Author: Arabinda Ghose
Publication: Organiser
Date: March 3, 2002
Introduction: Neharu used to meekly
surrender before Mountbatten and the British officers. Ultimately to the
chagrin of Sardar Patel, Neharu went over all India Radio on January 1,
1949, to announce a ceasefire in Kashmir. Shocked, Sardar Patel had remarked
"Jawahar Pachhtayega" (Jawahar will repent). How right he was!
Speaking in the Central Hall of
the Parliament House on the midnight of August 14-15, 1947, on the occasion
of India becoming Independent after a long struggle, Jawaharlal Nehru,
in his "tryst with destiny" speech, began with, "when the whole world sleeps",
India emerged as an independent nation. How wrong he was! For one thing,
from purely a geographical point of view, it was only about 6.30 in the
evening that time in London when it was not even dark, and the United States
and the western hemisphere had just woken up. For another, the British
were certainly not asleep at that moment, at least not even figuratively.
The Viceroy of India, now renamed
Governor-General, Lord Louis Mountbatten of Burma and his consort, Lady
Edwina Mountbatten, were on the podium in full regalia, reminding everyone
that the head of the dominion was still the King of England, George VI.
And the entire armed forces of India, which had won laurels in both the
world wars with a number of Victoria Crosses to their credit, remained
under the command of the British officers.
Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck
was the Supreme Commander of both the Indian and Pakistani armed forces.
General Lockhart (later General Bucher) was the Commander-in-Chief of the
Indian Army. Air Vice-Marshal Elmherst was the Commander-in-Chief of the
Indian Air Force till 1950 and Admiral Hall was in charge of the Indian
Navy.
On the Pakistani side, General Douglas
Gracey was the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army. Pakistan did not have
then either a Navy or an Air Force worth mentioning. However, it were the
British who were manning the seniormost posts in the armed forces in that
country too.
One of the many cases of apparent
insubordination by these officers emanated from a secret instruction issued
by Sir Claude Auchinleck which enjoined all British officers serving with
the two dominions to "Stand Down" in the event of India and Pakistan going
to war. At the height of the Junagadh crisis on September 27, the three
service chiefs manning the Indian Armed Forces wrote to the Defence Minister
Sardar Baldev Singh in a joint memorandum virtually refusing to obey the
Government of India's orders in case the Army was asked to march into Junagadh.
In his recently published book War
and diplomacy in Kashmir 194 7-48 (Sage Publications India Ltd, New Delhi)
Shri C. Dasgupta former diplomat says that General Rob Lockhart, Admiral
Hall and Air Commodore Mukherjee (representing Air Marshal Elmhirst) point
out to the 'very real danger' of a clash with Junagadh forces... They went
on to draw the attention to the position of British officers including
themselves serving with the Indian Armed Forces who "belong to the British
fighting services and it would be impossible for any of them to take part
in a war between the two dominions or to be the instrument of planning
or conveying orders to others should the operations now contemplated lead
to such a war, or appear likely to do so". They concluded by urging that
the "movement of armed forces for the projected operations be stopped and
that the dispute regarding Junagadh be settled by negotiations".
The Cabinet reacted sharply, adds
Shri Dasgupta, to this invasion of the political domain by the military.
Sardar Patel was outraged by what he regarded as the disloyalty of the
British Officers. Prime Minister Nehru as usual, consulted Mountbatten
on this matter. 'The Governor-General warded off a crisis by sending for
General Lockhart and persuading him to Withdraw the letter. After securing
the consent of the two colleagues Lockhart wrote to the Prime Minister
expressing distress and admitting that this could be interpreted as a -attempt
to "trespass our proper sphere". However, even while admitting their guilt
Lockhart wrote that we were anxious to make (the point) that at the present
time all the British officers serving in India, whether at Supreme Headquarters
or in the Armed Forces of India or Pakistan, are on a single list (and)
we feel it incumbent on us to represent this."
Shri Dasgupta remarks that "the
apology tendered by the service chiefs did not alter the fact that British
officers were prohibited, by orders, from taking part in an inter-dominion
war. On the very next day after the service chiefs withdrew their letter,
the stand down instructions were reiterated in a secret message from Field
Marshal Auchinleck to all senior British commanders in the Indian and Pakistani
armed forces. The Supreme Commander for India and Pakistan issued the following
orders.
