Author: J. S. Tissainayagam
Publication: www.tamilcanadian.com
Date: April 25 - May 1, 2003
URL: http://www.tamilcanadian.com/cgi-bin/php/northeastern_herald/pageview.php?ID=1766&SID=360
Another bout of rioting and civil
unrest was witnessed in Muttur last week that saw Tamils and Muslims clash
using weapons ranging from cudgels and swords to guns and grenades. It
was reported by the Trincomalee government agent the rioting had resulted
in five deaths, though the number was still in dispute at the time of writing.
Over a score was injured and 100s of families displaced.
The agitation came in the wake of
a reported suicide of a Muslim woman at Muttur on Thursday 17 April, following
the alleged kidnapping of two Muslim youths, one of whom is her son. In
the wake of the alleged abduction was the attribution of blame, which fell
on the LTTE. The LTTE however denied any connection with the incident and
said parties interested in wrecking the peace process were the culprits.
There were sporadic clashes at Muttur
on Thursday and two Tamils were admitted to Kiliveddy hospital with stab
wounds and three Muslims were admitted to Muttur hospital with gunshot
injuries. Tamil houses were also burnt in Muttur. Things took a more serious
turn in the adjacent village of Thoppur where an unidentified Tamil gang
killed a Muslim, wounded others and set fire to Muslim houses. Police from
Kantalai and Trincomalee were despatched to the riot-torn areas to restore
calm.
On Friday, 18 April conditions deteriorated
when at the very moment a government team including Minister of Defence
Tilak Marapana was in Muttur, a grenade was flung near Kattaiparichchan
bridge that marks the boundary between the government-controlled and LTTE-controlled
areas, killing one Tamil and injuring 14 others. One more Tamil died when
the army opened fire. Rioting and arson that broke out rendered more of
families of Muttur, Thoppur and Palathoppur homeless. A curfew was declared.
Violence spread closer to Trincomalee
town on Saturday, 19 April when miscreants in a trishaw lobbed a grenade
at a group of Muslims at Jamaliya injuring six. The immediate aftermath
saw Muslims going on the rampage and assaulting Tamil passers-by. However,
it was later revealed the incident had been instigated by trade rivalry
between two Muslims.
On Monday, 21 April a memorandum
of understanding was signed between the LTTE and Muslim religious leaders
to restore normalcy in the area and take steps to prevent the recurrence
of civil violence. However, on the night of 22 April a group of Muslims
were attacked in Alli Nagar. A death was reported in the incident but not
confirmed at the time of writing.
The profile of the violence in Muttur
and the adjacent villages is reminiscent of what has been the order of
the day in the three districts forming the eastern segment of the Northeast
Province - Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Amparai - during the ceasefire.
A quick recap will refresh the minds of the readers on Tamil- Muslim violence
and the patterns that emerge.
The first bout of violence at Muttur
after signing of the ceasefire agreement occurred on 21 June 2002, exactly
four months to the day of the signing. Miscreants, labelled the shadowy
Osama Front, broke into the LTTE's office at Muttur and damaged furniture
and other materials within. In response to this, several Tamil organisations
called for a hartal on 25 June, which was observed by Tamils and Muslims
by closing shops and schools, and even public buildings.
Tamils organised a procession to
Pachchanoor demanding police take action against the arsonists who had
broken into the LTTE office, and arrest members of the Osama Front. The
procession clashed with Muslims where several were injured and admitted
to hospital. Following threats, Tamil families moved to churches and schools
fearing disturbances. On 26 June there were more clashes with Muslim extremists
going on the rampage assaulting Tamils and setting fire to their possessions.
A Tamil journalist was also attacked.
Within a day, rioting had spread
from ethnically sensitive Muttur in the Trincomalee District to Valaichenai
in Batticaloa, which is equally volatile. A hartal organised by the Muslims
on 27 June became an opportunity for Muslim extremists to attack and destroy
Tamil houses, businesses and fishing gear using guns, grenades and anti-personnel
mines, while the police and army stood by watching. When curfew was declared
the police and military told Tamils shop- owners their goods would be protected,
whereas they turned a blind eye when Muslim rioters indulged in arson and
pillage of Tamil shops under cover of the curfew.
Tamils in retaliation burnt Muslim
shops in Valaichenai town and two Muslim cooks were abducted from a wedding
and murdered. When the Tamils appealed to the LTTE, the organisation refused
to help protesting it was bound by the tenets of the Ceasefire Agreement.
Eventually armed members of the EPRLF beat back marauding Muslim mobs to
protect Tamils.
Four months later it was the turn
of Akkaraipattu in the Amparai District. This time however there was no
rioting though the area was like a tinderbox and could have exploded any
moment. In mid-October a Muslim youth S. M. Abdul Wajeed was 'kidnapped'
from his home. Muslims in the area charged the LTTE had abducted him, a
charge that the organisation promptly denied. Due to the intense rivalry
between ministers Rauff Hakeem and A L M Athaullah the latter used the
opportunity to stir up trouble by burning tyres to intimidate Tamils at
Akkaraipattu's main junction, while Muslim youth at Addalachenai abducted
two Tamils, but who were eventually set free.
On Friday, 18 October Abdul Wajeed's
neighbours saw him at home and informed the authorities. He was arrested.
