Author: Ehsan Ahrari
Publication: Asia Times
Date: February 11, 2003
URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EB11Df01.html
A recent issue of Defense News has
an interesting byline of a dispatch from New Delhi: "India, Iran sign strategic
accord." The "startling new accord", it notes, "gives New Delhi the right
to use Iranian military bases in the event of a war with neighboring Pakistan,
in exchange for India providing Tehran with military hardware, training,
maintenance and modernization support".
There is little doubt that this
strategic nexus between Iran and India will force the United States to
reassess its own strategic partnership with India. By the same token, Pakistan
will not only take a note of it, but will also reassess its own ties with
its neighbor to the west. Only recently, Pakistan and Iran were edging
toward establishing warmer relations than they had enjoyed for the past
six or more years, when the Taliban were in power in Afghanistan.
Examining the details of the accord,
India has indeed pulled off a diplomatic coup de grace. A number of its
specifics are somewhat bizarre, given the highly tense relations between
India and Pakistan.
To begin with, rationale is to establish
closer ties between the militaries of India and Iran than they have been
any previous times. Indian naval technicians will station "at Iranian military
bases to maintain and give mid-life upgrades to Iran's MiG-29 fighters".
Indian ordnance-factory technicians will travel to Iran "to refit and maintain
T-27 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, and 105mm and 130mm towed artillery
guns". Indian and Iranian troops and navies will conduct "operational and
combat training for warships and missile boats".
If such an all-service cooperation
between the two countries were not comprehensive enough, the other characteristic
of the strategic accord will enable India's military planners "to quickly
deploy troops, armored personnel carriers, tanks, light armored vehicles
and surveillance platforms to Iran during crises with Pakistan". Considering
the fact that the chief operational focus of "India's current rapid-mobility
capabilities are aimed at defending the Indo- Pak borders", this particular
feature of the accord will quickly deprive Iran of a neutral role between
the two South Asian rivals. In fact, Pakistan may be forced to view Iran
as a potential enemy. At the same time, it provides India an excessive
strategic advantage over its South Asian rival, a reality that has a potential
of tilting an arguable strategic balance significantly in favor of India.
One only wonders how Pakistan will react to such realignment between its
two neighbors.
One feature of this accord promises
to provide India a transport corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia through
Iran. In this sense, it will also be a substantial gain for the South Asian
state, since it is aspiring to enhance its economic and even strategic
presence in that region.
Assessing the nature and scope of
the Indo-Iranian strategic accord, it is clear that both partners have
very different but equally significant needs for it. As a rising power,
India has always found itself at a disadvantage vis-a-vis China, which
had received the lion's share of attention and preference from all US presidents
from Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton. However, George W Bush has changed
the nature of strategic dialogue in South Asia by labeling China as a strategic
competitor and by pursuing a strategic partnership with India. The seeds
of that partnership were sown during the Clinton presidency.
India would have continued to reap
the benefits of Bush's preference for it over China if not for September
11. Since then, to India's chagrin and dismay, Pakistan emerged as a frontline
US ally. Even though the United States still pursues its strategic partnership
with India, the focus of that attention was considerably diminished, while
Washington initiated its global war on terrorism. The newly resuscitated
US-Pakistan partnership meant that India had to look for other strategic
niches in its neighborhood. Iran is a natural candidate for reasons of
its own.
Fortunately, from India's point
of view, Iran's strategic options have been severely limited. It had been
a victim of the US policy of dual containment during the Clinton presidency.
When Bush entered the White House, there were hopes that the United States
and Iran might reach some sort of a positive readjustment, if not a rapprochement,
especially when Washington was getting ready to launch Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. Iran had privately offered to assist the US in
the search-and-rescue operations involving downed American pilots within
its borders during the course of that campaign.
However, when Bush lumped Iran into
his so-called axis of evil, along with North Korea and Iraq, the chances
of any improved ties between Washington and Tehran suffered a severe jolt.
Though the European Union did not share Bush's condemnation of Iran, even
that source was not open for it in terms of getting military wherewithal.
