Author: Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: June 26, 2003
New Delhi and the US State Department
found themselves in the same camp, trying to scuttle President Pervez
Musharraf's hopes of receiving F-16s and more at Camp David.
About three weeks ago, Pakistan
persuaded the US Central Command that the US should fulfil its promise
to provide F-16 fighters as a reward for Pakistan's post-9/11 military
assistance.
The Pentagon's green signal was
driven by an assessment, based solely on military grounds, that providing
Pakistan with F-16s and other hardware would not alter the subcontinent's
conventional military balance.
If Musharraf stitched together a
deal by the time of Camp David, he would have scored a huge diplomatic
coup.
Tipped off early on, India launched
a pre-emptive diplomatic strike.
The first salvo came with Deputy
Prime Minister LK Advani's visit to the US. With everyone he met
he repeated a simple mantra: India expects the US to maintain its
decision regarding the supply of F- 16s and other weapons to Pakistan.
Advani's trip helped sensitize the
US to the F-16 deal. He unknowingly was backed by the State Department's
South Asia desk which argued Central Command didn't know how politically
charged the F-16 issue was. The non-proliferation desk also nay-said
the F-16s saying it would be rewarding Pakistan for its nuclear weapons
programme.
The F-16s were off the agenda, but
Central Command still pitched for other major weapons platforms.
India, concerned about the early warning capability these would provide
Pakistan, renewed its lobbying.
In the weeks that followed, India
publicly and privately warned against the provision of "offensive
weapons." It also signalled to the US that while New Delhi was leaning
towards a role in Iraq, all bets would be off if Musharraf was gifted
military goodies.
For example, India warned UK National
Security Advisor Sir David Manning last weekend about the difficulties
of getting a "political consensus" on troop deployment. The message:
Arms to Pakistan would lead to a domestic uproar and wreck any chance
of a consensus.
On the eve of departing for Beijing,
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee pointedly said the decision on
Iraq would follow the Camp David summit.
In the second round, India again
found support from Foggy Bottom. The State Department's South Asia
desk felt any major arms deal would unsettle the region and the peace
process. The nonproliferation lobby said Pakistan had to show it
was no longer doing dirty nuclear deals with North Korea.
But the clincher, which swung the
White House and led the Pentagon to give up its campaign, was the
fear giving Pakistan any big-ticket arms would kill any role by India
in Iraq. This was all the more remarkable given that New Delhi had
yet to officially agree to such a deployment.
As Musharraf began his foreign tour,
Washington warned: Expect no weapons in giftwrapping. Musharraf did
make a plea for F-16s. Bush turned him down. The general got only
small-calibre stuff and lots of money. But the White House publicly
said everything Pakistan was promised would be tied to progress on
ending terrorism, keeping a distance from Pyongyang and democratisation.
In one month, Musharraf's summit of hope had been reduced to a base
camp.
