Author: Wasbir Hussain
Publication: Outlook
Date: January 14, 2004
URL: http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20040114&fname=bangladeh&sid=1
Introduction: The Indian accusations
were shrugged, the Bhutanese action stung, but it is the increasing international
attention focused on terrorist and insurgent activities in Bangladesh that
makes Dhaka's past pretence progressively unsustainable.
The presence of Indian insurgents
in safe havens in Bangladesh has never been in doubt, considering the volumes
of hard intelligence input that New Delhi has. If confirmation was needed,
a spate of reports relating to multiple incidents on January 2, 2004, and
Dhaka's subsequent responses, gave confirmation to India's long standing
complaint that its neighbour was being less than honest on the issue.
* On January 2, Bangladesh Rifles
(BDR) raided a hideout of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
and captured six of its cadres and seized some weapons and a mobile telephone
set. According to media reports originating from Bangladesh, the NLFT camp
that was raided was located near Karisapunji village under Chunarughat
upa-zilla (sub-district) in Habiganj district. The United News of Bangladesh
(UNB) identified those arrested as Kokek Tripura (22), Philip Debbarma
(24), Manjak Debbarma (20), Bukhuk Debbarma (24), Satish Debbarma (25)
and Shoilen Debbarma (25).
* In another incident on January
2, the rebel All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) chief Ranjit Debbarma's residence
in Dhaka was attacked by rocket propelled grenades (RPG). Indian media
reports said five ATTF rebels were killed in that attack and eight others,
including Debbarma, were wounded.
* On January 2, Bangladeshi security
forces reportedly arrested as many as 34 rebels belonging to the United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) from different parts of Dhaka. Some Bangladeshi
newspapers, including Jugantar, quoted police officials as saying the militants
were arrested after raids at different places including Mohammedpur, Green
Road and Gulshan, all upmarket localities in Dhaka. According to Jugantar,
four people who were caught while making bombs at a house in the city's
Mohammedpur area, had received treatment at the Suhrawardy Hospital, under
concealed identities.
* Intelligence sources indicated
that the January 2 'rocket attack' - actually two grenades lobbed into
Debbarma's residence - took place in the Shamoli building apparently owned
by a leading Bangladeshi political figure. The chiefs of the ATTF and ULFA
were reportedly staying in this highly secure building. After the attack
on the building's 2nd floor, where the ATTF chief was allegedly staying,
the local police swung into action and rounded up almost everyone in the
building. Some of those picked up were supposed to have been Bangladeshi
intelligence operatives. Four injured persons were taken to hospital. Later,
all those picked up were released by the police. Sources claim that top
officials of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI, Bangladesh's
Military intelligence agency) intervened to secure the release of these
men. It is claimed that many of those arrested were ULFA cadres, and that
this is the same incident that the local media reports in Dhaka were referring
to, when they mentioned the arrest of 34 ULFA men. It is also claimed that
members of a local mafia group called 'Seven Star' were behind the rocket
attack. No independent confirmation of this incident was immediately available.
How did Dhaka respond to these media
reports? While it preferred to remain silent on the reports relating to
the raid and the arrest of six NLFT rebels as well as the bomb attack on
the residence of the ATTF chief, Bangladesh came out with a formal denial
of reports about the arrest of 34 ULFA militants from Dhaka.
"We would like to categorically
state that the reports (about the ULFA rebels' capture) are false, baseless
and concocted and have been fabricated to strain the friendly relations
between Bangladesh and India. No such incidents took place in the capital
city of Dhaka," a Home Ministry Press Release issued in Dhaka on January
3 said. The Bangladesh Home Ministry statement added: "We would also like
to reassert the well- known position of the government of Bangladesh that
Bangladesh has never allowed or assisted insurgent groups of any country
for acts against that country and this policy was being pursued by the
government consistently and rigorously."
Bangladesh certainly is on the back-foot,
and its official position vis-a-vis the Indian insurgents is not coming
in handy anymore in view of the changing global and South Asian counter-terrorism
scenario. Further, the case against its support to Indian insurgent groups
is gradually being independently validated. For instance, the location
of the NLFT hideout that was raided by the BDR on January 2 tallies with
a location mentioned in the latest list of 194 Indian insurgent camps inside
Bangladesh submitted by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) to the visiting
BDR team in New Delhi only last week (during the meeting between the two
border forces from January 6 to 9, 2004). The Indian list says that the
NLFT has a transit camp at Thakurgaon under Chunarughat Police Station
in the Habiganj district of Bangladesh. Again, the very fact that Dhaka
has not denied the raid and subsequent capture of six NLFT rebels goes
against its official position that there are neither camps nor any Indian
insurgent cadres operating from within the territory of Bangladesh.
