Author: Navnita Chadha-Behera
Publication: The Hindu
Date: February 14, 2003
URL: http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/02/14/stories/2003021400041000.htm
Introduction: The U.S.-Pakistan
alliance (in the war on terror) was tactical, born out of the given exigencies
of the situation and not due to any fundamental shifts in the strategic
imperatives governing the relationship.
The Pakistan Foreign Minister, Khurshid
Kasuri's mission to the United States has failed to prevail upon the Bush
administration to exempt Pakistani nationals from being subjected to compulsory
registration and fingerprinting under a new INS (Immigration and Naturalisation
Service) directive. For the first time since September 11, 2001, when Pakistan
reclaimed its status as the U.S.' `frontline ally', it has been bracketed
with countries alleged to be harbouring terrorists. The U.S. Ambassador
to Pakistan, Nancy Powell, had fired the first warning shot. Her statement
that Pakistan must not allow itself to be used as a "platform for terrorism"
evoked strong protests from the Pakistan Foreign Office and demands for
her expulsion by the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The ensuing debate
has, however, failed to address the root cause of these growing fissures
owing to the divergent U.S. and Pakistani strategic goals in the region.
The key objective of the U.S.-led
Operation Enduring Freedom was to capture the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership
and dismantle the terror network in South Asia. Pakistan, on the other
hand, is averse to dismantling the domestic jehadi network because that
has been its chosen instrument for securing its critical foreign policy
goal of liberating Kashmir. This alliance is coming under strain precisely
due to these conflicting interests.
After the devastating September
11 terrorist strikes, Washington decide to target the Al-Qaeda and its
host, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which necessitated Pakistan's
cooperation for political and operational reasons. It realised that the
war on terrorism, at least in the initial phase of regime change in Kabul,
was not possible without active Pakistani cooperation. Faced with a U.S.
ultimatum of "you are with us or against us," the Pervez Musharraf regime
too had little choice but forsake the Taliban. The resulting U.S.-Pakistan
alliance was tactical, born out of the given exigencies of the situation
and not due to any fundamental shifts in the strategic imperatives governing
the relationship. In the short term, both countries have gained limited
dividends. Pakistan's support was crucial in routing the Taliban regime.
It allowed the U.S. forces to use its three airbases, station troops and
shared intelligence on the Al-Qaeda. It also permitted joint military operations
on Pakistani soil and handed over hundreds of Arabs to the U.S. filling
the cabins in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Pakistan was rewarded with lifting
of sanctions, economic aid, legitimating Gen. Musharraf's military regime
and a promise of facilitating a bilateral dialogue with India on Kashmir.
The last element held the key.
Gen. Musharraf's political calculation
in helping the American military campaign in Afghanistan rested on protecting
Pakistan's stakes in Kashmir. He tried hard to draw a fine distinction
between terrorism on the country's western borders in Afghanistan and jehad
or the "freedom struggle" on the eastern front in Kashmir. Washington obliged
in part. After banning the two terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed,
accused of attacking India's Parliament, the task of pursuing the Pakistan-based
jehadi groups became a secondary consideration - a task entrusted to their
bilateral counter- terrorism working groups. When India upped the military
ante and massed troops on the border following the Parliament attack, the
Bush administration intervened to avert a possible war between the two
neighbours. While Gen. Musharraf was forced to concede that Pakistan would
not allow jehad in the name of Kashmir, Washington also leaned upon the
Indian leadership to observe restraint. The U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert
Blackwill, argued that terrorism against India would be addressed in the
second phase of the war on terrorism. The Bush administration vouched for
Gen. Musharraf's regime; that it was committed to crack down on terrorists
at home but needed more time to do so.
However, with both countries reaching
an impasse in securing their respective fundamental goals, the initial
bonhomie has given way to growing scepticism. For the U.S., the leaders
of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have proved elusive. Reports of the Al-Qaeda
regrouping and attacking American troops before melting away in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan have been mounting. The constant
refrain heard from U.S. military commanders has been that Pakistan could
do more to combat Islamic militants in the border areas but has chosen
not to.
There is an increasing lack of trust
in the Pakistani leadership, armed forces and intelligence services about
their capacity to deliver in the war against terror. Since August last
year, they have been talking of "hot pursuit of Al-Qaeda remnants and Taliban
into Pakistani territory", a statement first made by Dan Macneil, U.S.
military commander in Afghanistan. Culminating in the first clash between
Pakistani and U.S. military forces across the Durand Line, it triggered
a heated debate on the issue of hot pursuit.
The wild goose chase for Osama bin
Laden and the remnants of the Al-Qaeda has drawn a blank partly because
the Bush administration has not understood the logic and character of the
terror network in the region and partly due to Gen. Musharraf's reluctance
to launch a concerted drive against the Pakistan-based jehadi groups. The
U.S. approach overlooks the ground reality that the Al- Qaeda thrives on
a vast, deeply entrenched and integrated network of more than 50 radical
groups which share deep bonds of Islamic ideology, common political targets
- U.S., India and Israel - training facilities and resources. These groups,
unlike states, are operating from a radically different worldview. Some
have their own agenda and are unlikely to emulate the Musharraf regime
and abandon the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Washington must understand that
the Al-Qaeda cannot be vanquished without simultaneously targeting its
support structures - the other jehadi groups - in the region.
The Musharraf regime is reluctant
to take on the jehadi networks because of their indispensability to Pakistan's
Kashmir strategy, which has grown for two reasons. First, the Kashmiris
in the Valley no longer revere Pakistan as their saviour and are less willing
to do its bidding. The Kashmiris' perception of their protector buckling
under international pressure during the Kargil crisis and in jilting the
Taliban has confirmed their worst fears that Pakistan does not have the
wherewithal or the political will to go to war against India to liberate
them. Kashmiris have become pawns in Pakistan's strategy of bleeding India.
Second, Pakistan had armed and trained Kashmiri militants but never trusted
them as reliable partners. Islamabad is increasingly nervous that they
will strike a deal with New Delhi. This is evident from the growing rift
among the Hurriyat leadership, the killing of the moderate Kashmiri leader,
Abdul Ghani Lone and the dismissal of senior (Valley-based) commanders
of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The jehadi groups are, therefore, Gen. Musharraf's
only leverage against India. The Pakistani establishment resents the growing
U.S. pressure and the public demands for ending infiltration into Jammu
and Kashmir. Islamabad also feels the U.S. is backing off from its commitment
to actively engage in brokering a Kashmir settlement through a dialogue
between India and Pakistan.
The impending war in Iraq and Pakistan's
presence in the U.N. Security Council will ensure continuity in the U.S.-
Pakistan alliance in the near future. But unless Washington and Islamabad
mount a concerted effort to address the underlying fissures, Gen. Musharraf's
prophecy that Pakistan could be the next U.S target after Iraq, may well
come true.
(The writer is a Reader in International
Politics, Delhi University.)