"On receipt of the code word 'STAND
DOWN' the following order will be immediately put into force:
Owing to the immediate risk outbreak
of open conflict between the armed forces of India and Pakistan, all British
officers and other ranks HOWEVER employed and WHATEVER rank shall cease
forthwith to take any further part in the command or administration of
the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan. You will take immediate action
to this effect, and nothing is to be allowed to impede it."
If one opens almost any page of
the book, one will find how the leaders of India meekly surrendered before
both the Governor General and the Service Chiefs. Let us take page 94 for
example which relates to the issue of holding on to Poonch or surrendering
it. Here are excerpts:...... the question of evacuating Poonch led to a
heated debate. The Governor General vigorously supported the Chiefs of
Staff in calling for evacuation. Operations in Jammu, he said, were the
'exact inverse' of operations in the Jhelum Valley. In the Srinagar area,
victory was certain." In the Jammu sector, however, India suffered from
a serious strategic weakness since her lines of communication ran parallel
to the Pakistani border. He compared the situation with the Imphal operations
during World War II.
"The Prime Minister questioned this
approach says Shri Dasgupta" and "called for bold action, urging an offensive
at selected points in the Poonch area". A fighting force like the raiders
could not hold together for long unless they were winning. A series of
successful offensives by the Indian army would break the morale of the
invaders and cause them to withdraw. Nehru rejected the parallel with operations
in the Burma theatre. In the Burma operations, the main bases were far
removed from the lines of communication; in Jammu, on the other hand, the
main bases in east Punjab were not very far from the lines of communication.
Even if the lines of communication were to be cut temporarily, it would
not entail the same disastrous consequences as might have been the case
in Burma.
The Governor-General brought the
debate-to an end by observing that ministers could only give policy directives;
details of operations should be left to the Chiefs of Staff. He expressed
the opinion that the policy might take the form of directing the Chiefs
of Staff to keep at the front the largest force which could be adequately
maintained, in order to prosecute operations vigorously. The Prime Minister
agreed but added significantly that it was most important to adopt an offensive-and
not defensive approach. The Governor General conceded that this should
be an essential element of the directive. In regard to Poonch, it was agreed
that a decision would await receipt of General Russell's recommendation
but, meanwhile, there should be no withdrawal.
Nehru was unshakeably determined
to hold on to Poonch, Russell met him the day, after the Defence Committee
meeting in a final attempt to get him to reconsider his decision. The General
once again emphasised the military risks involved in maintaining an insulated
garrison and the problems involved in its relief. The Prime Minister declared
emphatically that evacuation of the town should not even be contemplated.
A withdrawal would give encouragement to the raiders at a critical juncture.
Moreover, the refugees who had sought shelter in the town would meet a
terrible fate at the hands of the enemy. The Prime Minister's unyielding
stand settled the question. Russell accepted the decision and assured Nehru
that he would do his utmost to implement it successfully though this would
require a bit of good luck.
Shri Dasgupta has also revealed
that the British Officers were getting increasingly anxious about the role
of Lt Gen K.M. Kariappa who was to take over as the Commander-in-Chief
of the Indian Army in January 1949. Towards the end of 1948 when there
were a sort of stalemate in the Kashmir war Lt Gen Cariapp's actions showed
that he was functioning independently of the British officers including
his senior, Gen. Bucher.
Although Nehru often spoke strongly
about how the army should carry on operations in Kashmir he used to meekly
surrender before Mountbatten and the British officers. Ultimately to the
chagrin of Sardar Patel, Nehru went over All India Radio on January 1,
1949, to announce a ceasefire in Kashmir. Shocked, Sardar Patel had remarked
"Jawahar pachhtayega" (Jawahar will repent). How right he was!
One must mention here the role played
by Philip Noel Baker who was the Secretary of State in the Common Wealth
Relations Office during the war. He was the evil force in the entire Security
Council debates in Kashmir and had consistently tried to get resolutions
favourable to Pakistan, often violating the instructions of his Prime Minister,
Clement Attlee. It will surprise many an Indian to learn that he was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize a few years later!
