Author: G Parthasarathy
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: June 17, 2004
Shortly after he returned to Delhi
in 1982 following his term as Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr Natwar Singh remarked
that it was his ardent wish that India-Pakistan relations should be conducted
in a manner that ensured that Pakistan was not a regular feature in Indian
newspaper headlines.
He is going to find this easier
said than done in this age of 24-hour live television news coverage. But
we are perhaps finding the recipe to make our approach to foreign policy
seem less Pakistan-centric, following the policies outlined by President
APJ Abdul Kalam in his June 7 address to the joint session of Parliament
and recent remarks made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In his typically
low key manner, Dr Singh sent Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf and the
international community a very clear signal on just how far any Government
in India would go in responding to General Musharraf's ambitions on Kashmir.
Dr Manmohan Singh told British journalist Jonathan Power: "Short of secession,
short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything,
as far as Kashmir is concerned."
In the meantime, comments made by
Mr Natwar Singh about the primacy of the Simla Agreement and his advocacy
of a "joint nuclear doctrine" for India, Pakistan and China created huge
media controversy and evoked a predictable reaction from Pakistan. President
Kalam has now clarified that dialogue with Pakistan will be "within the
framework of the Simla Agreement and all subsequent agreements between
the two governments, including the joint statement of January 6, 2004".
He also spoke of expanding "political and security exchanges with China
to ensure regional security". It is important for India to stress the primacy
of the Simla Agreement, even as it respects all other agreements signed
with Pakistan. The Simla Agreement set the stage for bilateral resolution
of all issues between India and Pakistan. It replaced the old UN mandated
"cease fire line" with a new Line of Control (LoC) based on ground realities.
It is also the only agreement that explicitly requires both sides to "respect"
the LoC and commits both sides not to seek to alter the LoC unilaterally.
It has been the practice of successive
military dictators in Pakistan to unilaterally reject or seek to replace
agreements that the democratically elected Governments have signed with
India. General Zia ul Haq sought to replace the Simla Agreement with a
so-called "No War Pact" even though the Simla Agreement contains all the
elements of a "No War Pact". Barely six weeks after the Lahore Declaration
was signed, General Musharraf described the Declaration as "hot air" and
went on to add provocatively that "low intensity conflict" with India will
continue even if the Kashmir issue is resolved. The Lahore Declaration
commits both India and Pakistan to abide by the Simla Agreement. And thanks
to some inept handling of negotiations by Mr Jaswant Singh, we came perilously
close to pandering to General Musharraf's claims that Kashmir was the "core
issue" and abandoning all reference to both the Simla Agreement and the
Lahore Declaration at the Agra Summit. After some deft diplomacy by Mr
Vajpayee and Mr Brajesh Mishra, Pakistan faced international isolation
during and after the Kargil conflict, primarily because it violated the
provisions of the Simla Agreement, when its forces crossed the LoC.
The stage is now set for wide-ranging
discussions with Pakistan. It is to the credit of Mr Brajesh Mishra that
the January 6, 2004, declaration not only commits General Musharraf to
prevent territories under Pakistan's control being used for terrorism,
but also resumes the composite dialogue agreed to in the Lahore Declaration.
There has, therefore, been no erosion in our insistence that the provisions
of the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration should be observed. While
the initial discussions will be on nuclear and conventional confidence
building measures, the foreign secretaries are expected to discuss issues
like Jammu and Kashmir. The Lahore Declaration had envisaged a detailed
exchange of information between India and Pakistan on their respective
nuclear doctrines. While India has transparently enunciated its nuclear
doctrine, Pakistan has deliberately chosen to not do so. Ambiguity on this
score enables Pakistan to resort to nuclear blackmail by constantly speaking
of Kashmir as being a "nuclear flashpoint".
The head of Pakistan's Strategic
Forces Command, Lt General Khalid Kidwai, recently spelt out the entirely
India-centric focus of Pakistan's nuclear strategy. New Delhi should seek
clarifications on Mr Kidwai's comments and make it clear that unless Pakistan
clearly enunciated its nuclear doctrine we would regard Mr Kidwai's remarks
as constituting the basis of its nuclear doctrine. Further, while Mr Natwar
Singh's thoughts about having a common nuclear doctrine are obviously unrealisable
for the present, Pakistan and India have worked together in 1998 and 1999
in the United Nations, advocating the de-alerting of nuclear arsenals and
removal of nuclear warheads from missiles globally. A UN resolution cosponsored
by the two countries on this score received widespread support and exposed
the real intentions of other nuclear weapons powers. This common approach
could be revived by the two countries in forums like the NAM and the UN.
During his visit to Pakistan in
1996, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin had advised the Pakistan Senate
that the interests of South Asian states would be best served by concentrating
on economic cooperation, if they found that they were unable to resolve
some of their differences. This has been the model for the steadily improving
ties between Beijing and New Delhi. But it is also a model that General
Musharraf publicly rejected during the Agra Summit. Hence, his rather strong
response to comments by Mr Natwar Singh on the subject. But General Musharraf's
comments on this issue need not deter us from pursuing our own approach
of promoting cooperation, contacts and confidence with Pakistan, even as
we seek to resolve differences on Kashmir. They will inevitably take years
to reconcile and resolve. Apart from implementing proposals like the reopening
of the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad road, it would be helpful if we could move
ahead in promoting discussions between representatives of the peoples of
Kashmir on both sides of the LoC. Sadly, there are no empowered representative
institutions either in PoK or in the so-called Northern areas.
These territories are ruled as virtual
colonies of Islamabad. The Pakistan Government has constantly sought to
change the demographic, ethnic and sectarian composition of PoK and the
Northern areas. A wave of repression has also recently been let loose against
the majority Shia population in the Northern areas. The people of PoK and
Northern areas will have to enjoy a modicum of representative democracy
and autonomy if they are to be credibly represented in any intra-Kashmiri
dialogue. New Delhi should not be shy of raising such issues in the forthcoming
dialogue.
While the UPA Government has spelt
out its diplomatic strategy, the country is still in the dark about how
the Government proposes to deal with ISI sponsored terrorism, not only
across the LoC, but also across the international border and our borders
with Nepal and Bangladesh. Given the relentless American pressure to crack
down militarily on the Al Qaeda along the Afghanistan border General Musharraf
will obviously avoid escalating tensions by stepping up infiltration across
the LoC for the present. One would however like to broadly know what the
Government proposes to do, if emboldened by American indulgence; General
Musharraf chooses to step up infiltration across the LoC after September.
Groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba still remain active in Pakistan and PoK.
There does appear to be an inclination to neither acknowledge nor spell
out how the Government intends to deal with issues of global terrorism-issues
that K Subrahmanyam recently described as resulting from "Saudi Arabian
money, Pakistani (ISI) infrastructure and American indulgence".
