Author: Jonathan Calt Harris
Publication: National Review Online
Date: May 14, 2003
URL: http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/692
There has been a lot of attention
in the last month to the reporters, columnists, and TV generals who mis-predicted
the outcome of the Iraq war - all that talk of "quagmire" and an army "bogged
down" against "stiff resistance." Media heavies have either admitted their
mistakes (Chris Matthews), defended their record (William Raspberry), or
done a bit of both (Nicholas Kristof).
In contrast, academic specialists
on the Middle East remain unrepentant, even defiant about their wildly
faulty predictions, and no one seems to call them on the matter. Here a
few choice prognostications:
* Edward Said, professor of English
literature, Columbia University: "The idea that Iraq's population would
have welcomed American forces entering the country after a terrifying aerial
bombardment was always utterly implausible."
* Fawaz Gerges, professor of Middle
East studies, Sarah Lawrence College and ABC News consultant: "There is
a high risk that Iraq will become a symbol of Muslim resistance against
American military presence similar to Afghanistan for the Soviets."
* Joel Beinin, professor of Middle
East History, Stanford, and past president of the Middle East Studies Association
(MESA): The fighting in Iraq would "justify Israel's use of pre-emptive
force against Palestinians," permitting Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
"to push Palestinians into Jordan."
* Jere L. Bacharach, professor of
Middle East history, University of Washington: "the war is over and we
have lost," he announced on March 28, while predicting that American tank
forces will be "surrounded and forced to surrender." Perhaps worse than
this misreading, Bacharach excused the Iraqi regime's practice of using
its own civilians as military cover. "We may denounce these Iraqi tactics
as immoral and inhumane, but the goal of the Iraqi military is to win,
not play by international rules," he said.
An extensive search to find a public
admission of error by these prophets turned up nothing whatsoever. I therefore
contacted each of them and asked if they "stood by or repudiated" their
views.
Despite repeated attempts, both
written and by telephone, I reached only two of the professors. Joel Beinin
replied with a curt "no comment." Jere Bacharach acknowledged his error
("We should all be pleased I was wrong") and indicated he would further
address the topic in print.
This problem of terrible predictions,
then pretending they never happened and shuffling on to the next topic,
is nothing new for Middle East studies. Here are some other examples, some
from the very same individuals who got the Three-Week War so wrong:
* Edward Said for years told all
who would listen about the rise of a moderate and democratic Palestinian
leadership. Here's what he said in 1979, by way of example: "Fateh tacitly
encourages a real democracy in political ideal and style." He actually
called Yassir Arafat a mere "symbol of authority" who never appeared to
be "despotic or capricious."
* Fawaz Gerges often minimalized
the importance of militant Islam in general, and Osama bin Laden in particular.
In late 2000, about the time the 9/11 attacks were in planning, he pronounced
Osama bin Laden "exceptionally isolated" and "preoccupied mainly with survival,
not attacking American targets."
* Rashid Khalidi, professor of Middle
East history at University of Chicago and past president of MESA: writing
in January 1991, he said this about the Iraqi soldiers who soon after went
on to surrender to unarmed journalists: "They're in concrete bunkers. And
it won't be easy to force them out without resorting to bloody hand-to-hand
combat. It's my guess that they'll fight and fight hard, even if you bomb
them with B- 52s."
* John Esposito, professor of Islamic
Studies at Georgetown University and another past president of MESA: the
rise of militant Islam presents no particular problem. In 1994, for example,
Esposito informed readers of The Middle East Quarterly that militant Islamic
movements "are not necessarily anti-Western, anti-American, or anti-democratic."
None of these analyses proved correct,
just as none of their dire predictions occurred in the current Iraq conflict;
and none of them - so far as my research can find - were acknowledged or
lessons learned.
Can one ask for a more succinct
proof of Middle East studies' failure?
