Author: Kaushik Kapisthalam
Publication: United Press International
Date: June 17, 2004
URL: http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20040617-112653-2661r.htm
In a move that went all but unnoticed
by the rest of the world, the People's Republic of China was accepted into
the Nuclear Suppliers Group at a meeting in Sweden at the end of May. The
NSG is an informal cartel made up of 40 nations that work together to coordinate
and control the trade of nuclear reactor technology and 'dual-use' materials.
More specifically, the NSG forbids its members from trading with nations
which do not adopt "full- scope" International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
over their entire nuclear program.
The United States non-proliferation
bureaucracy played an active role in supporting China's bid to join the
NSG. In a hearing on May 18, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told
the House International Relations committee that by the 1990s, China began
"taking a more serious approach to nonproliferation issues" and that the
U.S. began a long-term dialogue with the Asian giant which promised China
more nuclear co- operation in return for stronger export control laws.
Wolf told congressmen that in the
State Department's view, China's progress since then has been sufficient
enough to warrant strong U.S. support for moves like China's joining of
the NSG.
Unfortunately, this a short-sighted
move that once again betrays an unwillingness to learn from history on
the part of American non- proliferation bureaucracy. Just days before it
formally joined the NSG, China finalized a deal with Pakistan to build
a 300 Mega-watt nuclear reactor.
This is especially galling because
China knew that it could not trade nuclear technology with Pakistan after
it joined the group. What makes this more appalling is that China concluded
this hasty deal even as Pakistan's role in the A.Q. Khan nuclear scandal,
which is perhaps the worst nuclear proliferation scandal in history, was
unraveling.
China itself was implicated in the
same scandal with indisputable evidence of its transfer of a nuclear warhead
design, with detailed manufacturing instructions, partly in Chinese, to
Pakistan, in direct violation of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty commitment.
The 25 kiloton Chinese implosion
device design freely circulated within the A.Q. Khan network and there
is no telling which other countries and more ominously, terrorist groups
managed to acquire the warhead design.
Nuclear weapons expert David Albright
has stated that this Chinese bomb design would be ideal for a terrorist
nuke that could fit in a pickup truck. In the wake of this embarrassing
and deadly revelation, one would think that China would be circumspect
in its dealings with its proliferation partner, Pakistan. Instead, China's
decision to conclude a reactor deal with Pakistan now betrays the nation's
lack of respect for multilateral restraint regimes and shows a willingness
to thumb its nose at the rest of the world.
The claim that China started taking
non- proliferation seriously since the 1990s also does not bear scrutiny.
In 1992, the U.S. slapped sanctions on Chinese firms for delivering M-11
ballistic missile components to Pakistan. After a written assurance from
China to stick to Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, the sanctions
were lifted.
Nine months after the waiver, the
Los Angeles Times quoted U.S. intelligence officials as stating that China
had delivered about around 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan through the port
of Karachi, making a mockery of its earlier pledge. In 1996, after obtaining
clear evidence of the sale of 5,000 ring magnets, critical uranium enrichment
components, to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories by the China Nuclear
Energy Industry Corporation, American non- proliferation bureaucrats bailed
out China yet again by refusing to make a "determination" whether China
violated its NPT commitments. For the rest of the world however, the ring
magnets sale was a clear breach of Article III (2) of the NPT.
And there is no sign of improvement
in China's behavior yet. The 2004 Annual report to the Congress by the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes that "Continuing
intelligence reports indicate that Chinese cooperation with Pakistan and
Iran remains an integral element of China's foreign policy."
This view fits in well with the
actual Chinese actions, which are aimed to create nuclear and ballistic
missile armed regional troublemakers like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran
to both keep the U.S. occupied as well as to stymie China's local rivals
like Japan and India, while China builds itself economically. The report
also debunks the notion that the proliferation happens without the knowledge
of top Chinese officials by pointing out many of the proliferating Chinese
companies, which are state owned, have direct ties to top-level government
and military officials.
Former Secretary of State James
A. Baker noted in his memoirs that top Chinese officials partook in the
profits from nuclear and missile proliferation by government owned Chinese
companies.
Another red herring is the issue
of "export controls." State Department officials have prided themselves
in their ability to help China supposedly shore up its export controls
by working with the Asian behemoth to come with lists of what can and cannot
be sold to other nations. But given that government owned companies with
ties to top Chinese officials are the ones proliferating, reducing China's
problems to one of bureaucratic regulations is like working with the mob
to write laws to regulate itself.
Within a totalitarian regime like
China, government laws are meaningless and can be broken if top officials
want to do so. Given this, framing the Chinese proliferation issue as one
of export controls, instead of intent, flies in the face of facts.
By seeing an American willingness
to repeatedly believe their bad-faith promises and eagerness to bail them
out when they renege, Chinese leaders only get to draw one lesson -- that
they can reap the benefits of belonging to multilateral nuclear regimes
while being able to selectively break its commitments with impunity.
In the May 18 Congressional hearing,
Assistant Secretary Wolf told lawmakers that the U.S. has not even seen
the contract that China recently signed with Pakistan. What is the State
Department likely to do should China try to pass more nuclear weapons aid
to Pakistan under the cover of the reactor deal?
Unfortunately, China's entry into
the NSG is likely to turn into a Trojan horse that could only serve to
further undermine global non- proliferation efforts.
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(Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance
commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on
terror and non- proliferation.)
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(United Press International's "Outside
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