Denials aside, Bangladesh, by reliable
accounts, may in fact be waking up to the need to rein in these foreign
militants. This report in a leading English daily from Dhaka, The Daily
Star (Internet edition, January 5, 2004), makes interesting reading:
"The Home Ministry at a high level
meeting with paramilitary BDR and intelligence agencies yesterday (January
4, 2004) asked them to step up border security and watch on Dhaka to stem
infiltration of Indian terrorists. The Ministry officially denied discussion
on steps to tackle infiltration of the operatives of the ULFA and other
outfits, but meeting sources confirmed the agenda. They said Home Minister
Altaf Hossain Chowdhury and State Minister Lutfozzaman Babar asked the
DGFI and NSI (National Security Intelligence) agencies to keep an eye on
suspicious people in hotels and rest houses in Dhaka. The ministers also
asked the agencies to strengthen vigilance in the porous bordering areas
of Cox's Bazar, Bandarban, Rangamati, Khagrachhari and Sylhet."
There is some speculation that Dhaka
may, in fact, have been stung by Bhutan's year-end crackdown on anti-India
separatist camps on its territory, a move for which the Royal Government
in Thimphu has received widespread appreciation from nations in the forefront
of the global war on terror. But any actions that Dhaka may be initiating,
do not appear to have been triggered off simply because another South Asian
neighbour has shown the way by launching an assault on anti-India rebels
in the Kingdom, or because New Delhi has been persistent in its claim that
an increasing number of camps of Indian insurgents are located inside Bangladesh.
It is, rather, the rising pressure of international opinion that is forcing
a reassessment in Dhaka.
The publication in part, on December
10, 2003, of a report on Bangladesh, prepared by the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service (CSIS), and an advisory issued by the US State Department
to its citizens and officials posted at or visiting Bangladesh, have been
particularly embarrassing for Dhaka. The CSIS report prepared in December
2003, said that the Bangladesh Government was not taking enough measures
to prevent the country from becoming a haven for Islamist terror groups
in South Asia. The report expressed concern over the activities of terrorists
suspected to be connected with Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. The
CSIS report added that Dhaka was not willing to crack down on terror, and
expressed fear of dangers to Canadian aid workers in Bangladesh. Significantly,
the report also said, there have been a number of serious terrorist attacks
on cultural groups and recreational facilities in Bangladesh, but Prime
Minister Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has been blaming
the opposition party (the Awami League of former Premier Sheikh Hasina)
for such criminal activities as a matter of routine, rather than zeroing
in on the real people or group behind such acts of violence.
Dhaka has rejected the observations
made in the CSIS report and has been consistently denying that Bangladesh
has become the latest hub of Islamist terror groups, including the Al Qaeda.
The fact remains, however, that a local terror group, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami,
Bangladesh (HUJI-BD), led by Shauqat Osman, with the avowed objective of
establishing 'Islamic rule' in Bangladesh, is indeed active in the country.
Western media reports suggest this group has an estimated 15,000 cadres.
With increasing international attention
focused on terrorist and insurgent activities in Bangladesh, Dhaka's past
pretence is becoming progressively unsustainable. Nevertheless, the flow
of insurgents from India to safe havens in Bangladesh continues. Indeed,
with ULFA having lost its bases and once- secure staging areas inside Bhutan,
it is expected to turn to two obvious alternate locations, Myanmar and
Bangladesh. But Yangon is already supposed to have turned on the heat on
Indian insurgents in the country, leaving Bangladesh the only place that
rebels like those of the ULFA have to hold on to. This , too, may not be
easy anymore. Dhaka might continue to push ahead with its stand that no
Indian insurgents are located or operating from the country, but may have
to move as quietly as possible to neutralize these rebels and choke them
off within its territory to escape a possible foolproof indictment by the
international community as a nation that has not done enough to combat
terror.
(Wasbir Hussain is Associate Fellow,
Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel,
Guwahati. Courtesy, the South Asia Intelligence Review of of the South
Asia Terrorism Portal)
