Author: Swapan Dasgupta
Publication: Free Press Journal
Date: January 19, 2004
It is a matter of eternal regret
that foreign policy is not dependent on the sound bites of either the vegetable
sellers or fashion designers of Islamabad. Had it been so, India would
have coupled its joy over Finance Minister Jaswant Singh's pre-election
bonanza with the additional reassurance that the carefully vetted voices
for peace we heard on the news channels constituted the definitive Pakistani
perception of what President Pervez Musharraf called his "deal" with Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
It is a "deal" India has absolutely
no reason to be displeased with. The sticking point at the Agra summit
in 2001 was India's insistence that Pakistan repudiate the jehadi terrorism
mounted from camps across the Line of Control. Now, with the US breathing
down its neck for its undercover export of nuclear technology to rogue
regimes, Pakistan was undeniably beleaguered. It needed a respite, a little
bit of breathing space. Forever the guerrilla commander in search of openings
and opportunities, Musharraf knew that this was the moment to effect a
retreat. India has reason to be grateful to both Vajpayee and Principal
Secretary Brajesh Mishra that they seized the moment.
Diplomatic niceties and a sense
of generosity have propelled India's assertion that the joint statement
that commits Pakistan to ending state-sponsored terrorism in return for
a composite dialogue on all outstanding bilateral issues is a win-win for
both sides. Yet the fact remains that this agreement to allow negotiations
to prevail over armed conflict constitutes a negation of everything Pakistan
has stood for since the Kashmir Valley erupted in 1989. It is a U-turn
that is far more awesome in scope than Musharraf's decision after 9/11
to abandon the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
If the joint statement does mark
a change, history will view Vajpayee's Isamabad visit in the same light
as President Nixon's journey to Beijing and Menachim Begin's hop to Cairo.
Of course, it is unlikely that the manifestations of a Pakistani retreat
are going to be felt immediately. Musharraf's comment that he will not
accept the LoC as the international border is an early indication that
Pakistan will want to be seen to shift the focus from terrorist strikes
to hard bargaining. It is significant that the pro-Pakistan faction of
the Hurriyat Conference, led by Ali Shah Geelani, has also chosen to shift
to a negotiating mode.
Yet, this is not the time to add
enduring peace to the growing "feel better" mood that is overwhelming the
country. Vajpayee and Mishra didn't take any great risk by limiting the
final bout of negotiations to themselves. At best, only Deputy Prime Minister
L.K. Advani and External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha were in the loop.
After all, what India was seeking was completely in line with the existing
policy.
The only real differences within
the BJP was over the question of beginning serious negotiations with Musharraf
now or after the general election had given Vajpayee a renewed mandate.
In short, the debate within India were centred on tactics and the extent
of accommodation.
The same, unfortunately, cannot
be said of Pakistan. All indications suggest that the decision to disavow
terrorism in Kashmir was taken by General Musharraf personally, with Tariq
Aziz and General Hamid Javed being the only others involved. The wider
military establishment, the all-powerful ISI and the fledgling political
authority were not consulted.
It is safe to hazard the guess that
had the consultation process been enlarged, Vajpayee would have returned
from Islamabad without anything more than the multilateral free trade agreement.
Last month, when Musharraf first indicated in an interview to BBC that
he was willing to "set aside" the 1948 UN Security Council resolution,
there was the spectacle of his words being disowned by the rest of the
Pakistani establishment.
It may sound deliciously ironic,
but it cannot be denied that Musharraf demonstrated exemplary statesmanship
in Islamabad last week. At the same time, he has exposed himself to grave
risks. Unless he is able to sell the "deal" with Vajpayee to the wider
military establishment in Pakistan, including the ISI that operates a parallel
state apparatus, India cannot afford to let its guard down.
Let us not forget that Nawaz Sharif
too displayed amazing courage by negotiating the Lahore agreement with
Vajpayee in 1999. Pakistani sources have indicated that the formal agreement
was also supplemented by an unwritten understanding that Kashmir would
be put on the backburner. This may explain why Sharif was brutally undermined
and then ignominiously ousted by a military establishment that believed
Kashmir could be liberated by war and terrorism. It was Musharraf who was
the chief conspirator against his prime minister. It is possible that the
changed reality of the post-9/11 world has dawned on the whole of Pakistan
but it would be risky to proceed on the assumption it has. As yet, there
is no evidence to suggest that there has been a fundamental review of Pakistan's
broader strategic goals in Kashmir. The shift cannot happen overnight.
All India needs to constantly monitor is that a beginning has been made
by Pakistan to accommodate the international revulsion against terrorism.
In addition, Musharraf has the reputation
of being an artful dodger who is immodest enough to claim he has nine lives.
That claim will be tested in the coming months. For the moment, India will
have to cautiously assess whether the trust reposed in Musharraf's ability
to stick to the letter and spirit of the Islamabad agreement is justified.
For the past two years, India has
berated the US for reposing exaggerated faith in Musharraf's ability to
steer Pakistan away from jehadi madness. After last week's agreement, India
too has developed a vested interest in his political survival.
