Author: Antony Barnett
Publication: The Observer
Date: January 18, 2004
Antony Barnett investigates the
illegal global market in nuclear equipment and expertise and how the weapons
programmes of Iran, Libya and North Korea all lead back to Pakistan
The Austrian village of Seibersdorf
is so anonymous that cab drivers from nearby Vienna have difficulty finding
it. But it is home to a laboratory complex whose scientists have the power
to start a war or keep the peace.
Hunched over electron microscopes
and mass spectrometers, they are the world's nuclear detectives, analysing
minute fragments of radioactive matter collected by UN inspectors in places
such as Iran and Libya. Testing particles as small as one-hundredth of
the width of a human hair, they can spot the secret yet indelible signs
of a nuclear programme.
It was in Seibersdorf last summer
that a scientist analysing dust taken from a cotton swipe used inside facilities
in Iran discovered evidence of highly-enriched uranium - the key component
of an atomic bomb. It was the first hint of a programme that had remained
hidden for 18 years.
Like DNA from a crime scene, analysis
of these particles also provides vital clues to the source of any nuclear
material. Each radioactive isotope has its own signature.
Scientists at Seibersdorf work for
the UN's nuclear watchdog - the International Atomic Energy Authority.
They are just one part of a nuclear police force that is at the forefront
of a war against a growing black market in nuclear material, equipment
and atomic know-how. The battle involves rogue scientists selling their
technical knowledge, nations desperate to join the nuclear weapon states
and middlemen turn ing a quick buck by trading equipment and material.
Dramatic evidence from Iran and
now Libya reveals a clandestine and sophisticated network stretching from
North Korea, Malaysia and China to Russia, Germany and Dubai. Yet one country
more than any other stands accused of easing this proliferation. In the
network of illegal radioactive trade, all roads point to Pakistan. More
precisely, they lead to the Khan Research Laboratories in Kahuta in north
Pakistan.
Uranium 235 is the holy grail in
bomb-making. It is a specific radioactive isotope whose atoms can split
in two, releasing the huge amount of fissile energy vital to an atomic
weapon. One way of acquiring it is to obtain uranium ore from the ground
- which has minute amounts of uranium-235 - then 'enrich' it using thousands
of centrifuges. This involves putting unrefined uranium into a tube and
spinning it at twice the speed of sound to expel any impurities. By doing
this, the amount of uranium-235 becomes more concentrated.
While this process may not sound
too complicated, it requires a feat of supreme technical engineering involving
a number of complex components. In particular, the rotors of the centrifuge
spin so fast they need to be made of extremely strong material and be perfectly
balanced.
In the mid-Seventies, these engineering
problems were faced by a Pakistani metallurgist, Abdul Qadeer Khan. An
ardent nationalist, he had just seen India test its first nuclear bomb.
At the time he was working in Holland for an Anglo-Dutch-German nuclear
engineering consortium called Urenco. Through his work there, Khan became
aware of secret blueprints for two types of uranium enrichment centrifuges:
one based on rotors made of aluminium and another based on a highly-strengthened
alloy of steel.
Khan went on to steal the blueprints
and a list of Urenco suppliers. With the blessing of the then Pakistani
government, he established the Khan Research Laboratories near Islamabad
and, with the help of the Chinese, went on to secretly develop the country's
atomic bomb.
When, in 1998, Pakistan tested its
first nuclear bomb in the desert of Baluchistan, Khan became a hero in
his home country as the 'father of the Pakistani nuclear programme'. He
once said: 'All Western countries are not only the enemies of Pakistan
but in fact of Islam.'
His fundamentalist sympathies mean
that it is perhaps no surprise that he is also known as the 'godfather
of the Islamic bomb'. Evidence has now emerged from Iran and Libya that
Khan's programme in Pakistan may be the source of the greatest level of
nuclear weapons proliferation since the Cold War.
The Observer has learnt that UN
inspectors who have recently visited a number of facilities in Libya discovered
large amounts of aluminium centrifuge parts that had 'all the hallmarks
of the Urenco designs' stolen by Khan. Pakistan used these to enrich uranium
before later turning to the more complex steel centrifuges.
A Vienna-based diplomat familiar
with the Libyan inspections said: 'The big surprise was that components
found were almost off-the-shelf turnkey equipment. It was as if somebody
had been shopping at Ikea and just needed to put the bits together.'
The diplomat said this was unlike
Iraq's secret nuclear programme, which required large teams of scientists
to deal with research issues and solve mechanical problems. He said: 'The
worry is that if a country like Libya - with little industrial infrastructure
and a small population - could lay its hands on this equipment, then a
large country might be able to set up a weapons programme at a very fast
pace indeed.'
Libyan authorities have been helping
the IAEA to piece together the 'cartel' of middlemen feeding this clandestine
network of nuclear know-how and equipment. They have been helped by the
US seizure of a German-registered ship in the Suez Canal last October destined
for Libya with thousands of parts - believed to be Malaysian-made but based
on Pakistani designs - for aluminium centrifuges.
The UN inspectors uncovered evidence
that many of the same middlemen were responsible for arming Libya and Iran.
Last November, Iran finally admitted to a vast, secret procurement network
that acquired thousands of sensitive parts and tools from numerous countries
over an 18-year period.
It is believed that rogue scientists
from Pakistan, motivated by million-dollar payouts, were helped by German
middlemen and Sri Lankan businessmen based in Dubai. The middlemen are
believed to have secured items for Iran from European, Asian and North
American companies.
Until the end of last year the Pakistani
government furiously denied that any of its nuclear technology had been
'exported'. However, it now accepts that 'certain individuals might have
violated Pakistani laws for personal gain'. Last month Pakistan announced
it was questioning four of its scientists over the sale of nuclear secrets,
including Abdul Khan, but Western officials fear little will come of this
inquiry.
The political sensitivity of 'arresting'
a national hero such as Khan would inflame Islamic sentiment and backfire
on both the US and President Pervez Musharraf, who is an important ally
in the war on terrorism. Yet while the 'rogue scientist' theory is helpful
to all parties in explaining how Pakistani equipment has ended up in Libya
and Iran, an added complication is the role played by North Korea.
US intelligence claims that the
Pakistani government, through the Khan laboratories, struck a deal which
swapped Pakistani nuclear centrifuge technology for North Korean long-range
missiles.
South Korean intelligence agents
were reported to have discovered the transactions in 2002 and that summer
US spy satellites photographed Pakistani cargo planes loading missile parts
in North Korea.
Pakistan has denied such a deal,
but pressure is mounting for Musharraf to clamp down. Reports have also
emerged of Pakistani nuclear scientists visiting Burma. It is clear that
the extent of the black market in nuclear weapons technology is only just
beginning to emerge. As one of the scientists in Seibersdorf said: 'This
year looks like being a busy one.'
