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Rust never sleeps

Rust never sleeps

Author: Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: September 22, 2004
URL: http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1018816,00120001.htm

The Beslan school siege has created panic among Indian security officials who fear that a terrorist group could carry out a copycat attack in India. It is noteworthy that the Chechen separatists had planned their attack meticulously months in advance. They came to know that the gymnasium's floor was to be relaid during the school's summer holidays. They disguised themselves as construction workers, and hidden within supplies of planks and cement, stashed vast quantities of arms and ammunition, explosives, food supplies, medical kits, gas masks and communications sets under the wooden floor. When they assaulted the school on September 1, they pried open the wooden floor to retrieve their stash of arms and explosives. A similar procedure of smuggling in supplies for a long siege while disguised as construction workers had been followed by the Chechen separatists who had seized a Moscow theatre in October 2002.

With all the refurbishing of bungalows going on in Delhi for both new and outgoing ministers, as well as construction of flyovers and the Metro, hundreds of similar bombs could be laid unobtrusively now, deep under bungalow floors, road surfaces, or inside the Metro's columns or tunnels, for detonation months later. The explosive used in the assassination of the then Chechen president, Akhmad Kadyrov, on May 9, 2004, in a Grozny stadium was an artillery shell, easily available from any Indian munitions depot or firing range. Significantly, even deep search metal detectors (of the kind used to sanitise the routes of Indian VIPs) did not detect it as it had been buried too far deep inside the concrete during construction.

But terrorist groups within India use explosives far more advanced than the artillery shell used in Grozny. The latest generation of plastic explosives - such as cyclo-tri-methylene-tri-nitro-amine, penta-erythritol-tetra-nitrate, cyclo-tetra-methylene-tetra-amine, and ethylene-di-amine-di-nitrate - are almost impossible to detect. They look and feel like children's plasticine and can be easily moulded into any shape. Construction workers refurbishing ministerial bungalows could unobtrusively place them deep within fittings and furnishings or walls and ceilings.

Any competent chemist could manufacture these plastic explosives in a makeshift laboratory by reacting vegetable oils or fruit essences with nitric acid. They only need a small electric current to detonate them. This current was supplied in the Grozny stadium by having the wires going into the concrete block disguised as ordinary lighting or telecom wires. The assassins had embedded long-life batteries, together with a timer, in the concrete, since the exact moment when Kadyrov would view the Victory Day celebrations was publicly known months in advance. The use of physical wires also circumvented the electromagnetic jammers that are usually used to protect VIPs from remotely detonated bombs, such as those triggered by cellular phones.

The attack on N. Chandrababu Naidu by the PWG at Tirupati on  October 1, 2003, is a prime example of precise long-term planning. The PWG used World War II-vintage low-technology appropriately. It did not use either remote-triggers which could be jammed by electromagnetic jammers, nor timers which would require precise forecasting of the exact second when Naidu's convoy would pass by.

Significantly, even the deep search metal detectors used to survey Naidu's route failed to detect the gelatin Claymore mines packed with metal shrapnel. Nor did sniffer dogs, who had searched Naidu's entire route for several hours, manage to detect them. An indicator of the PWG's meticulousness was that the Claymores had been planted at least two months prior to the attack, and thick grass had grown over them. The PWG managed to dig up the earth from behind without disturbing the stone formation on the embankment at all and place the mines inside. Again, the outfit knew months in advance that Naidu would be travelling on that road on October 1 to attend an annual religious function.

Naidu survived only because the Claymores were planted horizontally perpendicular to the road on embankments, and his Level-3 bulletproof Ambassador withstood the sideways blasts. But whereas the shells of such cars are heavily armoured with steel plates, their undersides continue to be practically unprotected. If the PWG had used a mine or explosive planted underneath the road surface - as the militants in Kashmir do - Naidu may not have been so lucky. PWG units in tribal areas of Orissa, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh also possess similar expertise in land mines. Tamil Nadu's ban on the PWG could instigate it into carrying out further attacks.

It would be almost impossible for Delhi police to monitor the movements of every construction worker in ministerial buildings, or flyovers or the Metro. The Beslan terrorists succeeded in sneaking in their arms only 200 metres from police headquarters. The attack on Pervez Musharraf at a bridge in Rawal-pindi on December 14, 2003, clearly proved that terrorists could plant bombs in full public view on busy streets without arousing suspicion.

Another likely threat is that Islamic militant groups inspired by Jemaah Islamiah's bombings in Indonesia may carry out copycat bombings in discotheques and pubs frequented by westerners. Since hotels rarely frisk their visitors, it would be easy for a suicide bomber wearing a belt of plastic explosives to enter such pubs and discotheques and trigger off an explosion using cellular phones.

Often, terrorists can cause greater disruption by making VIPs ill and unable to attend to their duties rather than by assassinating them outright. Workers refurbishing ministerial bungalows could unobtrusively place radioactive substances like Cobalt 60 or Cesium 137 within beds or sofa sets. These could cause the VIPs to develop cancer within a few weeks. Security agencies would have to frequently sweep the offices and homes of VIPs with Geiger Mueller counters to detect such radioactive sources.

The Chechen attacks have driven home to Indian security officials that they will now have to continuously monitor the construction and electrical and telecom wiring of all buildings and roads and bridges  likely to be inaugurated or used by VIPs. Merely combing the building a few days before the VIP's visit will not be sufficient since explosives could be embedded deep within the flooring or foundation or walls or ceiling. Architects and interior decorators will have to invent new designs and construction methods to take into account such assassination techniques.

The writer heads a group on C4ISRT (Command, Control, Communications and Computers Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting) in South Asia
 


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