Author: Shekhar Gupta
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: February 8, 2003
And this time, it is not about oil
but about political Islam
The past week has seen some welcome,
if belated, course correction in our policy on Iraq and the US. The confusion
had peaked last week with Defence Minister George Fernandes asserting that
India won't participate in any military action against Iraq. It was said,
perhaps, as a measure of extreme caution just in case somebody happened
to ask us. But since then the silence of our policy-makers and leaders
is more than welcome. It was nobody's case that we should become Donald
Rumsfeld's cheerleaders. But repeated expressions of friendship with Saddam,
or exaggerated faith in the UN, were driving us into a hole.
Usually policy establishments are
loath to make mid-course corrections. It is worse in cases where policy
has been pushed forward by the foreign service establishment and then articulated
by the political leadership. It is tough for any bureaucracy to adjust
to the political masters that it led into a trap. It is tougher for an
establishment as brahmanical as our foreign service to even admit that
they were wrong. That is why it is even more creditable that this shift
has come about. For once the political leadership has acted in time. Somebody
had to tell a runaway South Block where India's national interest lay and
that it is silly to get carried away by the very typically European anti-Americanism.
Also, that India is not France, at least not yet.
The reason the policy had gone astray
was simply that the political leadership had been so distracted by internal
issues, the pre- and post- Gujarat situation, the Cabinet reshuffle and
economic issues particularly in the build-up to the Budget that this vital
concern was overlooked for the moment. Or perhaps the increasing irritation
with Washington over its failure to decisively rein in Pakistan had coloured
our judgment as well.
The government had to be extremely
distracted, if not confused, for even the prime minister to publicly express
apprehensions on the impact of the war on oil supplies. It fitted very
well with the popular view that the US move on Iraq is about oil. It's
okay for your landlord to believe that. But when your government begins
to plug such misconceptions, it is time to get concerned.
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was
at least partly about oil. With the occupation of Kuwait, Saddam controlled
far too much of the world's oil. He could have moved into Saudi Arabia
just as easily and become an oil monopoly of sorts. The Saudi forces, despite
possessing the most modern American weaponry, wouldn't have fared much
better than their Kuwaiti counterparts.
They were never so hot at fighting.
Their fighting prowess was best described by political humourist P.J.O.Rourke,
who covered that war. He defied anybody to find a Saudi soldier lifting
anything heavier than his paycheck. The US-led intervention in 1991 was,
therefore, to save the Gulf oil from Saddam. That is why it stopped well
short of Baghdad or toppling Saddam. That is why the Americans returned,
happy that the Saudis and Kuwaitis also reimbursed all their operational
costs.
Today the situation is fundamentally
different. Iraq is not threatening anybody's territory, oil reserves or
sovereignty. This war is not about oil but about political Islam. That
is why this situation is enormously more complicated than 1991.
The 1991 Gulf War was easier to
see in black-and-white terms. A sovereign nation had been occupied and
Saddam was the aggressor. It was easy, therefore, for the rest of the world.
So easy that not merely the Gulfies and Egypt but even the Pakistanis had
found it convenient enough to contribute their armed forces to the effort
with expectations of a post-war dividend. India, too, had facilitated the
war effort by allowing US military planes to refuel. Watch how the Gulfies,
the Egyptians, the Pakistanis twist in the wind this time as the US moves
into Iraq. We will have the choice of two options. We could share these
nations' predicament and howl with them.
Or we could sit back and contemplate
our next move to take advantage of this unique situation. When US moves,
all guns blazing, against political Islam, much to the discomfiture of
its own traditional and oh-so-cynical Muslim allies it is no cause for
us to mourn. Yes, we should never forget the people of Iraq and their right
to sovereignty and freedom but never forget that they need as much of that
freedom from Saddam Hussein than from any foreign power.
How does this campaign to change
the nature of political Islam work? Let us, first of all, imagine the modern
democratic and liberal world's (we include ourselves in it, of course)
worst nightmare scenario, post 9/11, and 13/12.
