Author: Claude Arpi
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: November 27, 2002
Hu Jintao's appointment as the new
General Secretary of the CCP was no surprise. Though the media reported
that little was known about Mr Hu's past, at least one part of his life
is well documented: The period between 1988 and 1992 when the "core leader
of the Forth Generation" was Tibet's party secretary. A closer look at
the way Mr Hu used his post in Tibet as a stepping stone to reach the top,
is indeed fascinating.
Mr Hu's political career really
started when he joined the Young Cadre Course at the Party School in Beijing
in 1981. It is here that he met Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the
CCP who became one of his first mentors. The elder Hu was certainly one
of the most remarkable leaders of modern China and a great reformer. Remember
his funeral ceremonies after his sudden death during a Politburo meeting
in April 1989, triggered the Tiananmen student revolt!
When the elder Hu tried to introduce
reforms in China in the early 1980s, he was violently opposed by some of
his colleagues in the Politburo. During this period, it appears that the
younger Hu defended him. But, the mid-80s saw a new wind blowing in Beijing.
As Hu Yaobang progressively lost to the most conservative elements led
by Mr Li Peng and Mr Qiao Shi, Mr Hu Jintao was quick to realign himself,
primarily with Mr Qiao Shi, in charge of internal security, who became
the younger Hu's new mentor.
But let us come back for a moment
to Hu Yaobang. During a visit in Tibet in 1980, he was so shocked to see
the suffering of the Tibetan people that he publicly admitted that the
party "has let the Tibetan people down. The life of the Tibetan people
has not been notably improved" after the Chinese invasion. As a result
of his determination to implement a more lenient Tibet policy, the elder
Hu invited the Dalai Lama to send fact finding delegations to Tibet and
negotiating teams to Beijing. Unfortunately, due to the changes in Beijing,
everything came to a sudden halt in 1985. Two years later, the situation
took a turn for the worse when some monks demonstrated against the Chinese
rule in Lhasa. As hundreds of visitors and media persons were present in
the capital, images of the repression which followed were flashed the world
over.
While in Beijing, Mr Hu Yaobang
was replaced by Mr Zhao Ziyang; Mr Wu Jinghua, the elder Hu's protege,
lost his job as party secretary in Lhasa. It is probably when Mr Qiao Shi
visited Tibet in July 1988 that the decision was taken to appoint Mr Hu
Jintao as the new Tibet chief. It was to be the crucial turn in the younger
Hu's career; he knew he could not afford to fail in his task. Had not Mr
Qiao threatened of "merciless repression" if the demonstrations were not
immediately stopped? A Hong Kong paper Kuang Chiao Ching wrote then: "If
he rules Tibet successfully, perhaps the question on everyone's mind in
the near future could be: Will Hu Jintao become a superstar on China's
political stage?"
On January 19, 1989, a few days
after his takeover, Mr Hu informed the army about "the CCP Central Committee's
new instructions on work in Tibet." Involvement of the PLA in Tibet's internal
affairs was ominous. A week later he defined his strategy of "grasping
with both hands". A Beijing newspaper reported about the tasks for the
two hands: "To safeguard the unification of the motherland and stabilise
the situation in Tibet", and "to continue to carry out economic construction".
From that day, events moved very fast. On January 23, accompanied by the
Panchen Lama, Mr Hu visited the Tashilhunpo monastery. During the function,
the Panchen Lama denounced the party's role in Tibet: "Although there had
been developments in Tibet since its liberation, this development had cost
more dearly than its achievements". Four days later, he passed away in
mysterious circumstances. The Lama's death cleared the stage for the "merciless
repression".
When a demonstration erupted on
March 5, the Armed Police (PAP) quickly took control of the situation.
A Chinese journalist, Tang Daxian, who had access to party documents, wrote
later in The Observer that the order had come from Beijing to unleash the
repression. His information was that on March 6 alone, 387 Tibetans were
massacred around the Central Cathedral in Lhasa. The next day, Mr Hu declared
that "the PAP following the instructions of the Central Committee (read
Qiao Shi) had maintained the unity of the Motherland". Martial Law was
clamped down on March 8. The tragic events in Lhasa seem to have been a
rehearsal for another episode 3 months later: The student rebellion on
Tiananmen Square.
Mr Hu's ruthless implementation
of his bosses' orders proved that he was a leader that could be relied
on. Mr Jiang Zemin who replaced Mr Zhao Ziyang after the massacre on the
square, remembered it. Mr Hu was to stay for 4 more years in Tibet to further
"stabilise" the situation by targeting the Tibetan cadres "harbouring separatist
thoughts" and introducing political education in the monasteries. Now that
Mr Hu has reached the top, will he continue to "grasp China with two hands"?
In other words will he use force again as his Elders did, or will he choose
the path of Hu Yaobang and open up the system? Only the future will tell
us, but both have risks.
