Author: Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: September 22, 2004
URL: http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1018816,00120001.htm
The Beslan school siege has created
panic among Indian security officials who fear that a terrorist group could
carry out a copycat attack in India. It is noteworthy that the Chechen
separatists had planned their attack meticulously months in advance. They
came to know that the gymnasium's floor was to be relaid during the school's
summer holidays. They disguised themselves as construction workers, and
hidden within supplies of planks and cement, stashed vast quantities of
arms and ammunition, explosives, food supplies, medical kits, gas masks
and communications sets under the wooden floor. When they assaulted the
school on September 1, they pried open the wooden floor to retrieve their
stash of arms and explosives. A similar procedure of smuggling in supplies
for a long siege while disguised as construction workers had been followed
by the Chechen separatists who had seized a Moscow theatre in October 2002.
With all the refurbishing of bungalows
going on in Delhi for both new and outgoing ministers, as well as construction
of flyovers and the Metro, hundreds of similar bombs could be laid unobtrusively
now, deep under bungalow floors, road surfaces, or inside the Metro's columns
or tunnels, for detonation months later. The explosive used in the assassination
of the then Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov, on May 9, 2004, in a Grozny
stadium was an artillery shell, easily available from any Indian munitions
depot or firing range. Significantly, even deep search metal detectors
(of the kind used to sanitise the routes of Indian VIPs) did not detect
it as it had been buried too far deep inside the concrete during construction.
But terrorist groups within India
use explosives far more advanced than the artillery shell used in Grozny.
The latest generation of plastic explosives - such as cyclo-tri-methylene-tri-nitro-amine,
penta-erythritol-tetra-nitrate, cyclo-tetra-methylene-tetra-amine, and
ethylene-di-amine-di-nitrate - are almost impossible to detect. They look
and feel like children's plasticine and can be easily moulded into any
shape. Construction workers refurbishing ministerial bungalows could unobtrusively
place them deep within fittings and furnishings or walls and ceilings.
Any competent chemist could manufacture
these plastic explosives in a makeshift laboratory by reacting vegetable
oils or fruit essences with nitric acid. They only need a small electric
current to detonate them. This current was supplied in the Grozny stadium
by having the wires going into the concrete block disguised as ordinary
lighting or telecom wires. The assassins had embedded long-life batteries,
together with a timer, in the concrete, since the exact moment when Kadyrov
would view the Victory Day celebrations was publicly known months in advance.
The use of physical wires also circumvented the electromagnetic jammers
that are usually used to protect VIPs from remotely detonated bombs, such
as those triggered by cellular phones.
The attack on N. Chandrababu Naidu
by the PWG at Tirupati on October 1, 2003, is a prime example of
precise long-term planning. The PWG used World War II-vintage low-technology
appropriately. It did not use either remote-triggers which could be jammed
by electromagnetic jammers, nor timers which would require precise forecasting
of the exact second when Naidu's convoy would pass by.
Significantly, even the deep search
metal detectors used to survey Naidu's route failed to detect the gelatin
Claymore mines packed with metal shrapnel. Nor did sniffer dogs, who had
searched Naidu's entire route for several hours, manage to detect them.
An indicator of the PWG's meticulousness was that the Claymores had been
planted at least two months prior to the attack, and thick grass had grown
over them. The PWG managed to dig up the earth from behind without disturbing
the stone formation on the embankment at all and place the mines inside.
Again, the outfit knew months in advance that Naidu would be travelling
on that road on October 1 to attend an annual religious function.
Naidu survived only because the
Claymores were planted horizontally perpendicular to the road on embankments,
and his Level-3 bulletproof Ambassador withstood the sideways blasts. But
whereas the shells of such cars are heavily armoured with steel plates,
their undersides continue to be practically unprotected. If the PWG had
used a mine or explosive planted underneath the road surface - as the militants
in Kashmir do - Naidu may not have been so lucky. PWG units in tribal areas
of Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh also possess similar expertise in
land mines. Tamil Nadu's ban on the PWG could instigate it into carrying
out further attacks.
It would be almost impossible for
Delhi police to monitor the movements of every construction worker in ministerial
buildings, or flyovers or the Metro. The Beslan terrorists succeeded in
sneaking in their arms only 200 metres from police headquarters. The attack
on Pervez Musharraf at a bridge in Rawal-pindi on December 14, 2003, clearly
proved that terrorists could plant bombs in full public view on busy streets
without arousing suspicion.
Another likely threat is that Islamic
militant groups inspired by Jemaah Islamiah's bombings in Indonesia may
carry out copycat bombings in discotheques and pubs frequented by westerners.
Since hotels rarely frisk their visitors, it would be easy for a suicide
bomber wearing a belt of plastic explosives to enter such pubs and discotheques
and trigger off an explosion using cellular phones.
Often, terrorists can cause greater
disruption by making VIPs ill and unable to attend to their duties rather
than by assassinating them outright. Workers refurbishing ministerial bungalows
could unobtrusively place radioactive substances like Cobalt 60 or Cesium
137 within beds or sofa sets. These could cause the VIPs to develop cancer
within a few weeks. Security agencies would have to frequently sweep the
offices and homes of VIPs with Geiger Mueller counters to detect such radioactive
sources.
The Chechen attacks have driven
home to Indian security officials that they will now have to continuously
monitor the construction and electrical and telecom wiring of all buildings
and roads and bridges likely to be inaugurated or used by VIPs. Merely
combing the building a few days before the VIP's visit will not be sufficient
since explosives could be embedded deep within the flooring or foundation
or walls or ceiling. Architects and interior decorators will have to invent
new designs and construction methods to take into account such assassination
techniques.
The writer heads a group on C4ISRT
(Command, Control, Communications and Computers Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance and Targeting) in South Asia