Author: Claude Arpi
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: May 4, 2003
A prophecy written ages ago in the
Land of Snows said: "In the Year of the Male Iron Dog, a war with China
will occur." In 1910, the year of the Male Iron-Dog, the Chinese entered
Tibet. The 13th Dalai Lama had to flee his country and seek asylum in India.
On his way to the border, he sent a telegram to "Great Britain and all
the Ministers of Europe" informing them about "large insects eating and
secretly injuring small insects."
Nearly a century later, reading
these words from a leader who had no knowledge of the world outside the
limits of his mountainous country, one is surprised by the accuracy of
the description of the forces at play. How can we avoid drawing a parallel
with the situation today in Iraq? Perhaps the only difference is that the
"small insect" of today is a "nasty one", which does not believe in enlightenment
and ahimsa.
A lot of debate has been generated
in India on whether it should follow suit with the US or "condemn" the
war. Most agree that the world community will not survive if the order
established more than 50 years ago with the foundation of the UN is not
accepted by all. It is obvious that for any conflict, the only solution
is for the main players to sit together, thrash out their differences and
find the best solution.
Some have argued that if the Americans
are criticised today, they might not help India in sorting out the Kashmir
tangle or the terrorism problem with Pakistan. On the other hand, others
take a strong moral position, condemning the use of brutal force to destroy
a "small insect" and take its petrol and assets.
In its wisdom, the Vajpayee Government
has decided to follow the great Indian tradition of the "Middle Path".
Addressing leaders of 21 political parties, he recently said that India
must take the "totality" of the situation into account and adopt a position
consistent with its principles and long-term national interest. While
the Opposition wanted the war to be condemned because it violated "all
accepted canons of international law", the Prime Minister maintained: "Our
words, actions and diplomatic efforts should be aimed at trying to achieve
pragmatic goals, rather than creating rhetorical effect. Quiet diplomacy
is far more effective than public posturing."
Although one can seriously doubt
that in the present circumstances "quiet diplomacy" will be effective,
it is worth looking at India's interests. Analysts believe that they are
two-fold: One, India might "generously" be invited after the war to participate
in the reconstruction of what has just been destroyed; and, two, the US
might turn their ire towards Pakistan for being a nest of terrorism and
nuclear proliferation in the region.
Regarding the first, it might be
a risky affair to bet too many stakes in an unpredictable scenario. On
the second question: Can India expect substantial support from the US after
the Iraq war to solve its five-decade old problem with Pakistan? The answer
is No. First, Pakistan has no petrol and the motivations to intervene in
Pakistan will never be the same as in Iraq for the simple reason that nobody
will cover the cost of military operations in Pakistan. In Iraq, there
are ample possibilities for the US to get back their war investments through
sale of petrol to friendly companies or reconstruction contracts, etc.
If any action was ever undertaken in Pakistan who would foot the bill?
Obviously, if the US were serious
about terrorism, they could easily starve Pakistan of aid instead of pouring
in new rewards each time a terrorist is caught. But historically, the greatest
fear in Washington has always been the collapse of Pakistan. From the early
'50s, when the first military assistance reached Pakistan, till today,
this has been the recurring nightmare haunting Washington. It is particularly
apparent in the recently declassified documents of the 1971 Bangladesh
war when Nixon was over-anxious to prevent an Indian attack on the Western
front and see the disintegration of Pakistan.
The US policy has been reiterated
shortly after the beginning of the Iraq war: India should resume dialogue
with Pakistan. While one can easily guess what President Bush would have
done if he had been in the seat of the Indian Prime Minister after 24 Kashmiri
Pandits had been massacred by terrorists, "composite dialogue" is what
is requested from India! The Indian spokesman could only point out that
the US "regrettably" shifted the focus from the basic problem. In the national
security strategy of the US, "preemptive strikes" by its forces are permissible.
However, the same actions are not acceptable from lesser insects.
While India's short and long-term
interests of stopping cross-border terrorism, finding a solution in the
spirit of Shimla Agreement (with Pakistan first abandoning the concept
of jihad in Kashmir) are known, it is increasingly clear that India can't
depend on anybody for help. If India is to become a "big insect" and claim
a permanent seat in the UN, it is time it stopped depending on others to
solve its problems, through the Middle Path or otherwise.
As for the "consistent principles",
it is not clear what they are today. Are they the Nehruvian principle of
"non-alignment" or the vague Panchshilas which led India to the greatest
disaster of her modern history or else Sardar Patel's who believe that
India should "offer himsa for himsa and ahimsa to ahimsa"? A beautiful
word existed in India to define these principles, "dharma". But who wants
today to remember its real meaning?