Author:
Publication: The New York Times
Date: December 23, 2003
The United States has again been
given good reason to wonder whether Pakistan is the trustworthy ally it
claims to be. Fresh evidence indicates that it has sold nuclear- weapons
secrets to Iran, North Korea and perhaps other countries over the years.
Pakistan's military ruler, , insists that he stopped such sales after seizing
power four years ago. Yet just last year, American spy satellites detected
a Pakistani plane picking up North Korean missile parts thought to be part
of a swap for Pakistani nuclear technology. The Bush administration must
demand stronger controls over Pakistan's nuclear labs, which seem to have
been central to the transfers.
General Musharraf, who narrowly
escaped assassination last week, is a key to American policy in south-central
Asia. The general supported America's war in Afghanistan and has helped
arrest Al Qaeda fugitives in Pakistan. Yet it is not clear how fully he
shares American objectives on fighting nuclear proliferation and international
terrorism.
During the 1980's and 90's, Pakistan,
although closely allied with Washington, was virtually a rogue state. It
shared nuclear bomb technology with Iran and North Korea, sponsored terrorism
in Indian-ruled Kashmir and backed the Taliban government that sheltered
Osama bin Laden. General Musharraf has changed some of these policies.
But Washington must pressure him to do more.
The latest evidence on nuclear exports
came to light when Iran recently shared with international regulators information
about its nuclear suppliers. Earlier this year, international inspectors
found uranium enrichment centrifuges in Iran that were identical to early
Pakistani designs. The technology trail points to Pakistan's A. Q. Khan
Research Laboratories, and several of its leading scientists have now been
questioned. Three years ago, at Washington's urging, General Musharraf
removed Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's own nuclear weapons
program, as the laboratories' director. It is possible that nuclear technology
exports continued, as the intercepted North Korean missile shipment suggests.
The laboratories have allies in Pakistan's army and its powerful military
intelligence agency. To ensure that nuclear exports are truly halted, General
Musharraf must tighten government control over the laboratories.
Washington should demand changes
in other policies as well. General Musharraf's undermining of mainstream
opposition parties has helped strengthen the Islamic parties that now rule
areas along the Afghan border where Taliban recruiters openly operate.
Containing Islamic extremism in Pakistan requires allowing mainstream opposition
parties to function freely.
General Musharraf is again pledging
to stop terrorists crossing into Indian-controlled Kashmir. Such vows are
easily made in December, when infiltration routes are blocked with snow.
An effective crackdown requires reining in army leaders who use the Kashmir
issue to win higher military budgets than Pakistan can afford and local
commanders who wink at border- crossing militants.
The Bush administration, which sees
General Musharraf as a valuable ally against terrorism, has not pressured
him to restore democracy. Betting American security on one man in a troubled
country of 150 million is risky. A wiser course would be to hold General
Musharraf to all of his promises, on nuclear exports, terrorist infiltration
and restoring democracy.
