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Terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan

Terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan

Author: Doug Bandow
Publication: The Economic Times
Date: January 15, 2003

Although the Bush administration is focused on planning an entirely new war against Iraq, the battle against al Qaeda and its terrorist allies is far from over. Unfortunately, the conflict isn't likely to end until the US stops allowing western Pakistan to act as a sanctuary for them. Shortly after Christmas a Pakistani border guard wounded a US soldier on patrol in Afghanistan. Islamabad appeared more concerned that America may have dropped a bomb on its territory than that one of its personnel might have aided America's enemies.

US secretary of state Colin Powell called Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf about the incident and the two issued a statement that "reiterated the need to further strengthen co-ordination to ensure that such incidents do not happen in the future."

However, such co-ordination does not mean allowing American forces to operate in Pakistan. Said information minister Sheik Rashid Ahmed: 'Absolutely not. The Americans cannot cross the Pakistani border from Afghanistan to chase what they say are vestiges of Taliban and al Qaeda' Foreign minister Khursheed Kasuri added 'that operations within Pakistani territory would be conducted solely and exclusively by our own forces and in response to decisions taken by Pakistan.'

Leaving the job up to Islamabad would be fine if Pakistan had lived up to its earlier promise to seal the border. If it really controlled its western provinces. If its armed forces had not been closely linked to the Taliban and other Islamic extremists before September 11. If Islamic hard-liners had not recently taken control of two of Pakistan's border provinces and released suspected terrorists. And if al Qaeda and Taliban forces running back into Pakistan had not become a constant problem. Shortly before Christmas a group of men crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan, killed a member of the 82nd Airborne near the border, and fled back into Pakistan.

Islamabad's co-operation is obviously critical for American policy in Afghanistan and President Musharraf has taken some chances for backing the US. However, he has also reaped significant benefits from cooperation with America: financial aid and political support, despite his dictatorial rule and economic mismanagement. He has also earned a more benign view of Pakistan's backing for violent insurgents in the disputed territory of Kashmir, which has brought it to the brink of war with India.

Moreover, Pakistan has long played both sides. The US funneled aid to the anti- Soviet Mujahideen through the inter- Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which supported the most radical Islamic factions, including a much younger Osama bin Laden. Islamabad, along with another US ally, Saudi Arabia, was the primary supporter of the extremist Taliban regime.

Shortly after the US attacked Afghanistan, the ISI apparently spirited numerous al Qaeda and Tabban soldiers back to Pakistan. Suspicions abound that friendly ISI officials have protected as well as arrested al-Qaeda operatives. Most important, Islamabad seems to be doing as little as possible in the Pashtun tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

Allowing Taliban and al Qaeda forces to survive strengthens those Pakistani factions most opposed to the Musharraf government. Moreover, not allowing the US military to destroy terrorist elements lengthens the conflict, confronting the Musharraf government with even more tough political decisions over a longer period of time.

Washington must focus on destroying al Qaeda. Solongas Pakistan, rather like Cambodia and Laos in the Vietnam War, provides sanctuary for America's enemies, they will be able to fight our troops more effectively and threaten the rest of us more seriously. And as long as al Qaeda and Taliban remnants operate in Pakistan, they will attract more adherents and create another generation of terrorists.

Already, some Pakistanis claim, Islamabad looks the other way when limited US cross-border forays occur. If so, Washington needs to expand the deal: it will do whatever is necessary to destroy terrorist sanctuaries while maintaining a discreet silence about such operations. If incidents nevertheless come to light, the Musharraf government can deny that it gave permission, vigorously protest the action, and demand an American apology. But it will do nothing to hinder such operations.

Winning the war on terrorism is obviously in the interest of America and its allies and friends. It is also in Pakistan's interest. Washington must impress upon Islamabad the importance of eliminating any sanctuaries for terrorists.

(The author works u4th the Cato Institute)
 


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