Author: G. Parthasarathy
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: June 21, 2004
URL: http://indianexpress.com:8080/full_story.php?content_id=49383
Introduction: Musharraf's challenge:
extremism, sectarianism. And the Pak army
While Pakistan's capital Islamabad
is often described as a city of "bureaucrats, bores and boulevards", the
vibrant port city of Karachi has always prided itself with possessing the
cosmopolitan ambience of Mumbai. And the posh suburb of Clifton, where
the residence of India's Consul General is located next to the luxurious
mansion of the Bhutto family, is regarded as the Malabar Hill of the city.
Clifton is as heavily protected as Raisina Hill in Lutyen's New Delhi.
I still recall the relaxed ambience of the Clifton suburb where I used
to jog past the Bhutto residence followed by two pot-bellied intelligence
sleuths every morning. I was, therefore, shocked to learn on June 10 that
terrorists had ambushed the heavily armed convoy of Karachi's Corps Commander
Lt General Ahsan Saleem Hayat at the very heart of the "high security zone"
in Clifton. The corps commander barely escaped with his life. Seven of
his security guards and his driver were killed. This is the first time
a senior commander of the Pakistan army has been targeted in the heart
of a metropolitan city.
The attack came barely two days
after the Pakistan army commenced a second round of operations against
alleged Al Qaeda terrorists and their Pakistani supporters in the tribal
areas of south Waziristan along the Pakistan- Afghanistan border. These
military operations have been undertaken because of increasing American
pressure on the Pakistan army to "get" Osama bin Laden and his supporters.
They followed military operations in April that had ended in disaster with
scores of Pakistani soldiers being killed. There were reportedly instances
of officers (up to the rank of brigadier) and soldiers refusing to fight
their countrymen merely to please the Americans. With the Pakistan military
now using air power to pummel alleged Al Qaeda strongholds and even the
homes of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, the anger against Musharraf for his
pro-American policies is mounting. These military operations have prompted
the pro-Taliban and pro-Al Qaeda elements within Pakistan to vow revenge
against Musharraf and his colleagues. But interestingly, there have also
been reports suggesting that while the administration and army have acted
against the Al Qaeda and its supporters, the ISI has been in continuing
touch with these elements. Is Musharraf still trying to run with the hare
and hunt with the hounds?
In a press conference just after
he assumed office, Natwar Singh noted that while in India democratically
elected governments based foreign policies on national consensus, the direction
Pakistan's policies had taken in the "War on Terror" had provoked internal
dissent, threatening Musharraf's life. There have been a number of assassination
attempts on Musharraf, who has revealed the involvement of members of the
armed forces in one of them. Musharraf would obviously like to see generals
whom he trusts assume high offices in coming months, as two four star generals,
Mohammed Yusuf Khan and Mohammed Aziz Khan, are scheduled to retire in
October. The favourites are Musharraf's cousin Lt General Shahid Aziz,
who is corps commander in Lahore, and Lt General Salem Hayat in Karachi.
Was the assassination attempt on Lt General Hayat meant to be a signal
to pro-Musharraf officers that they would be targeted? And more importantly,
are there elements in the army who would like to see changes in policy
towards Afghanistan and the Americans?
Evidently, there is increasing discontent
within the Pakistan armed forces on current policies towards the US. Anti-Musharraf
pamphlets are being circulated within the armed forces establishment. There
is evidence of arbitrary arrests of officers whose loyalty and discipline
are suspect. The Pakistan army has encouraged the growth of religiosity
within its ranks from the days of General Zia. The numbers of bearded officers
and men is growing, reflecting societal changes and the growth of Wahhabi
influences within Pakistan. It is acknowledged that the plane crash in
which General Zia died was engineered by Shia technicians of the Pakistan
Air Force. General Zia earned the wrath of the Shias for his partisan approach
that led to sectarian violence, in which Shias were targeted. General Musharraf
was an ardent supporter of the Taliban and not unsympathetic to Osama bin
Laden when Laden set up the "International Islamic Front for Jihad against
Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998 in Kandahar. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba
and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen were encouraged to join bin Laden's Islamic
Front and to propagate the view that "Hindus" and not merely "Jews and
Crusaders," were enemies of Islam. Ever since he was forced by Colin Powell
to turn against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Musharraf has attempted a delicate
balancing act of helping the Americans capture Al Qaeda figures while providing
haven and support to the Taliban leadership and cadres within Pakistan.
That strategy now lies exposed, as the Americans are attempting to force
him to act militarily in south and north Waziristan where the Taliban,
Al Qaeda and elements of the ISI appear to be still hand in glove.
Pakistan is going through troubled
times, with its army divided on the approach towards fundamentalist groups
it had patronised earlier. The army is still a disciplined force that functions
with a clear chain of command. But it remains to be seen how Musharraf
deals with growing signs of unease and discontent within what is the most
pampered institution in Pakistan.
The CIA report entitled "Global
Trends 2015" ominously noted in 2001: "Pakistan will not recover easily
from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics
and ethnic feuds. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the Central
Government's control will probably be reduced to the Punjab heartland and
the economic hub of Karachi". India can only hope that the leadership in
Pakistan will adopt enlightened policies that will enable it to end religious
extremism and sectarianism and make Pakistan a "moderate Islamic State".
This effort would not only require a radical transformation of its internal
polity, but also its approach to its neighbours and the world. A "moderate
Islamic State" cannot afford to use jihad and militant Islam as instruments
of foreign policy. It also cannot afford to just curb groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammed
that threaten internal stability, while giving others like the Lashkar-e-Toiba
a free hand to wage jihad in Jammu & Kashmir and elsewhere in India.
