Author: G Parthasarathy
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: May 8, 2003
When terrorists, quite evidently
from the Lashkar-e-Toiba, massacred innocent Hindus in Nadimarg on March
23, they sought to shatter the credibility of the newly elected Government
in Jammu & Kashmir and establish that they could undermine efforts
to restore peace and normalcy in the State. Lashkar leader Hafeez Saeed
proudly announced that killing Hindus was a legitimate action for people
devoted to jihad.
Having achieved so little by its
attempts at "coercive diplomacy" by withdrawing its forces deployed on
the border after the December 13 terrorist attack on Parliament House,
New Delhi came under severe pressure to respond to the terrorist outrage
by strikes across the Line of Control. Not surprisingly, Pakistan condemned
the terrorist outrage, denied involvement and demanded that accusations
against it be backed with evidence.
This was entirely predictable, as
"denial diplomacy" is its standard stock in trade. Whether the accusations
pertain to its missile and nuclear links with North Korea, its ties with
the Taliban and Mr Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami in Afghanistan,
or its love and support for its jihadis let loose in J&K, Islamabad
gets into the denial mode, proclaims its innocence and demands "proof".
Recognition of the dangers arising
from the Nadimarg massacre was evident when United States President George
W Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met at Camp David at the height
of the Iraq war on March 27. Rather than outright condemnation of the massacre,
the State Department had earlier urged India to resume "dialogue" with
Pakistan. This response is believed to have been drafted by Assistant Secretary
of State Christina Rocca, who is widely regarded in New Delhi as anti-Indian,
like her predecessor Robin Raphael.
Sensing the outrage in New Delhi
at this insensitive reaction and the possibility of retaliatory strikes,
Mr Colin Powell and his British counterpart Jack Straw were directed by
their bosses to set out measures to de-escalate tensions. The Powell-Straw
statement of March 27 condemned the Nadimarg massacre, urged respect for
the Line of Control, called on Pakistan to end infiltration across it and
urged Pakistan to do its utmost to discourage acts of violence by militants
in J&K. The two countries were not asked to resume "dialogue" but to
resolve differences through a peaceful means and "engagement" including
by moves within SAARC. The statement also reflected Anglo-American willingness
to "facilitate" this process. What the US seeks today is not to "mediate,"
but "facilitate," on India-Pakistan relations.
Despite denials in New Delhi and
Islamabad, there is little doubt that subsequent developments leading to
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's speeches in Srinagar and in Parliament,
holding out the olive branch to Islamabad, were substantially influenced
by Washington's calls for "engagement" between India and Pakistan.
It is a pity that rather than taking
measures like sending a new envoy to Pakistan, restoring people-to-people
links earlier and appearing pro-active on such issues, India was seen as
responding only when the international community grew concerned at the
possibility of the situation spinning out of control. But this has been
somewhat redressed by the positive international perception that Mr Vajpayee
has the courage to swim against the tide, when it comes to holding out
the olive branch to Pakistan.
Mr Vajpayee told Parliament that,
while one must learn from history, one should not become immobilised by
history. He was responding to those who urged caution, given what the nation
had experienced after the Lahore and Agra summits. While the Lahore summit
certainly taught us that eternal vigilance is the price for security, the
Agra summit did teach us a number of lessons that we should not forget.
First, the summit established that
wishful thinking is no substitute for hard and realistic assessments. Second,
that summit diplomacy is doomed to failure unless there is meticulous preparation
and one has a clear idea of what is to be achieved. Third, gestures of
goodwill and forbearance are often regarded as manifestations of weakness
by military dictators, who after all, have no compunctions in bullying
their own people.
Finally, negotiations of joint declarations
should be left to officials with experience, who are careful about the
long-term implications of what they are doing and not undertaken by Ministers
having no past experience of such negotiations. Mr PN Haksar negotiated
the Shimla Agreement, and the Lahore Declaration was concluded under the
directions of Mr Brajesh Misra. Mercifully, no joint declaration was concluded
at Agra, given the inept manner in which negotiations were conducted there.
It is obvious that the US is going
to take a keen interest in how India proceeds with its "engagement" of
Pakistan, even as it seeks to become a "facilitator" in this process. General
Pervez Musharraf is scheduled to visit Washington in June. He is having
problems with the Bush Administration, arising from attacks on American
forces in Afghanistan by elements of the Taliban and Hizb-e-Islami operating
from Pakistan, quite obviously after receiving substantial assistance on
Pakistani soil. He will doubtless ensure that a few Al Qaeda and Taliban
leaders are arrested before he leaves for Washington, where his hosts will
then shower him with fulsome praise.
President Bush cannot, after all,
now tell the American people that a country that he has described as a
"staunch ally in the war against terrorism" is double-crossing him. At
the same time, the infiltration across the LoC will be regulated to keep
the pot boiling, without letting the water boil over. New Delhi should,
therefore, accept that there has been a change of direction in Islamabad
only if there are visible signs that General Musharraf has acted to irrevocably
end cross-border terrorism and also to end the vituperative propaganda
against India on the state controlled media and through ISI-funded news
agencies.
Islamabad is preparing to receive
Mr Vajpayee for the postponed SAARC summit. Its strategy will be to show
some cosmetic progress in negotiations for establishing a South Asian Free
Trade Area. But the question that should be asked is whether New Delhi
would accept such cosmetics as a substitute for the agreement by SAARC
members in Kathmandu that a Draft Free Trade Agreement would be finalised
in the year 2002. It is Pakistan that has deliberately stalled progress
on this. Assuming Mr Vajpayee goes to Islamabad for the SAARC summit without
cross-border terrorism having ended, how will he fulfil his pledge in Parliament,
that he will not hold talks unless cross-border terrorism ends and the
infrastructure of terrorism is dismantled?
Finally, Pakistani Foreign Minister
Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri and others would like us to commence talks from
where they were left off in Agra. Are we prepared to move ahead on a dialogue
framework that omits all mention of the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore
Declaration and attaches the highest priority to talks on J&K, while
relegating other issues to the periphery? Are we going to accept the Pakistani
thesis that Kashmir is the "core issue" that divides us? If this is indeed
the case, the question that arises is, why is it that Pakistan never once
raised the Kashmir issue in any negotiations with us between 1972 and 1988?
For us, terrorism and not Kashmir
is and should remain the core issue. There can and should be no compromise
on this. And Washington should be left in no doubt on this score.
