Author: B Raman
Publication: Rediff on Net
Date: May 21, 2004
URL: http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/may/21spec4.htm
Israel does not figure in the Congress
document at all. As already mentioned in Part II of this series, it was
under Indira Gandhi in the late 1960s that channels of communication and
mutual security assistance with Israel were opened. These were kept sustained
by the Morarji Desai government and further strengthened by the Rajiv Gandhi
government and the governments that followed. The Narasimha Rao government
established full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992.
However, all governments, which
preceded the BJP-led coalition, kept the relations with Israel in various
fields a secret lest public disclosure of them damage India's standing
in the Islamic world. The BJP-led government brought these relationships
into the open and further expanded them.
It also sought Israeli experise
in the use of technical means for countering terrorism. It also encouraged
non-governmental contacts with Israel as well as the Jewish community in
the rest of the world and, particularly in the US, to identify new areas
of co-operation. There was also an open exchange of visits at various levels,
the high point of which was Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's high-profile
visit to India last year.
There was strong criticism of the
BJP's handling of the relations with Israel from the Congress (I) as well
as the Leftist parties and pro-Arab intellectuals in the months before
the election. The Congress (I)'s criticism was mainly due to the fact that
it felt that the BJP had allowed the importance attached by it to these
relations to mute its criticism of Israel for its policy of reprisals against
the Palestine Liberation Organisation and downgrade India's traditional
support to the Palestine cause.
None of this criticism finds mention
in the Congress (I)'s document, but one is likely to see a qualitative
change in the Congress (I)'s handling of the relations with Israel.
First, the mutual security and military
supply relationship would, most probably, be maintained, but in secret
as it was before 1998.
Second, the priority given to counter-terrorism
co-operation may be downgraded.
Third, high-level and high-profile
exchanges of visits, particularly of personalities perceived by the Congress
(I) as controversial, may be reduced, if not stopped.
And four, there would be much stronger
vocal support to the Palestine cause and criticism of Israeli's policies
and actions against the Palestinians.
Also Read: 'Relations with Israel
of tremendous significance'
ASEAN
The 'Look East' policy started by
the Narasimha Rao government to expand and strengthen India's relations
with the South-East Asian countries and ASEAN was further developed by
the BJP-led coalition. The momentum in this regard would be maintained.
The Congress (I) policy document
says: 'The Congress will attach high importance to India's relations with
the United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, China, Japan
and the ASEAN countries. The Congress will improve and expand strategic
relations between India, on the one hand, and the USA, European Union,
Russia, Japan and the ASEAN region, on the other. The Congress will revive
purposeful efforts to strengthen India's relations with other regional
groups like ASEAN and APEC.'
How effective will the Congress
(I) be in the implementation of its policies?
There is a big question mark over
this. The past Congress (I) governments of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi
had absolute majorities and did not have to depend on other parties for
their policy formulation and implementation. The Narasimha Rao government
did not have that kind of majority, but it managed to survive without any
undue dependence on others. In the incoming coalition, the Congress (I)
has only a half of the required absolute majority. Its dependence on its
electoral allies, particularly the Communists, would be high and possibly
crucial.
While policy differences with other
coalition partners at the Centre or to the right of the political spectrum
would be minor and manageable, those with the Leftists, who have won the
largest number of seats since Independence, could prove to be difficult
to manage in respect of economic reforms and relations with the US and
Israel.
Any slowing down of the economic
reforms or reversal of past policies could have an adverse effect on India's
relations with the West, particularly the US. The regimes in China and
Russia, who were the past mentors of the Indian Leftist parties, have realised
the importance of good relations with the US, even while maintaining their
vital national interests. Many of our leftists continue to live in the
past and have nothing to learn from the present pragmatic regimes of Beijing
and Moscow.
The Congress (I) led government
is likely to be weak and the Congress (I)'s ability to enforce its leadership
on others is uncertain. One can already hear discordant voices in respect
of economic reforms and relations with the US. While the Congress (I) through
K Natwar Singh has underlined the importance attached by it to India's
relations with the US, the Leftists have been saying quite the opposite.
A statement issued by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of India-Marxist on May 18, calls for
opposition to 'imperialist (Read US) penetration' in society and a foreign
policy consistent with India's traditional stance of non-alignment. 'The
policy should promote multi- polarity and good relations with our neighbours
and promote dialogue with Pakistan.' It adds.
During the election campaign, the
Leftists had been calling for a re-look at all the agreements on military-military
cooperation with the US signed under the BJP-led coalition.
Will the Leftists revive and persist
with these demands? Will the Congress (I) be able to persuade them not
to insist on them? What influence will the Leftists exercise on the foreign
policy and national security management? It is difficult to answer these
questions at present.
