Author: Seema Sirohi
Publication: Outlook
Date: January 12, 2004
Introduction: N-weapons going cheap.
Does Musharraf know?
When sales brochures from Pakistan's
Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) are found with dangerous middlemen in
Libya and Iran, who trade in illegal nuclear technology, the tracks are
difficult to cover. When second-hand Pakistani centrifuges are discovered
by UN inspectors in Iran, the plot thickens. When Colonel Muamar Gadaffi's
son reveals that Libya spent millions buying plans from Pakistani scientists
to make a nuclear bomb, it is time to pull the alarm. In some ways, the
Bush administration has done so, leaking like a sieve to the US media about
the hair-raising state of affairs inside Pakistan's nuclear establishment.
US and European pressure forced
Islamabad last month to question the father of the Pak bomb, Abdul Qadeer
Khan, and three of his associates. From the slew of reports, Pakistan seemed
more like a nuclear cornershop
than a country in control of its
assets. The New York Times last week nailed Pakistan as the intellectual
and trading hub of a loose network of hidden nuclear proliferators. It
quoted a senior US official as saying: "These guys are now three for three
as supplier to the biggest proliferation problems we have", referring to
Pakistan's nuclear links to Libya, Iran and North Korea.
The centrifuges found in Iran last
year are a modified version of those built by Urenco, a European consortium
where Khan worked in the 1970s. He stole the design and was later convicted
by a Dutch court in absentia. According to David Albright, a former UN
inspector, Pakistan made a number of machines before abandoning them for
a sturdier model. The early models or Pak-1s were given to Iran in 1987,
the nyt reported. Last week, it revealed that Pakistan was also the source
for Libya making "major strides" in uranium enrichment.
Khan was publishing papers in the
1980s, boasting and advertising his skills. In 1991, his team even wrote
about how to etch grooves on the centrifuge, a specially difficult skill.
According to a report by the American Congressional Research Service, sales
brochures from KRL soon followed and in 2000 the Pakistani government ran
its own advertisement announcing export rules for nuclear gear. But US
strategic interests in Pakistan prevented any overt censure.
The story is the same today. Private
jitters felt by US officials are a sharp contrast to public affirmations
of faith in Pakistan, a key ally. No one wants to jeopardise Musharraf's
already precarious position-two close attempts on his life were enough
to scare Washington. President George Bush, has never mentioned Pakistan's
leaky nuclear set-up. When asked about Pakistani nuclear weapons, he said
curtly, "Yes, they are secure."
US spokesmen blandly repeat Musharraf's
assurances given after 9/11 to secretary of state Colin Powell about stopping
all proliferation. "We are confident that Pakistan takes these issues very
seriously and has taken robust steps to secure its sensitive materials,"
a state department spokesman told Outlook. But in 2002, spy satellites
caught a Pakistani plane picking up missile parts in North Korea, believed
to be in exchange for Pakistani nuclear technology. Last October, Italy
intercepted centrifuge components going to Libya which were based on Pakistani
designs.
Nuclear technology has continued
to leak from Pakistan despite Musharraf's assurances. "Whether he is deliberately
doing this or can't control the activity-either way it is a dangerous situation,"
says Stephen Cohen, a veteran South Asia analyst. "It is a sort of a hear-no-evil,
see-no-evil policy. The Bush administration is caught in a dilemma. It
can't sanction Pakistan but finds it hard to influence what goes on inside."
The deal between North Korea and
Pakistan has long been in the public realm. Now, revelations about the
Pakistani hand in the nuclear programmes of Iran and Libya have shocked
the US."I wonder whether the reported transactions with Iran began when
Pakistan's former army chief Aslam Beg (1988-1991) was advocating a posture
of 'strategic defiance' against the US and an alliance with Iran," says
Michael Krepon, a nuclear expert. Question now is: can Musharraf put an
end to it all?
