Author: Vir Sanghvi
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: April 26, 2003
For as long as I can remember, I
have always regarded myself as being a free-enterprise liberal.
This means that while I recognise
that India made the wrong economic choices, I believe that this country
has held together because of the values propounded by our founding fathers:
secularism rather than religious chauvinism, a scientific approach to the
world, freedom of speech, tolerance, equality of opportunity and the like.
But there is one issue where I do
not fit into the liberal mould. Most Indian liberals incline to the view
that because Indians and Pakistanis are basically the same people, it is
only natural for them to be friends. They argue that those who see Pakistan
as the enemy are being at least subliminally anti-Muslim because
they are suggesting that Muslims and Hindus are different people. And they
believe in the classic formulation that we hear again and again
that a strong and stable Pakistan is in Indias best interests.
I disagree with nearly all of this.
For a start, I object strongly to
the secularist suggestion that anybody who is anti-Pakistan is also anti-Muslim.
The association of Indian Muslims with Pakistan has done the Indian Muslim
community a huge disservice. At the time of Partition, many Muslims who
had the option to go over to Pakistan chose to stay here because they disagreed
with the two-nation theory and with the Muslim Leagues view that Hindus
and Muslims could not live together in peace and harmony.
They believed in a secular India,
built on a foundation of ideology and patriotism and chose it over a nation
founded on religious chauvinism. To attack Pakistan and what it stands
for is not to insult Indian Muslims. Rather, it is to applaud their choice
in choosing a modern secular state over an Islamic one.
As for the view that Indians and
Pakistanis are basically the same people, this is true. A Punjabi on our
side of the border will have far stronger ethnic ties (language, culture,
food, music, literature etc) with a Punjabi on the Pakistani side than
he will with say, a Malayali or a Manipuri.
But consider this: when people of
the same ethnicity as us declare that they cannot live in peace with us
and ask for their own country, then should this really bring us closer
as liberals claim? Or does it only serve to emphasise how Pakistanis have
turned their backs on our shared heritage and invented an Islamic identity
for their nationhood?
You expect people with different
languages and ethnicities to want separate nations. But contrast the idea
of India 18 official languages, dozens of distinct cultures and more
Muslims than Pakistan, held together by a faith in a common nationhood
with the idea of Pakistan: same ethnicity and culture as large parts of
India but created out of a sense of separateness and hatred. As for those
who say that a strong and stable Pakistan is in Indias best interests,
I always ask: does Pakistan believe that a strong and stable India is in
Pakistans best interests?
If it does, then it is certainly
behaving very strangely: infiltrating mercenaries into Kashmir, financing
and manipulating the Hurriyat, sheltering Dawood Ibrahim, helping organize
the Bombay blasts, supporting and mentoring Muslim fundamentalist organisations
within India etc.
The truth is embedded in one of
the stock clichs that liberals deploy we are basically the same people
though it surprises me that more liberals dont see it themselves. If we
are the same people, then why did they need a separate country?
They needed it because they believed
that a secular, united India would not work; that no Muslim would be happy
or safe in India. So, if the idea of India is shown to work then the obvious
corollary is this: there was no need for Pakistan to have been created.
So how can a strong and stable India ever be in Pakistans best interests?
On a more practical note: under
General Musharraf and his American masters, Pakistan is now reasonably
strong and stable. And yet, are Indias interests being served? Contrast
this with the decade and a half after the 1971 war, when Pakistan was dismembered
and in crisis. We had no problems with Pakistan during that phase when
it was neither strong nor stable.
For all of these reasons, I have
to part company from my liberal comrades. They see me as a war-monger and
a hawk. I see them as dangerously nave, misguided peaceniks whose idea
of foreign policy consists of lighting candles on the Wagah border. And
yet, though the doves and I are approaching the issue from completely different
perspectives, heres the funny thing. We agree on what the next step in
Indo-Pak relations should be. We need to talk to each other.
This apparent logical leap deserves
some explanation, so here goes: there are basically three ways in which
we can handle Pakistan. The first is war. It worked in 1965, when we opened
a new front to repulse the infiltrators Pakistan had sent into Kashmir
we saw a sharp drop in infiltration into Kashmir and their dictator-of-the-moment,
Ayub Khan, eventually had to go. It worked also in 1971, when Pakistan
was broken up and left us alone.
But this is not an option that works
very well these days. Our success in the Kargil war brought us no respite
in Kashmir. And besides, the world is not going to let two nuclear powers
go to war. We have an acknowledged conventional superiority so, if things
start going badly for Pakistan, it is conceivable that some crazy general
will push the nuclear button.
If the war option is ruled out,
then we have the choice of doing unto them what they have done to us: covert
operations. The Pakistani strategy has been to arm, encourage and finance
terrorist and secessionist movements in India. They did this in a small
way in 1982-5 in the Punjab, moved to Kashmir in a big way in 1989, and
are now doing this all over the country.
Indian intelligence services have
always claimed that there is no shortage of disaffected Pakistanis
Sindhis, Baluchis, mohajirs etc. who loathe the ruling Punjabi elite
and would happily balkanise Pakistan for us; much easier to do than it
is to break up India.
This approach seems superficially
attractive but will not work for two reasons. One: there is no consensus
within the political establishment. R&AW had to roll-up painstakingly
recruited networks in Pakistan because of Morarji Desais stubborn stupidity
in 1977, and Inder Gujral also halted covert operations. Two: we are a
different kind of country. Could we really sleep at nights if it came out
that a bomb that killed 50 civilians in Karachi had been supplied to Pakistani
dissidents by Indian intelligence? One of the differences between the idea
of India (liberal, democratic, secular) and Pakistan (authoritarian, military-dominated,
unliberal) is that we care about these things.
That leaves us with no choice but
to negotiate.
There will, of course, be problems.
Both sides have painted themselves into corners. Pakistan says Kashmir
must be settled first; India says that we must create an atmosphere of
trust by focusing on other issues and then tackle Kashmir. India says that
we will not negotiate till cross-border terrorism stops. In effect, this
gives any bloody-minded terrorist group the ability to sabotage any talks
with a well-timed incident.
Nor should we make the mistake of
depending on summits. Lahore was impressive but it was followed by Kargil.
Agra was a fiasco because Musharraf had come with the intention of putting
Kashmir on the agenda while denying the existence of cross-border terrorism.
Far better, therefore, to start
small with official-level talks and then, when the momentum builds up,
upgrade to foreign minister-level meetings. There are no opportunities
for grandstanding and more work gets done.
It is nobodys case that the dialogue
process will be an instant success. But equally, we must concede that our
present position is unsustainable. Foreign policy cannot exist in a stalemate.
India cannot keep refusing to talk, despite the worlds urging, when Pakistan
says it is ready for talks anytime, anywhere.
I do not believe, as the peaceniks
do, that once we begin talking, we will all dance arm-in-arm through the
streets of Lahore reciting Urdu couplets. But let us learn from America.
Reagan loathed everything that the Soviet Union stood for. But he still
agreed to talk. He knew that war was not an option so he chose a dialogue.
Agreeing to talk is not a sign of weakness. It is a sign of good sense
and of strength.
And dont forget that eventually,
the stronger nation and the stronger ideology won the Cold War. America
is today, the worlds only super-power. The Soviet Union broke up under
the weight of its own contradictions and the failure of communism.
There is a lesson in that for the
future of South Asia. Lets negotiate from a position of strength, secure
in the power of Indias nationhood. And then, lets see how a small undemocratic
country, built on hatred and alienation, can stand up to the strength and
power of the worlds largest democracy.