On 31 October Abdul Wajeed after initially claiming he was abducted by
the LTTE confessed to having been made to disappear on the instigation
of the EPDP.This series of incidents during the ceasefire form a recurring
pattern that include:
1) the police and military standing
by indifferently when Tamils were victims of violence both in Valachenai
and Muttur, or opening fire on Tamil mobs but not on the Muslims;
2) rumours circulated the LTTE had
kidnapped Muslims, which were in the Akkaraipattu incident proved untrue
(no conclusive details have emerged on the Muttur incident as yet, but
the charge seems frivolous);
3) Muslim politicians using the
opportunity presented by civil disturbances to push their own political
agendas - Hakeem last week and Athaullah during the Akkaraipattu incident;
4) Muslims being presented generally
as a neutral group in the ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamils
and the increasingly frequent Muslim-Tamil agitation as proof of the unreasonableness
of Tamil demands;
5) obliterating the history of clashes
between the Tamils and Muslims in the 1980 and 1990s both in the Batticaloa
and Amparai districts where there was explicit connivance between Muslims
and the security forces.
It appears that even before the
ceasefire agreement was negotiated, due to the history of violence between
the Tamils, and Muslims who aided and abetted government forces during
the late 1980s and 1990s in the ethnically sensitive east, Muslim politicians
believed the way to the heart of the eastern Muslim was by displaying defiance
of the Tamils in general and the LTTE in particular.
This was seen after the ceasefire
was signed too when in the latter part of last year the SLMC, which arguably
still remains the single most influential Muslim political party in the
east, was split by factionalism when Athaullah challenged Hakeem. The basis
of the challenge was that Muslims were being victimised by LTTE (read Tamils)
and that separate Muslim representation was needed at the government-LTTE
talks. At that time Hakeem who was part of the government delegation advised
patience. But the persistence of the challenge and precarious compromise
that has emerged within the SLMC has forced Hakeem to articulate views
as extreme as his challenger's. It is also believed Muslim intransigence
is funded and encouraged by a neighbouring country that is not happy about
government-LTTE talks.
Meanwhile, successive governments
have used the Muslims to oppose, discredit and de-legitimise Tamil claims
to equality and nationhood by insinuating that such claims not only undermine
the Sinhalese but the Muslims too. One of the tried and tested doctrines
of counter-insurgency is to de-legitimise an organisation by discrediting
it. It has become very useful for the government that the Muslims are indulging
in discrediting the LTTE because "legitimate Muslim security concerns,"
is a matter that is raised by the government and the international community
to drive a wedge into seeing the northeast as a cohesive political and
security entity. Similar politics of discrediting is indulged by states
and the organisations supporting them whether the rebels be the Sinn Fein,
the Maoists, the Islamic Hurriyat or whatever.
These political doctrines are able
to put forward more clearly today than when the LTTE was at war with the
government. The basic reason for the transformation is because the ceasefire
prevents the LTTE from using armed aggression. The balance of power that
prevailed in the northeast when both the LTTE and the government could
use military hardware did not permit civil disturbances occurring, at least
not in this frequency. Now that the Tigers are virtually forbidden from
using arms thereby creating a security imbalance, the Muslims believe they
can intimidate and coerce Tamils at will.
The government too finds the situation
today convenient because it can coerce the Tamil population without much
effort. When the government and the LTTE were at war the state could oppress
the Tamil civilians in the name of counter- insurgency, but always faced
the possibility of LTTE retaliation. With the ceasefire, oppression has
become milder though sporadically exploding into violence (Kanchirankudah,
Trincomalee, Nelliyadi, Kayts etc.) but government intervention can be
done in the name of law enforcement and with the gratifying sense of assurance
the LTTE cannot retaliate.
It will however be foolish for the
government to be impervious to the broader implications of the Tamil-Muslim
riots. If there is any one thing that endeared the LTTE to the Tamils,
it was that the Tigers have been the most effective in ensuring the physical
security of the Tamil population. This is despite memories dying hard of
the LTTE's 'desertion' of the civilians during Operation Liberation (1987)
and compelling the Tamils to move out of Jaffna during Operation Riviresa
(1995), among other instances.
Despite such setbacks the Tigers
have managed to legitimise themselves as the defenders of Tamil security.
This legitimacy was also reflected in the agreement reached on Monday to
stop hostilities between Tamils and Muslims in Muttur, which was between
the LTTE on the one hand and Muslim religious leaders on the other. The
government and the SLMC were conspicuous by their absence. What is more,
in an obvious reference to the proclivities of the armed forces the LTTE-religious
leaders' agreement states, "To jointly request the law enforcement agencies
in areas under government control to impartially enforce the maintenance
of law and order."
Repeated infringements of the Tamils'
physical security by the Muslim rioting and armed government action has
left the Tamils without any alternative but hoping that the security imbalance
created by the LTTE's forced sheathing of weapons does not remain a permanent
disability. This is a slap in the face of the government because it has
been only too anxious to see an end to the LTTE's legitimacy in the eyes
of the Tamils as their sole protector replaced by the Sri Lankan state.
But more ill conceived acts come to be perpetrated on the Tamils, more
will the Tamils yearn for a set-up where law enforcement is equitable and
just for which they will be compelled to turn to the Tigers.
There is debate in the media whether
the LTTE has conceded too much to the state during and due to the peace
process. It might have in some ways, but it appears to remain the best
hope for ensuring Tamils' physical security, a situation for which the
south can blame no one but itself.
Source: NorthEastern Herald
