Author: Ashok K Mehta
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: May 21, 2003
While infiltration may be looking
down, acts of terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir have not subsided. This
will only happen once the swamps and pits of terrorist infrastructure have
been dried and destroyed, permanently and irreversibly. This is easier
said than done. The Indian Army early this month launched one of its biggest
terrorist hunting operations in recent times in the Surankote forests in
a place called Hilkaka on the southeastern slopes of the Pir Panjal range
which separates Srinagar valley from Jammu. In the old days, in summer,
the Mughal caravans from Delhi would cross over the Pir Panjal pass into
Srinagar.
Operation Sarp Vinash was a division-size
operation involving seven battalions and two brigade headquarters. Spearheaded
by the 9 Para Special Forces, six other units of the 163 Infantry Brigade
and 12 RR sector took part. These were 2/4 Gorkha Rifles, 15 Garhwal Rifles,
4 Garhwal Rifles, 16 and 20 Rashtriya Rifles. It is estimated that up to
100 terrorists were in and around the Hilkaka hideout, spread out in the
forest when Special Forces struck in the initial raid. They gunned down
13 terrorists and captured two of whom one died later.
In subsequent combing operations
which lasted 10 days, 4 Garhwal Rifles ambushed seven terrorists near Haripur
while they were attempting to cross over into Srinagar. Altogether, 45
terrorists were killed against a loss of four soldiers killed and two wounded.
Substantial recoveries were made. Approximately 60 caches and hideouts
were busted, yielding 20 AK-47 rifles, five PIKA guns, two sniper rifles
and unspecified quantities of grenade launchers, self-loading rifles and
45 kg of plastic explosives. In addition, substantial quantities of radio
sets and other communications equipment were also recovered, besides rations
enough to feed 500 men for two weeks.
How important and successful the
operation was can be judged from the fact that the Chief of Army Staff,
Gen NC Vij, flew into the area of operations and congratulated the troops
on an excellent job. It is very difficult to stage-manage largescale counter-terrorist
operations, as the movement of troops compromises operational security.
Many more similar operations need to be conducted in order to keep the
terrorists on the run. But these have to be based on hard intelligence
and properly staged. The Indian Army has done enough of jungle-bashing
in the past.
Op Sarp Vinash would not have been
possible without hard intelligence and tactical airlift. Three MI 17 helipads
were constructed for logistics, quick relocation of troops and maintaining
the integrity of the cordon and stops around Hilkaka. In a striking departure
from past practice, Army Aviation Lancer attack helicopters were used.
The army rarely uses helicopters in an attack role in counter-insurgency
operations in J&K and elsewhere in the country. Field commanders have
not wished to escalate the conflict by employing gunships that, due to
visibility constraints, cause collateral damage.
The only time the Air Force was
employed against CIS was in Mizoram in 1964, when rebels had seized Aizawl
and captured an Assam Rifles post. French Ouragan attack aircraft were
used to assist the army in its operations. IAF helicopters were also used
extensively in attack mode against the LTTE in Sri Lanka.
It has puzzled many counter-terrorism
experts as to why the Indian Army has been reluctant to use the attack
helicopter, especially when dealing with terrorist camps in the uninhabited
jungle hideouts of mountain ranges. Both the army and the air force have
fitted an impressive array of direct firing weapons and cannons on the
helicopters for flushing out and suppressive fire operations. These need
to be used more frequently, but selectively.
Op Sarp Vinash shows that, while
infiltration in J&K and into the Valley is continuing, counter-infiltration
and counter-terrorist operations are also in full swing but not with the
intensity and continuity required to deter and punish the terrorists. It
is possible to considerably reduce the lifespan of a terrorist-first, at
the stage of infiltration, second while he is staging through (as in Hilkaka)
and, finally, as he goes about his business of terrorising the people of
J&K.
It is also feasible to turn the
tables by terrorising the terrorist. The resources and wherewithal can
be mustered, but political will and stamina are lacking. A strategy reconciling
winning hearts and minds and reducing alienation with punitive operations
against terrorists can seriously alter the balance of advantage in favour
of the state. But conditions apply: Centralised command and non-interference
in operations.
At present, at any time there are
in J&K around 3,000 to 3,500 terrorists, 80 per cent mainly foreigners.
Pakistan spends roughly Rs 80 crore to maintain this force. Another 2,000
terrorists are waiting across the Line of Control at launchpads and training
camps to be inducted in the pipeline to maintain the force levels. This
costs another Rs 20 crore. On an average, nearly 12 to 1,400 terrorists
are disposed of to meet their maker every year.
Approximately 200 to 250 army personnel
are killed annually in counter-terrorist operations (this does not include
the wounded). About twice that number of paramilitary forces lose their
lives. The civilian losses are even more, equalling the combined casualty
of the security forces. These are horrendous numbers and reflect the very
low value index on human life in the country.
While the political process with
Pakistan and the people of Kashmir must never be halted, the Indian state
must think anew ways of defeating terrorists and not letting Pakistan succeed
in its bleeding war in which the military casualties suffered by security
forces in the 15-year long proxy war have exceeded the losses incurred
in all the wars India has fought against Pakistan since 1947. The social,
human and economic cost of this war has never been calculated and must
run in billions of crores.
As the Indian state has not had
the stomach to get to the roots and swamps of terrorism across the LoC,
it can surely raise the cost of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism on its side
of the LoC. The kill rate of terrorists vis-a-vis the army must be enhanced
from the present 1:7 (it becomes 1:5 including other security forces) to
1:9, and similarly better results sought from paramilitary forces. The
army is doing a very difficult job with commendable achievements. But this
proxy war has been going on for too long. It wants it ended.
Messers LK Advani, George Fernandes
and Mufti Mohammad Sayeed need to sit with military commanders and intelligence
chiefs to establish an operationally effective unified command headquarters
to replace the halfcock in vogue in order to persecute this war. The sense
one gets is that the political leadership is not serious about fighting
this war despite the routine threats to do so.
National Security Advisor Brajesh
Mishra recently called for an axis of counter-terrorism between India,
Israel and the US to root out the evil without getting bogged down with
the root causes or definitions. Let India first demonstrate resolve and
determination in J&K. We have five Special Force battalions. This number
must be quadrupled by the end of next year under a new Special Forces command.
The war in Iraq was won by Special Forces. They must be equipped by the
best men and equipment, given a clear mandate for operations in J&K
under the overall command of Northern Army Commander in Udhampur. This
gentleman must be appointed the overall theatre commander to fight the
proxy war. Given the latest intelligence, hi-tech equipment and Delhi's
full backing, he will begin delivering enhanced results.
It is possible in two years' time
to bring down the figure of exported terrorists to half, reduce their gene
pool from 3,000 to 2,000 and abridge their longevity. In five years the
terrorists should be down on their knees. We have wasted the last 15 years
not getting on top of the scourge. Even now it is not too late to terrorise
the terrorists.
