Author: Hussain Haqqani
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: March 24, 2004
Pak's journey down the jehadi road
was the result of the belief that its location, rather than its people,
is its greatest asset
The Pakistan Army is finally using
force in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to flush out Islamist militants
affiliated with Al Qaeda. Clearing Pakistani territory of terrorists and
militants is the right decision for Pakistan. The foreign militants who
came to fight as volunteers in the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and stayed
on have pursued their global jehad from Afghan and Pakistani soil for almost
two decades. Even those Pakistanis, who until recently sympathised with
the struggles of fellow Muslims under oppression, for example those of
the Kashmiris, Palestinians and Chechens, are beginning to recognise that
the methods of the jehadis are a threat to global order. Pakistanis do
not want their country to be subjected to an international military operation,
like the ones in Afghanistan and Iraq, and are therefore willing to support
a military operation of their own.
There will, of course, be serious
domestic consequences for Pakistan of the casualties resulting from the
military operation in the tribal areas. In addition to the militants and
the official troops, there is bound to be collateral damage. The Pashtun
tribes have a tradition of revenge that might embitter relations between
Pakistani officials and tribesmen for years.
The family members of Pakistani
Army jawans would also have difficulty reconciling to loss of lives resulting
from battles with fellow Muslims. They have, until now, been trained to
fight ''unbelievers'' as soldiers of Islam. Battling extremist brethren
in faith would result in a difficult transition from Mujahid (as Pakistani
troops see themselves) to professional soldiers. The Pakistani military's
standing within the country has seen constant erosion over the years, largely
as a result of its domestic political role. The stripping of religious
legitimacy resulting from its operation in the tribal areas is likely to
add to that erosion of the Army's respect in civilian eyes.
The negative fallout of the battles
in the tribal areas would have been worth it if it had been part of a strategic
decision to close the chapter of Pakistan's past support for jehadism and
move the country in a new direction. But closing the chapter on misdirected
strategies requires recognition of where the mistake was committed and
who was responsible for committing it. Unfortunately, that does not seem
to be happening in Pakistan at all.
General Pervez Musharraf has declared
his intention to change Pakistan's direction in several areas. He intends
to eliminate terrorism, end militancy as an instrument of state policy,
restore moderation in matters of religion, maintain strict controls over
Pakistan's nuclear resources and pursue normalisation of relations with
India. But he is unwilling to open discussion over what factors led Pakistan's
past leaders, and even General Musharraf himself before 9/11, to make incorrect
choices. I'm afraid that unless the origin of previous strategic blunders
is investigated and debated, Pakistan's current leadership will end up
making right decisions but for all the wrong reasons.
Pakistan's journey down the jehadi
road was the result of the belief that Pakistan's strategic location, rather
than its people or its economic potential, is its greatest asset. In the
aftermath of cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Pakistan's
intelligence apparatus saw the country as an indispensable ally of the
US. Possession of nuclear weapons conferred a special status on the country.
The success of the jehadi experiment against the Soviets encouraged Pakistan's
strategic planners to expand jehad against India, and into post-Soviet
Central Asia. At no stage was any attention paid to the economic and political
consequences of militancy and violence.
Just as the embrace of jehadism
was undertaken with the expectation of external glory for Pakistan, its
gradual abandonment since America's declaration of war against terrorism
in the aftermath of 9/11 has also been the result of external factors.
From the initial decision to withdraw recognition and support from the
Taliban to the latest steps in military confrontation with Al-Qaeda and
its allies in the tribal areas, American pressure rather than domestic
requirement has been cited as the principal motive for Pakistani policy.
The US, too, continues to raise the hopes of Pakistan's ruling establishment
about military cooperation and possible quid pro quos.
The latest ''incentive'' for General
Musharraf's cooperation is the prospect of declaring Pakistan a major non-NATO
ally. ''We'll designate Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally for purposes
of our future military-to-military relations,'' US Secretary of State Colin
Powell said during a recent visit in Islamabad. That status is currently
enjoyed by Australia, Bahrain, Israel and South Korea and would enable
Pakistan to acquire US weapons more easily than at the present moment.
Powell subsequently explained that
move may be largely symbolic. ''In some instances it's more symbolic than
practical,'' he later told reporters. ''I don't know (with) Pakistan whether
it will be able to take great advantage of it. But it's just a sign of
the strength of the relationship.'' According to reports, as a major non-NATO
ally, Pakistan could use US funding to lease some defence items and would
become eligible for loans of military supplies for research and development
projects. It would also become eligible to buy depleted uranium ammunition,
to have US-owned military stockpiles on its territory outside US bases
and to receive US military training on easier financial terms.
US praise and support during the
1980s led Pakistan's military leaders to over-estimate Pakistan's power
potential, leading to the strategic miscalculations of the 1990s. Expectations
of increased military muscle, through non-NATO ally status, could lead
to similar miscalculations by General Musharraf or his successors. It is
important that Pakistan's leaders understand the nature of the country's
problems and tackle issues such as confronting terrorism, normalising relations
with India, and controlling nuclear transfers for the sake of Pakistan,
not just as a means of pleasing their American allies. Pakistan cannot
seriously pursue economic development if it continues along the path of
militarism and militancy. That, rather than the prospect of new weapons
purchases from the US should be the reasons for Pakistan's strategic turnaround.
In the past, close military relations
with the US have encouraged Pakistanis to have an exaggerated notion of
their regional or global role. It is time for a reality check. In a world
where military power is usually an extension of economic and technological
strength, Pakistan is a nation with a relatively small GDP - around $ 75
billion in absolute terms and $295 billion in purchasing price parity.
It suffers from massive urban unemployment, rural under-employment, illiteracy
and low per capita income. One-third of the population live below the poverty
line and another 21 per cent lives just above it, resulting in almost half
the people of Pakistan being very poor. None of the state's institutions
works effectively. The Constitution has been amended more times than it
has been implemented.
What Pakistan's leaders must come
to terms with is the internal weakness of the nation. Instead of thinking
how we can secure American aid and praise, they need to recognise the threat
posed to Pakistan by its economic and political crises. They must take
stock of Pakistan's position, instead of convincing themselves that Pakistan
is powerful or globally important because it has America's blessings.
The writer is a visiting scholar
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He served
as adviser to Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif and as Pakistan's
Ambassador to Sri Lanka