Author: Sudip Talukdar
Publication: The Times of India
Date: July 21, 2004
Lieutenant General K.S. Brar commanded
the forces during Operation Blue Star two decades ago. He spoke to Sudip
Talukdar about the harrowing event and how it was unavoidable under the
circumstances, besides the root causes of terrorism in the country.
How do you look back on Operation
Blue Star, described by many as the most traumatic military operation in
India, now?
I still retain the same feelings
I had when I was assigned the task of clearing the Golden Temple of militants
20 years ago. Even though the inevitability of the military operation saddened
me, I drew consolation from the fact that it had restored the sanctity
of the shrine, after its desecration by militants who had not only entrenched
themselves within the hallowed premises, but also converted it into a fortress
and resorted to ruthless killings. The state exercised the military option
as the last resort and only after law and order had completely broken down
in Punjab. Having pledged to defend the nation against aggression and internal
strife, the question of caste, creed or religion among our soldiers did
not arise in the context of preserving the nation's integrity.
Critics tend to compare the 'failure'
of Blue Star with the 'success' of Black Thunder. How far is the perception
correct?
Blue Star was launched against more
than 2,000 hardcore and heavily-armed militants who had converted the holy
shrine into a bastion, besides the motivation and charisma provided to
them by the presence of Bhindranwale, who had begun to be venerated as
a saint by his followers. His military advisors like General Shabeg Singh
were determined to fight to the finish and resist any attempt to dislodge
them. Notwithstanding the success of Black Thunder, the fact remains that
there was no opposition or resistance offered by militants. The precedent
on forcible entry had already been established. There were also no leaders
of Bhindranwale's calibre to direct them. Nor were they prepared to attain
martyrdom as in the case of Blue Star. Any comparisons between the two
would be illogical and unjustified.
Why did you decide to write about
Operation Blue Star?
Soon after the event, a number of
books appeared on the stands, but I found them biased and based on hearsay,
as none of these writers had actually witnessed the military operation
or events as they unfolded. I felt it my moral duty to author Operation
Blue Star for providing a first-hand perspective and setting the record
straight. I received many letters of appreciation, but some were admittedly
critical. A Sikh intellectual from Canada, after perusing my book, wrote
back suggesting that it should be made accessible to the large Sikh populace
of the US and Canada in Gurmukhi, as they were unable to follow English.
Consequently, the vernacular version
did very well overseas and also in Punjab after publication. It removed
many misgivings from the minds of Sikhs and ran into a number of reprints.
What are the root causes of insurgency
and terrorism plaguing India for decades?
There are any number of motivating
factors which have given birth to terrorism and insurgency. For instance,
ethnically-rooted separatist movements such as those prevailing in Nagaland,
Manipur, Mizoram and Assam, besides the event in Punjab during the 1980s.
The more dangerous factor is that of religious extremism and fundamentalism.
There are occasions where two motivating factors go hand in hand such as
were the aspirations of Sikh militants for an independent Khalistan and
in Kashmir, wherein a mix of religious extremism and ethno-cultural identity
of the Kashmiris resulted in creating a cycle of mayhem and violence. In
both the latter cases, Pakistan can be held largely responsible for covert
and overt support provided to militancy inside Indian territories.
Was Kargil a failure of political
will or of military leadership or both?
It would be unfair to blame either
of them. One thing that stands out clearly is the failure of intelligence
agencies run by the military, Central and state governments, to have foreseen
Pakistan's intentions, and in timely detection of armed infiltration fairly
deep into Indian soil. However, the response and valour of our troops was
commendable. A number of remedial steps have been taken on the basis of
the findings of K Subrahmanyam panel.
Are joint military exercises with
the US desirable as India is required to share vital insights, lessons
and tactics, derived from years of experience in counter-insurgency and
terrorism, without corresponding gains, as some commentators believe?
There are many areas of US experience
which have provided us with vital insights, during such exercises. I feel
joint exercises with all friendly countries are desirable. Besides, it
would be incorrect to assume that we are not reaping any benefits from
the lessons and modern battlefield technology acquired in return.
Has the political establishment
learnt any lesson from the number of wars fought with our neighbours?
I would be surprised if the political
establishment were not to have learnt any lessons from the number of wars
fought with our neighbours. We can only hope that we derive benefits from
lessons learnt so that the well-being and sovereignty of the country is
taken care of in future wars.
