Author:
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: June 7, 2003
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/archive_full_story.php?content_id=25304
Introduction: Terrorism has changed
the strategic environment. Its implications are likely to be as far-reaching
as the end of the Cold War. The frontlines in the war against terrorism
will be different from the frontlines of the Cold War. Some countries and
institutions may lose their importance; others may gain in prominence.
Addressing the Shangri-La Dialogue
in Singapore on June 1, Defence Minister George Fernandes spoke on ''The
changing environment: Impact on security policy and military doctrine''.
Excerpts:
Two features of the evolving strategic
environment stand out. The first is the contemporary phenomenon of ''jehadi''
terrorism. The second is the danger of the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery by deviant states and/or
radical non-static formations. A third - which impacts on our political
environment very differently but nevertheless forms part of the strategic
calculus - is an increasing unilateralism in the use of force.
The tragedy of 9/11 led to terrorism
being acknowledged as the principal challenge before the global community.
An appropriate collective response was the need of the hour. The emotional
reaction was spontaneous but the practical experience has been more sobering.
The execution of the war against terrorism, while impressive, has been
far from consistent, the campaign sometimes confusing, the links with the
elimination of WMDs and regime change leading to democracy unclear, and
the final outcome still uncertain.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon,
but 9/11 marked the watershed between its perception as a geographically
localised malady and as a global threat. The Bombay blasts of 1993, which
killed over 200 people in serial and synchronised explosions, constituted
arguably the first major act of mass terrorism. But the event went relatively
unregistered in the catalogue of terrorist acts. New York, Washington,
the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, Bali, Riyadh and
Casablanca, among other such events, have driven home the global nature
and reach of terrorism.
Today's terrorism is different in
scale, selection of targets, causes it espouses and identification of the
enemy. Its roots lie in a distorted use of religion; its target is modern
civilisation and democratic values. Bali, Riyadh and Casablanca show that
its targets are not only the non-Muslim world but Islamic societies as
well. This is a matter of particular concern to South-East Asia, which,
like India, has had traditions of moderate Islam. The intrusion of alien,
extremist and ostensibly religious values, with militant pan-Islamic sentiments,
threatens the harmony of their pluralist societies and the security of
states.
The global terrorist finds refuge
in places and regions where sovereignty is weak, in failed states and states
where governments are neither legitimate nor effective. Or in repressive,
authoritarian, alienated regimes propped up from outside. Some governments
even use terrorism as a convenient instrument of state policy.
But though terrorism thrives in
these nether regions, the networks of terrorism exist all over. Finances
are raised globally, as are recruits. The very spread of technology that
underpins the current surge of globalisation and modernity has also empowered
the terrorist with a new lethality.
This then, is the challenge posed
by terrorism: not just the terrorism of some misguided youth in pursuit
of some lofty ideal, but the nihilism of the fanatic whose goal is not
just to die for his cause but, as far as possible, to take civilisation
with him.
To what extent can an open society
protect itself from the malicious use of freedoms and opportunities that
it provides? To what extent can the challenge of jehadi terrorism be met
with military force and new military doctrines? The answers are not easy.
The dictates of security often offer
no alternative but military force. Afghanistan is a classic case where
the infrastructure for terrorism was removed by the plain use of superior
military force even though the dangers of destabilisation remain. However,
force may not suffice in all cases.
Terrorism has changed the strategic
environment and the security discourse fundamentally. Its implications
are likely to be every bit as far-reaching as the end of the Cold War.
The frontlines in the war against terrorism will be different from the
frontlines of the Cold War. Some countries and institutions may lose their
importance; others may gain in prominence. Terrorism has forced a new world
where each nation will have to take sides because no nation can be immune
from it.
The second major challenge to security
is the proliferation of WMDs. It is bad enough if such proliferation takes
place at the level of states, of one state assisting another belligerent
state in obtaining such weapons from laboratories or the nuclear grey market.
But it is altogether a different proposition if such capabilities fall
into the hands of deviant states or terrorists, or if political parties
that share a fundamentalist ideology force their way through weak or defective
political structures to find a place in nuclear decision-making.
This is a challenge linked to, but
distinct from, terrorism. I do not feel we have evolved an adequate policy
to deal with it. Indeed, the complications are such that it may be tempting
to close one's eyes to its dangers.
The last issue I wish to flag today
is the demonstration of US power in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. On the
one hand there is the consensus with which the global community responded
in the aftermath of 9/11, as reflected in the UN Security Council Resolution
1373 and the military campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda. On the
other hand, where a consensus has not been forthcoming, we have seen the
US prepared to exercise its military power unilaterally or in coalitions
of the willing. And yet, the problem of the longer haul after the military
successes remains.
I make this point only to underline
that while decisive action may be necessary such actions need a cooperative
broad-based order to be sustainable. Absolute power has its own limits.
Side-by-side with such omnipotence
lurk unexplained and unknown threats. The virus has become a prominent
metaphor of our times and has, through the computer 'virus', crossed over
from the biological sphere to the technological. While we modify organisms
by transplanting genes from one organism to another, nature displays its
own ingenuity and seeks its own revenge.
Viruses from the avian and animal
worlds invade the human world, if some of the hypotheses about the origins
of SARS or even AIDS are to be believed. As we think of the strategic environment
ahead, and of the security challenges and doctrines that correspond to
it, it might be worth considering the hubris that mankind finds itself
in.
What then is the impact of this
new strategic context? We have to evolve security policies that will now
factor the transnational and domestic terrorist dimension as the major
challenge to the well-being of society. Military capability and civilian
intelligence will have to be synergised towards greater cooperation along
the low intensity conflict-internal security grid. As we all know there
is little of that at this point, both regionally and globally.