Only Russia and China, along with North Korea, were left as avenues for
the transfer of military weapons, and missile and nuclear know-how. However,
Iran had to broaden its strategic horizons. Thus, India emerged as another
important avenue for military cooperation.
Iran and India have been pursuing
the issue of strategic cooperation largely through signing oil deals and
limited military cooperation. During the Taliban rule over Afghanistan,
even though Iran-Pakistan ties were considerably strained, Iran did not
want to assign high visibility to its ties with India, fearing that Pakistan
might overreact. Besides, Iran and Pakistan had cooperated on nuclear training
and education programs prior to the Taliban's accession to power in Afghanistan.
The nature of that cooperation between 1996 and 2001 remains a mystery.
However, it is safe to assume that Iran did not want to broaden the scope
of its military cooperation with India during those years, without boosting
its strategic ties with Pakistan.
After the dismantlement of the Taliban
government, Pakistan and Iran rejuvenated their ties. President Mohammad
Khatami visited Pakistan toward the end of December last year. During,
prior and after that trip, he continued to dangle the carrot of US$3.5
billion pipelines in the face of Pakistan. These pipelines promise to carry
Iranian gas through Pakistan to India. Pakistan's annual royalties stemming
from the proposed arrangement are expected to be about $500 million to
$600 million. However, Khatami also emphasized that the gas pipelines could
not become a reality until India and Pakistan agreed to resolve their mutual
differences peacefully. President General Pervez Musharraf assured Khatami
that Pakistan was willing to sign an agreement guaranteeing the security
of those pipelines. However, India remains highly distrustful of such assurances.
One also has to examine the Indo-Iranian
accord from the US vantage point. After all, Iran remains as one of the
members of the so-called axis of evil for the Bush administration. The
fact that it has become a strategic partner of India means that Washington
will be forced to take a second look at its own strategic partnership with
New Delhi. Thus far, however, negative reaction from the United States
is either non-existent or may be conveyed through quiet diplomatic channels.
It is worth noting that the Washington
Post on January 28 reported that the United States and India will conduct
a joint air-combat exercise "later this year or early in 2004 ..." The
news release of this upcoming event describes it as a sign of "an intensification
of the new relationship between the US and Indian armed forces, which until
recent years tended to regard each other with suspicion". The US wants
to use its top-of-the-line F-15C to compete against the Russian-built Su-30s
that India has been acquiring since 1997. The unspoken aspect of this exercise
is that China also has Su-30s. That fact might be the driving force behind
the US insistence that India use those aircraft in the exercise.
Naturally, Pakistan is getting alarmed
over this development. It is concerned because through this exercise, the
Indian Air Force might "learn how to better deter Pakistan from believing
it could use US-built F-16s to threaten India with nuclear strikes". Considering
the fact that the F-15C is regarded as superior to the smaller, single-engine
F-16, Pakistani concerns are not at all groundless. In fact, from the Pakistani
viewpoint, this proposed exercise is just another example of how unmindful
the US has been about Islamabad's genuine security concerns, and is driven
only to promote its own strategic objectives.
Of all the actors that are affected
by the Indo-Iranian accord, Pakistan appears to be the only disadvantaged
party. What are its choices? First and foremost, it will have to refocus
on its ties with the United States. In the post-September 11 era, that
superpower has considerably escalated its presence and attention in South
Asia. This reality is likely to benefit Pakistan, if it can work on building
its economy, lowering the influence of obscurantist forces within its borders,
and eradicating all remnants of al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers within
its borders. That might be the only way to draw the US into its corner.
Second, Pakistan will have to approach Iran with a view to understanding
the real intentions of the Indo- Iranian accord.
Allowing Iran to do anything that
alters the South Asian strategic balance so significantly in favor of India
is not something that Pakistan can swallow without retaliating in kind.
Admittedly, at least for now, its choices are limited. However, given that
the modalities of political stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia are
so unsettled, Pakistan's disadvantages might not turn out to be of a lasting
nature. It behooves Iran to ensure that Pakistan stays its friend and an
ally.
(Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.)
