Author: Book review by M. V. Kamath
Publication: The Free Press Journal
Date: April 27, 2003
Pakistan : Eye of the Storm
Owen Bennett Jones; Viking
Pages 328: Rs.395
Some time in 1991, Viking published
'Waiting for Allah' by Christina Lamb, till then probably the best study
of contemporary Pakistan. Ms Lamb had served as Financial Times correspondent
in Pakistan for a couple of years and was allegedly quite close to Benazir
Bhutto. Her book created a sensation.
Brutally frank, it was Ms Lamb who
had written that Sindhis were "waiting for the Indian Army" to come and
were asking her "why it had not yet come?" Ms Lamb spared nobody.
She treated Pakistani elections as a joke maintaining that in the 1988
elections, of the 237 MPs elected, "more than 230 were major landlords
or tribal chiefs, and presumably beneficiaries of the feudal bloc-vote."
Corruption, she wrote, was rampant and "one needed to go to the top for
everything",. She dismissed Pakistan as "an invented country" which, in
the space of forty five years "has gone from a nation searching for a country
to country searching for a nation".
Owen Bennett Jones who was
BBC correspondent in Pakistan from 1998 to 2001 is no less frank.
He reminds readers that under General Zia "textbooks were overhauled to
ensure their ideological purity and un-Islamic reading matters was removed
from libraries and schools". Nawaz Sharief was no better. He is dismissed
as "an appalling administrator who consistently favoured making grand pronouncement
rather that seriously attempting to implement policies". The United
States is shown its place. Jones say bluntly "in the course of their
campaign to remove the Soviets (from Afghanistan) the US had spent over
$ 7 billion" to create an effective Mujahideen force. As for terrorism,
"Washington's message was clear, if the militants restricted their fight
to India's security forces in Kashmir, they would be left alone (but) if
they tried to attach Western targets, they would be treated as terrorists".
Jones makes it plain that "successive American administrations were quite
tolerant of the militant groups in Kashmir".
Who funded the madrassahs? Why,
the United States and Saudi Arabia, of course. By 1987, there
were 2,972 madrassahs when forty years earlier, in 1947 there were hardly
250 of them in the country. A survey carried out in Punjab in 1995
had revealed that there were 2,512 madrassahs in Punjab alone producing
over 30,000 graduates. In 2001no other than Gen. Musharraf was to
concede that there were 7000 to 8000 madrassahs in Pakistan with between
600,000 to 7800,000 students attending them. No even Musharraf knew
the exact number of terrorists that the madrassahs were churning out year
after year! Reading Jones is to get an education in the mindset of the
Pakistani armed forces. Detailed information is available on the
1999 coup during which Musharraf and the Pakistani army overthrew Nawaz
Sharierf
Much of what Jones has written on
the chapter on Kashmir is known though there are one or two minor revelations.
Of Sheikh Abdullah he writes that "in Public" he stated his commitment
to a secular India but "in private he made no secret of his desire for
independence" and had told the US Ambassador Loy Henderson "that he favoured
Kashmiri independence". We get a glimpse of the thinking of the Pakistani
armed forces prior to the 1965 war. In secret not to Gen. Mohammad
Musa, Ayub Khan had written that "as a general rule Hindu morale would
not stand for more than a couple of hard blows delivered at the right time
and the right place" and that therefore, "such opportunities should be
sought and exploited". It was Ayub Khan, incidentally who had said
that "one Muslim soldier was equivalent to ten Indian soldiers" . Ghazni
Mohammad continues to live in Pakistani army camps and in the hears and
minds of Pakistani army officer, no matter if they lost three wars.
Jones provides an excellent study
on the subject of Kargil. He writes to say that "Kargil was a piece
of adventurism that totally backfired because Pakistan's High Command had
not thought through the consequences" and blame is laid on Musharraf.
Who was responsible for Kargil? Jones lays the blame on Musharraf adding
that "the truth is that just as in 1947 and 1965, Pakistan to fudge its
offensive by saying it was carried out by volunteers and not regular troops".
In reality Islamic militants probably accounted for no more than 10 per
cent of the total Pakistan Kargil force and even these militants "were
only given portering duties". On Kargil Pakistan lies fully exposed
in this well-researched book. And what about Kashmir? Jones maintains
that "first, the Kashmiri people are tiring of the struggle" and "most
informed Pakistanis now accept that, given the chance, most Kashmiris would
opt for independence rather than a merger with Pakistan". But above
all else, Jones insists, "the people of Kashmir want peace". Furthermore
he says that "there is growing feeling in Pakistan that India will never
pull out", that Pakistan's size and economic weakness means it is not in
a position to force the hand of a country with a billion people and that
furthermore "if General Musharraf or any subsequent Pakistani leader
did make a compromise on Kashmir, he or she might receive more support
than is generally predicted."
Describing the sentiment in Jammu
& Kashmir Jones notes that "with the insurgency over a decade old,
most Kashmiris are sick of the conflict and are desperate for peaceful
settlement". It has often been claimed that Pakistan's silly desire
or aim is to balkanise India but it is left to Jones to say that balkanisation
of Pakistan is a more imminent danger. Writing of a Baloch tribal Chief
Jones days that "Pakistan may have been in existence for over half a century",
but for the Baloch chief, Pakistani troops in his vicinity is an "occupation
army" and Jones adds for good measure "Other chiefs, feudal leaders and
politicians in Baluchistan, rural Sindh, NWFP and even some in parts of
southern Punjab share his attitude towards Pakistan". Islam was bound
to be the binding force but for many, ethnic groups have proved to be stronger.
And that was what Ms Lamb had stated a decade earlier. Things haven't for
the better I Pakistan. This book has to be read to be believed.
Jones is not as bitter as Ms Lamb;
he tries to give credit to Musharraf but even of him he says in clear terms
that thought he may be a "benign leader, he has so far failed to do better".
Jones has no respect for the pakistan Army which he says "enjoy a better
reputation that it deserves" and that "both on the field of battle and
in periods of military rule, it record has been far from glorious".
Indeed say Jones, "democracy has few supporters in Pakistan". May
be President Bush of US should read this book about a failed state in which
a list of major defaulters in November 2001 owed the state over Rs.211
billion! Jones insists that Pakistan's state institutions are so weak that
the result has been "a prolonged deep economic and social crisis". So right
he is. And the book tells it al. And how!