Author: Manoj Joshi
Publication: Times of India
Date: May 12, 2003
Officials and ministers are putting
on a brave face, but the government feels let down by US deputy secretary
of state Richard Armitage's visit last week.
Last May-June, Armitage was part
of a torrent of high-level visits- British foreign secretary Jack Straw,
US secretary of state Colin Powell and secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld-
aimed at persuading the Vajpayee government to call off a military attack
on Pakistan. The message was similar: Musharraf had given them assurances
that Pakistan would end infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) permanently.
President Bush underscored this while speaking to reporters after a cabinet
meeting on May 30, 2002. Musharraf, he declared, must stop incursions across
the Line of Control. "He must do so. He said he would do so. We and others
are making it clear to him that he must live up to his word."
New Delhi called off the attack
and redeployed its forces. But there has been no let-up in infiltration
and violence, a fact that even the US acknowledges. But having succeeded
in preventing Indian retribution, and getting the Indian Army back to its
barracks, Armitage's message this time around was that it was not his job
to give assurances. It was up to India to decide what it wanted to make
of Musharraf's promises.
The Vajpayee government has no one
but itself to blame for having been taken for a ride by the US. The Anglo-American
officials, who came in last year, had their own military plans, but they
concerned Iraq and not Pakistan. With Iraq under their belt and Indian
forces back in their barracks, their focus has shifted to resolving the
Israel-Palestine dispute.
There is a positive flipside to
this and New Delhi can read Armitage's message another way: We are too
busy elsewhere, you should not depend on us to deal with Pakistan.
Prime Minister Vajpayee is set on
that course, but he has one problem. Pakistan has not abjured the military/terrorist
option, and the Army is putting forward the Jamali pawn to deal with the
Vajpayee diplomatic offensive.
As the Vajpayee strategy of calibrated
engagement unfolds, it will find that its greatest weakness lies in the
incapacity of its security forces. Unless India is able to show Pakistan
that its support for terrorism will not be cost-free, there will be no
movement on the negotiating table.
The problem is that despite spending
Rs 70,000 crore a year on defence, Indian forces are not adequately structured
to deal with this immediate military problem.
It is not a matter of political
will or bravery, but of the lack of adequate instruments.
The government began a process of
reforming the armed forces, but the efforts have come unstuck because of
bureaucratic back-sliding and lack of adequate political leadership.
Defence minister George Fernandes
and Deputy PM L K Advani have the right instincts about security, but they
lack the executive capabilities to translate their words into deeds.
