its nuclear device, we were told
that the tests were essential for Pakistan to restore the strategic balance
with India. That country, under a militant right-wing Hindu fundamentalist
government, had foolishly tested its nuclear bomb a fortnight earlier in
a show of jingoism. But now it is plain that this balance will not save
the two countries from self-destruction.
Initially, the governments on both
sides of the border proceeded on the assumption that MAD (the nuclear doctrine
of mutually assured destruction) will pre-empt a nuclear conflict between
them. The general belief - though questionable - is that the US and the
USSR didn't start a shooting war with each other in the cold war years
because their nuclear weapons acted as a deterrent.
What has happened in our case is
that we have come to wrongly believe that nuclear weapons can be made to
serve rational ends. But this is a misconception. They are basically weapons
of mass destruction and their use would amount to mass suicide, for the
contiguity of the two neighbours ensures that the attacker is equally vulnerable.
The nuclear fallout would show no
respect for international boundaries. Experts tell us that those close
enough to "ground zero" (a six square-mile area for a one megaton blast)
will be killed instantly by the gamma rays emitted from the blast. Others
- that is nine out of ten people - will die in a ten-mile radius from the
radiation, the pressure wave, the high-velocity winds and the firestorms
which will follow. Hundreds of thousands will die immediately and many
more will be doomed to die within a few weeks a painful and slow death
caused by radioactivity.
One wonders if our policymakers
understand the horrible implications of a nuclear attack. It is plain that
they will never be able to resist the temptation to press the nuclear button
when a conventional war breaks out in which Pakistan finds itself at a
disadvantage, being the weaker side in conventional warfare. Moreover,
in the climate of hatred and tension which is building up in the region,
neither of the two governments can truly give an undertaking that the nuclear
option will not be used.
Moreover, Pakistan with its smaller
size and lack of territorial depth will be the one to suffer greater devastation
even if it resorts to a first strike - which it might be tempted to do
as a pre-emptive move.
It is strange that there is no general
concern among the people at the mounting tension and the hazards of a nuclear
war. That is probably due to the low level of knowledge and awareness of
the dangers of radiation. In fact, the political parties and the media,
which should know better, are whipping up a war psychosis and militant
nationalism which will only encourage the government to throw all restraint
to the wind.
Chaghai instilled a sense of false
confidence in defence planners in Islamabad. From the revelations made
by Bruce Riedel, the special assistant to President Clinton for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs at the US National Security Council, it appears
that Pakistan was actually preparing to use its nuclear missiles in the
Kargil war in 1999 when India threatened, out of sheer desperation, to
broaden the theatre of the conflict.
The most negative impact of Chaghai
has been that it has robbed Islamabad of the incentive to try hard enough
for a politically negotiated settlement of its disputes with India. We
have attempted to bargain as though we hold the high ground - when we don't
militarily, politically or economically. We have a strong moral case in
Kashmir no doubt, but by now we should know that morality without tangible
strength on the ground takes one nowhere.
Paradoxically, the nuclear explosions
only weakened us in the areas where we needed to consolidate ourselves.
They started off an arms race, which has forced us to divert more and more
of our measly economic resources towards defence. The defence budget has
shot up from Rs 131.3 billion in 1997-98 to Rs 152.7 billion in 1999-2000
to plateau at Rs 131.6 billion in 2001-02 (budgeted - actual figures are
disclosed three years later).
And how has this impacted on the
national economy? Pakistan was subject to sanctions for more than three
years until 9/11 came to our rescue and the government's willingness to
cooperate with the Americans in their war against terrorism rehabilitated
Islamabad's status in Washington. But three years were enough to undermine
the economy. As Shaukat Aziz, the federal finance minister, has now admitted,
poverty has increased because of the declining growth rates - 4.2 per cent
in 1998-99, 3.9 per cent in 1999-2000 and 2.4 per cent in 2000-2001.
Since we cannot boast of a strong
tradition of research in the health sciences and sustainable environment,
no effort has been made to evaluate the effects of the Chaghai tests on
the ecology, climate, natural resources and the health of the people. Press
reports and random surveys give the impression that the incidence of cancer
is on the rise.
Widespread drought has affected
food production. In the absence of scientific research and surveys there
is no way of confirming if this could be related to the Chaghai blasts.
One just knows that the 'silent winter', a byproduct of nuclear explosions,
is known to produce similar effects, and at Chaghai the mountain died,
to use Eqbal Ahmed's anguished words.
Being a smaller state and having
weakened ourselves with our own follies, we want to deal with India on
equal terms. We proceeded to create a nuclear capability, which we planned
to use in times of crisis without as much as drawing up the rules of the
nuclear game with our adversary.
True, it was India which set the
ball rolling by detonating its nuclear devices, but was Pakistan obliged
to follow suit against all sane considerations and sensible advice?
Chaghai only made us bolder and
more reckless. A number of opportunities came for a peaceful resolution
of the crisis in the region. There was Mr Vajpayee's famous bus journey
to Lahore in February, 1999. There was the cease-fire in the Kashmir valley
in 2000 and the summit at Agra. But at no stage did the government attempt
to address the root cause of the immediate crisis, namely, the militants
who reportedly infiltrate into the valley to cause violence there. Their
action has all along had the potential of becoming a casus belli and yet
we did not try to hold them back.
India says that these militants
will be the target of "surgical" strikes. President Bush has set the precedent
when he attacked the Taliban in Afghanistan. If Islamabad is expecting
Washington to intervene and act as a restraining force, it might be disappointed
this time. We have forgotten the lesson of Kargil, when Pakistan was forced
to withdraw its forces under American pressure.
On this occasion too Mr Vajpayee
may be allowed to proceed with his unholy plans. After all, the Americans
have no love for the Islamic militants either and it would be expedient
to allow New Delhi to do the dirty work of cleaning them up without incurring
the odium the US did when it attacked Afghanistan.
President Musharraf insists that
the militants in Kashmir are not operating from our side of the border.
If that is so and he is sincere about avoiding a war, the president should
heed the sensible suggestion a newly-launched daily from Lahore gave last
week.
Pakistan should offer to unilaterally
pull back its forces from the LoC, create a demilitarized zone on Pakistan's
side of the Line and ask the UN for international monitors to be stationed
there. This will rob India of the pretext to attack.
