Author:
Publication: Rediff on Net
Date: June 4, 2004
URL: http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/jun/04inter1.htm
Lieutenant General (retired) Kuldip
Singh Brar commanded Operation Bluestar 20 years ago, when the Indian Army
entered the Golden Temple to remove the terrorists who had turned the Sikhs'
holiest shrine into a private bunker. It was one of the Indian Army's most
difficult operations, and undoubtedly the most controversial.
In the second part of a four-part
interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji, General Brar
looks back at the compulsions that forced him to send his men into the
Temple:
Q.: Were you given a timeframe within
which to act?
A.: The fastest possible. When
I met my CO [commanding officer] Lieutenant General K Sundarji [then General
Officer Commanding, Western Command; he later became Chief of Army Staff]
at Chandimandir [in Chandigarh], he told me he would fly down in 48 hours
to hear my first briefing. Time was at a premium.
So we moved all night and got our
forces into Amritsar and then the Temple.
Q.: What about a siege to flush
out the militants?
A.: A siege is easily spoken of.
A siege is only effective when you are able to make the people under siege
unable to continue to stay under siege. That means they have no water,
no food, no electricity, no ammunition and are forced to surrender or to
capitulate.
But, in the Golden Temple, there
is no shortage of water. There are any number of wells; besides there is
the Sarovar [the Holy Lake on the premises of the Temple]. There are a
number of generators. There is no shortage of food -- every day, thousands
of devotees flock to the Temple bringing with them food and provisions,
so there is enough food to feed a few hundreds of thousands of people for
over a month [food is served free of cost to the devotees every day in
the Golden Temple; this food is made from offerings by the devotees], and
here we are talking of forcing the hand of a few thousands.
The other problem of a siege was
that, once laid, word would have spread to the hinterland within 24 hours.
Every villager in Punjab would be told the Golden Temple was under siege.
In those days, every rumour or fact was exaggerated; such messages are
sent out emotionally, thus surcharging the atmosphere. People would have
picked up their swords or lances and hundreds of thousands would have converged
on Amritsar and the Golden Temple and besieged the army that was besieging
the Temple! We can't fire at these people, and we can't surrender, so what
are we to do? We didn't want such a situation to arise.
After asking the militants to surrender
[on June 5], we waited and waited. It soon became 8 o'clock, then 9 o'clock
and was nearing 10 o'clock. We were worried. We had to finish the operation
before dawn [around 5.30 am] for fear of mobs amassing around the Temple.
The news would spread fast that we hadn't cleared out the militants, then
we would be under siege. People must understand these things.
It is very easy to say to we could
have laid siege, we could have postponed it for a day or two, or carried
out the operation without the loss of life. It is only we, who were there
at that time, who know what our limitations and needs were. Our soldiers
went into what you would call a death trap. They had no cover, they were
out in the open [when moving from the entrances to the various rooms and
sections where the militants were hiding]; in contrast, the militants had
barricaded every window and were heavily armed.
Q.: So ultimately you had to finish
off the operation in 48 hours, because you feared Pakistan coming in?
A.: That was the biggest fear.
It had to be a surgical operation and one that caused the minimum damage
with least loss of blood but it had to be as quick as possible because
once word got around, there would have been a flood of people. like the
Brahmaputra. When the Brahmaputra floods, there is nothing you can do.
No amount of sandbags can stop the flood.
Q.: What about the innocent pilgrims
inside?
A.: We were to go in at 7 pm [on
June 5]. Since afternoon, we used the public address system to keep asking
those who were inside to surrender. We told them we don't want to come
in, we pointed out that there were pilgrims inside, there were women and
children inside, and we told the militants that if they want to fight it
out, do so but for God's sake to at least send the pilgrims, the old, the
young, out safely. But until 7 pm, nothing happened.
I asked the police if they could
send emissaries inside to help get the innocent people out, but the police
said that anyone sent inside would not come out again. They said the militants
were no doubt keeping the pilgrims as a sort of trump card, believing their
presence would stop the army from coming in. Eventually, about 100 sick
and old people were let out, but not the rest. They told us the others
were not being allowed to come out.
I feel sorry for the innocent people
who died in the crossfire.
Q.: In the fight, you were dealing
with a former superior, Major General [retired] Shahbeg Singh [a highly
decorated army officer who, after being dismissed from service for financial
irregularities, became a close accomplice of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale].
A.: Yes, and he knew something
was up because the day before, I had walked around the Golden Temple in
civilian clothes and seen the militants and the barricades. And he saw
me taking my rounds so he knew something was up. We had gone into Bangladesh
together.
Q.: Was he a formidable enemy?
A.: He was a very seasoned soldier
who won the Mahavir Chakra [India's second highest bravery award in war]
in 1971, who had to leave the army for whatever reason. He was a highly
emotional person and had joined with Bhindranwale. Perhaps he believed
that with the pilgrims inside, the Indian Army would not come in but he
never realised there is always a limit to how much any country can take.
Q.: How difficult was the operation?
A.: It was in the middle of the
night. One cannot see and one is out in the open and under fire from the
militants holed up behind barricades. Plus I was constantly screaming at
the men inside that come what may, they were not to fire in the direction
of the Harmindar Sahib [the sanctum sanctorum where the Sikh holy book,
the Guru Granth Sahib, is kept during the day] and that even if there was
fire from that side they were not to return fire. Later, there were a couple
of bullet holes in the Harmindar Sahib, which could have been the militants'
fire or odd stray fire from the soldiers. Otherwise there was no damage
to the Harmindar Sahib.
Even at the Akal Takht [seen above],
there would have been no damage. Our soldiers tried to lob stun grenades
[which release gas that momentarily stuns people without causing any collateral
damage]. But the Akal Takht was completely sealed and there was no way
to lob the stun grenades inside. And when our soldiers were crawling towards
the Akal Takht for some commandos to get in, they were being mowed down
by enemy fire. They were being killed by the dozen, it was a terrible sight.
As you know Bhindranwale had shifted
to the first floor of the Akal Takht. How did the Sikhs allow that? It
was against the religion's tenets. The Akal Takht is where the Guru Granth
Sahib [the Sikh holy book] is kept at night after being taken from the
Harmindar Sahib. No one is allowed to stay above the Guru Granth Sahib,
but Bhindranwale and his immediate accomplices were living on the Akal
Takht's first floor.
The members of the SGPC [the Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee which has managerial control of the Golden
Temple and other gurdwaras in India] were living elsewhere in the Temple.
They had long lost control of the situation and had no say in what was
happening. The writ of Bhindrawale ran not just in the Golden Temple or
in Amritsar but throughout Punjab.
Q.: Why were the tanks brought in?
A.: Tanks were brought in late
to illuminate the Akal Takht, so that the soldiers could see where they
were going and to momentarily blind the militants in the glare of the lights.
Those who have seen these huge halogen lights know these lights fuse in
20, 30 seconds, so the tanks had to keep going in and coming out. It was
not an easy task at all.
