Author: Robyn Lim
Publication: The Japan Times
Date: May 11, 2003
What would China prefer to see --
a Japan armed with nuclear weapons, or Japan's alliance with the
United States strengthened by its participation in missile defense?
In Beijing, neither option has much appeal.
With Japan, though, China has been
hoisted by its own petard. That's because a sea change in Japan's
security outlook is being wrought by China's quasi-ally, North Korea.
Leader Kim Jong Il is rattling his missiles and bragging that he
has nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, Japan is rapidly abandoning
its longstanding delusion that its security problems can be ignored,
or left to others to resolve.
No doubt, China would prefer a neutral
Japan that it could dominate by virtue of size, proximity and demographic
weight. Indeed, immediately after the Cold War, that outcome seemed
possible. Many Japanese were inclined to think that "it's all economics
now" and thus saw no danger in deferring to China as East Asia's
rapidly rising economic power.
Moreover, "multilateralism" became
the code word for those who urged greater independence from America.
That played into Beijing's hands by suggesting that U.S. alliances
in East Asia were no longer needed.
At the end of the Cold War, China
also benefited from Japan's optimism that nuclear weapons could be
abolished. Many countries that had been attracted to nuclear weapons
were abandoning their ambitions. In 1994, for example, Ukraine agreed
to give up the nuclear weapons it inherited when the Soviet Union
collapsed.
In 1995, Japan played an active
part in securing the permanent extension of the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, or NPT, by which signatories pledged not to develop nuclear
weapons. The flip side of that agreement was that the five declared
nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, China, Britain and
France) were to work toward abolishing their nuclear arsenals.
Few in Japan questioned whether
the abolition of nuclear weapons would serve Japan's interests. In
the unlikely event that the declared nuclear-weapon states agreed
to abandon their arsenals, the U.S. would still abide by its commitments.
But how could Japan trust China, a totalitarian state, to do what
it pledged to do? After all, the history of arms control is that
bad regimes lie and cheat.
Meanwhile, China's proliferation
activities continued. That helped usher in the "second nuclear age"
after India tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and Pakistan followed.
Japan was shocked, although it should not have been. The Soviet collapse
had deprived India of its great protector, while India was confronted
by a rising China that proliferated missile technology to India's
archrival Pakistan.
For China, such proliferation was
a means of containing India. That policy backfired when India sought
security, as well as great power status, in flaunting nuclear weapons.
China also indirectly threatened
Japan by proliferating missile technology to North Korea. Worse,
we now know that China winked when Pakistan proliferated nuclear
technology to North Korea in return for missile technology. North
Korea steadily built up its arsenal of medium-range missiles that
threatened Japan. (So did China.) Then in 1998, North Korea tested
its long range Taepodong missile over Japan without warning.
China proliferated nuclear technology
to North Korea partly to secure an advantage over the United States
and Japan, with the contingency of Taiwan in mind. In a future confrontation
with America over Taiwan, Beijing seemed to calculate, China might
gain leverage if North Korea precipitated a simultaneous crisis.
But China has miscalculated, especially
in relation to Japan. North Korea's provocations are making it easier
for Shigeru Ishiba, the head of Japan's Defense Agency, to secure
support for participation with the U.S. in the development of missile
defenses. China has long railed against such defenses because they
might nullify China's small nuclear arsenal, and would create a shield
behind which Taiwan could be emboldened to declare independence.
But in today's Japan, China's complaints
cut little ice. Missile defense is nonnuclear and nonoffensive. Most
Japanese will vastly prefer that to the development of offensive
capabilities such as nuclear weapons.
Thus China's proliferation policies
are backfiring with Japan, as they did with India. China has not
been able to stop North Korea from behaving in ways that undercut
China's own interests, not least in relation to Japan. The stakes
are growing even higher because North Korea's belligerence risks
a new Korean war.
The U.S., while continuing to urge
diplomatic solutions, cannot tolerate North Korea's acquiring and
selling nuclear weapons. The Bush administration keeps the military
card on the table because it must. Will China now rein in or overthrow
Kim Jong Il before further miscalculation leads to war?
Robyn Lim is professor of international
relations at Nanzan University, Nagoya.