Isn't it a pan-national extreme
Islamic terrorist network armed with nuclear and biological weapons? If
so, where will this operate from and from where will it get funds and weaponry?
And what is a workable strategy to prevent that from happening?
Five of the largest Islamic nations
are crucial to this equation: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.
Each one has unique characteristics.
Egypt is the oldest and most loyal
western ally. The Saudis control the Muslim holy places, the clergy and
endless stores of funds to promote pan-Islamic causes and movements. Iraq
and Iran are the two premier civilisational states for the Muslims. They
also represent two different ethnicities and cultures that have defied
the Islamic bond to nurture a history of distrust and wars for more than
a thousand years. The Persian-Arab wars are much older than the crusades
or Muslim invasions of India. All these nations also produce and export
oil. Pakistan is in a category by itself. It is the only Islamic nation
where the people have tasted some democracy or at least where they have
voted a few times. To that extent its 14-crore population is more volatile
than any other Muslim nation. It is also unique within the Islamic world
in possessing an army which is capable of absorbing modern technology as
well as following the orders of its brass. Finally, Pakistan has the Islamic
world's only nukes.
This new Great Game that is unfolding
now, will involve these five. The Americans have, rightly or wrongly, arrived
at three conclusions. One, that 9/11 was merely a beginning and their future
generations will inevitably be threatened by militant Islam armed with
weapons of mass destruction. Two, that this inevitability can't be averted
as long as the Muslim world's politics remains rooted in the mosque and
the madrassa and the gulf between its people and the rulers remains what
it is. Three, it is probably doubtful that the US has the ability to force
such fundamental changes in the Islamic universe as to change the very
nature of its political discourse.
A pan-national movement needs a
city, a shrine or any such visible symbol as its home. For militant Islam
that can't be Karachi or Kandahar. It has to be Jeddah, Jerusalem, Baghdad
or Tehran. And when the movement gets rooted in any of these, the firepower
could come from a post-Musharraf Pakistan, or a rogue Iraq.
Over the past decade we have all
watched, and celebrated Iran's slow march towards democracy. Even on Kashmir,
Iran has made more positive statements than Iraq. Khameini came to Lucknow
and helped soothe the post-Babri situation by expressing faith in Indian
secularism. The demonisation of Iran in the western media is now yielding
to a new tone of realism and appreciation. It is logical to presume that
the move into Iraq will be followed, if not accompanied, by a western opening
up to Iran.
If Tehran was coming around and
Jerusalem was more or less in control, how would you act in Washington
DC if you were worried about Jeddah? There is no excuse, however, to invade
Saudi Arabia. But you will loathe its leaders, fear its religious politics.
So move into the closest place that gives you both an excuse and an opportunity.
That is where Baghdad comes in. The truth is, if this wasn't about oil,
it isn't about Saddam or his nuclear or biological weapons either. It is,
instead, about getting a foothold in the heartland of political Islam.
This is where Pakistan comes in.
It is not for no reason that for the first time since 9/11 a note of discordance
is audible in the US-Pakistan relationship. Earlier this week, Colin Powell
said the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad was in cahoots with al-Qaeda and Musharraf
had to deny it from Moscow. The logic of this war is that what begins in
Baghdad will end in Pakistan though not in the same way. Any military success
in Iraq will mean nothing for the US unless it believes it's been able
to defang militant Islam. And that objective won't be achieved as long
as the Muslim world's only nukes are in control of an unstable Pakistan.
Surely, the Americans would hope to handle, and stabilise Pakistan on the
Egyptian model. But Kashmir, for the average Pakistani, is a bit different
from what Sinai was for the Egyptians. And Musharraf is no Sadat either.
The Pakistanis know this. Their
discomfiture will rise as the US forces invade Iraq. If the war gets messy,
Musharraf's commitment to the US will come under extreme strain from his
public opinion. If the US advance is swift and smooth, the pressure on
him to reform and stabilise his own political system, secure his nukes
in a manner that convinces the world at large, will be immense. It is for
them that we should be planning our moves rather than waste time, energy
and goodwill in empty sloganeering now.
